



UNIVERZITA PAVLA JOZEFA ŠAFÁRIKA  
v Košiciach

**FAKULTA VEREJNEJ SPRÁVY**

**1/20**  
**23**  
ročník XXIV.

ISSN 2453-9236

# VEREJNÁ SPRÁVA A SPOLOČNOSŤ

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  
AND SOCIETY



**VEREJNÁ SPRÁVA**

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**SPOLOČNOSŤ**

**PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

**AND SOCIETY**

**Open Access:**



**Indexovaný v:/Indexed in:**



**1/2023**

**ročník XXIV.**

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ISSN 2453-9236 (online)

<https://doi.org/10.33542/VSS2023-1-0>



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**VEDECKÉ PRÁCE**

# The Municipality Rulemaking Problem and the Position and Competences of the Local Self- Governing Bodies

Júlia Ondrová, Michal Úradník

<https://doi.org/10.33542/VSS2023-1-1>

## Abstract

*On the base of the legal regulation interpretation, the authors have provided the analyses of the stated limits that are given to the local self- governing rulemaking activities. Particularly, the attention has been given to the legal proceeding concerning the congruence of the assessment of the local self-governing generally binding legal regulations delivered by the municipalities and the higher territorial unit. Based on the syntheses of the essential data, the authors try to highlight the probable problems that might occur in the applicable practice caused by the absence of the legislative consistency. At present the comparative evidence is equally given by the absence of the local self- governing powers to initiate a procedure by means of the communal constitution complaint as regards the legal regulations compliance by the Slovak Republic Constitution Court.*

**Key words:** *local self-governing, rulemaking, proceeding, communal constitution complaint.*

## Introduction

By Article 64 and consequently by the Slovak Republic Constitution, the municipality is the core basis of the territorial self-governing. In the Slovak Republic, the local self-governing is created by the municipality and the higher territorial unit, and they both stand for the territorial self-governing and the local self-governing entities gathering all people who have the permanent residence in their localities. It should be pointed out that both of them have an equal posture the municipality, and the higher territorial unit as well. In relation towards municipalities the higher territorial unit, in other words the local self-governing region, constitutes the public corporation of the higher territorial self-governing level. It should be furthermore underlined that its responsibility for the maintenance rests in such areas which are not capable to be maintained by an individual municipality or by the inter-municipal cooperation, and if the maintenance is more advantageous to be provided by the higher territorial unit. Therefore, the higher territorial unit serves as a kind of the intermediate stage in the territorial organization of the public administration. However, on the other hand, the significant coordination functions fulfilment does not mean that the higher territorial unit administrative position creates the reasons for its directive supremacy over all municipalities (Jesenko 2017, p. 21).

In spite of the fact that the territorial self-governing does not fulfil the criteria bound to the executive, legal and legislative powers, it should be underlined that the existence of the

territorial self-governing is caused by the state own self-limitations pro bono the territorial corporation. Within the tripartite distribution of power, the territorial self-governing must be understood as an institute defined as a unique type of power penetrating into all of the other parts of power. The mentioned definition of the territorial self-governing affirms the reality that the self-governing has been established under the state conditions and the representative democracy (Trellová 2018, p. 61, Ondrová 2020, p. 6), anyway it must be highlighted that the local self-governing fulfills the significant and challenging tasks. Exempli causa, the municipality provides the construction and maintenance of the local communication means and all the public places, cultural, sport and further public areas and zones. Besides that, the municipalities participate in the protection of cultural memorials. Besides that, they are looking after the environmental care and the healthy human living conditions. Moreover, the municipalities organize the local referendum and many other activities connected with the everyday municipality life. Further on, they provide rulemaking activities and issuing the generally binding regulations.

### **1. The Local Self-Governing Rulemaking Activities**

The municipalities and the higher territorial unit rulemaking activity is one of the essential powers defined by the Slovak Republic Constitution legislative foundations. By Article 68 of the Constitution the local self-governing bodies are authorized to make the so-called original ruling regulations concerning the local territorial administration matters, and besides that to maintain the obligations that are authorized to them by law. The legal adjustment stated by the Constitution indirectly includes the existence of a certain legal authorization preconditions, even if it does not mean the explicit empowerment, and thus enabling the local self-governing bodies to deliver the generally binding regulations regarding the fulfillment of the execution of their obligations in a definite area (Article 71 paragraph 2 of the Constitution). In these cases, the rulemaking activity of the municipality and the higher territorial unit is implemented on the base of law and within its limits. In abstracto, the original generally binding regulations represent a certain kind of the legal authorization of the lower legal power enabling municipalities and the higher territorial units to exercise powers authorized them by the given legal regulations (Sotolář 1996, p. 21). As an example, it might serve the Act No. 582/2004 as amended on the local taxes and fees regarding the communal waste and the small construction waste valid for the stating the taxable amount and the rate amount together with the affirmation of the payment methods. In this way the municipalities are obliged to lay down the needed generally bounding regulations (Kubincová 2019, Kubincová – Jamrichová 2022, Úradník, 2020). The Slovak Republic Constitution Court in its court finding No. p. II. US 362/2019 April 2<sup>nd</sup> 2020 judicated that according to the enactment No.59 paragraph 2 of the Constitution, the constitution fuse is applied in order to hamper the executive power to implement tax and any other charging obligations to natural persons and legal entities on the base of their own



discretion. The authorization of such obligations is unquestionably the privilege that is granted to the legislative power, and that 'why such an authorization can be only provided by Act based on the law.

The second type of the generally binding regulations is adjusted by Article 71 permitting to confer some specific duties to be exercised by municipalities or the higher territorial units. As regards the execution of the state administration, the municipality and the higher territorial unit are allowed to deliver the generally binding regulations but only within their own local territory and only in case if it is authorized by law and within its exact definition. Consequently, the municipalities and the local territorial units are allowed to make the generally binding regulations, but only on the base of the expressly authorized by law and strictly within its force as it defined by the derivative regulations in the Article 71 paragraph 2 of the Constitution.

By the legal opinion of the Slovak Republic Constitution Court based on the finding No. p. III US 1/2000 published 25<sup>th</sup> May 2000, the general binding regulation represents the normative and legal act containing the legal norms, that means the obligation behavior code imposing duties and conferred rights. Therefore, it cannot be understood only as the informative resource, but primarily it has to be comprehended as a normative document.

That 'why, in the Slovak Republic the generally binding regulations have their place among the formal law sources and their contents create the legal norm bound for all natural persons and the legal entities having the residence on the territory of a definite municipality or the higher territorial unit. Besides that, with what was said, the certain basic legal norms characteristics are connected with it, more precisely speaking, they contain their legal obligatoriness and the general validity accompanied by the material, temporal, territorial and personal competences. Moreover, the validity of the local self-governing legal norm is of a fundamental character but only after fulfilling the delivering of the generally binding regulation's full wording, and consequently its coming into force (Jesenko 2017, pp. 105-107). More precisely said, the generally binding regulation becomes valid only after being placed on the official notice board and its becoming in force, usually after expiring a certain period of time covering more or less at least 15 days since its turn out to be public.

In conclusion of what was said, it must be necessary to draw attention to the fact that the constitution imperative is equally obligatory for the rulemaking activities of the local self - governing as it is stated by Article 2 paragraph 2 of the Constitution. It declares that all state bodies can only act on the base of the Constitution, within its bounds and contents, respecting the ways of procedures which are stated by law. The Slovak Republic Constitution Court in its finding No. p. I. US 53/2000 dated 25<sup>th</sup> April 2002 emphasized that the extent of the original rulemaking activities of the municipality and the higher territorial unit even in connection with their exercised rulemaking activities have to follow their conferred authorization delegated to them by the state administration which must be always based on respecting the basic human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, and that is the constitution imperative which must be valid and esteem by all levels of the local self-governing.

Therefore, the regulations of all sociable relations occurred in their localities cannot be provided and regulated only by municipality or the higher local territorial unit. according to the Article 152 paragraph 4 of the Constitution: “*The Commentary and the exercising of the constitutional acts, acts and other generally binding legal regulations must be in accord with the Constitution.*” It means that the Constitution does not authorize municipalities and the higher territorial units to exercise an absolute limitless rulemaking power, it can be executed only within the scope of the implemented obligations which are delegated to the local self-governing according to the Article 65 of the Constitution. Beyond the stated constitution provision, the local self-governing can regulate only some public relations by the generally binding regulation. More precisely said, there are only those ones which are allowed to be provided by the legislator expressed authorization as regards the rulemaking activity made by the territorial self-governing.

Besides that, theory and practice are consistent concerning the exercising the municipality powers by the generally binding regulations to modify the social relations which until now have not been adjusted by the legal regulations. But on the other hand, as it has been already mentioned, certain limits must be respected as it is declared by the Slovak Republic Constitution Court in their finding No. p. II. US 19/97 dated 13<sup>th</sup> May 1997. Here it is underlined that the municipality position as a legal entity is prohibited to restrict the fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. If the local self-governing body set up conditions restricting the basic human rights and freedoms by the generally binding regulation, then it is not only beyond the limits of Article 68 and 71 of the Constitution, but at the same time such an application of the rulemaking is in contradiction with Article 2 paragraph 3 and Article 13 paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Constitution. The argument rests in the fact that the generally binding regulation is not permissible to amend issues that can be regulated only by the Constitution.

## **2. Research of the General Binding Regulation**

In case, when the municipality or the territorial self-governing unit generally binding regulation displays the evidence of its inadequacies, e. g. the infringement of the fundamental human rights and freedoms, or if it is in contradiction with the legal regulation of the higher legal power, then as a result of these inadequacies the several legal institutes come into the effect.

The first one of them is the prosecutor protest. After the submission of protest the prosecutor applies the control concerning the respecting of laws and any other generally binding legal regulations released by the public administration bodies. According to the Act on prosecution § 23 section. 1 Act No. 153/2001 Coll. as amended (further on used only Act No. 153/2001 Coll.), the prosecutor is justified to submit the protest under the condition when the local self-governing bodies generally binding legal regulations are against the law. Proceedings regarding the prosecuting attorney protest is arbitrated in cases when the law infringement was made by the generally binding legal regulation or if any other generally binding legal regulation had been violated. In case when the

municipality or the higher territorial unit accepts the justification of the prosecuting attorney protest, then it is obligatory without any needless delay, at least up to 90 days from delivery of the prosecutor protest to annul the generally binding regulation, or according to the nature of the matter, it must be replaced by another generally binding regulation which will be in accordance with law, or eventually likewise with other generally binding rulings. Concerning the justification of the protest regarding the generally binding regulation, its canceling or amending or the failure to comply with the prosecutor protest, the municipality or the higher territorial unit are notified about the mentioned facts and the time of improvement, and that is usually 90 days after the delivery of the protest.

In case when the municipality or the higher territorial unit do not comply with the filed protest, then the prosecuting attorney is justified to lay down the lawsuit to the regional court as it is declared by § 6 section 2 letter h) Act No. 162/2015 Coll. (further on used only Act No. 162/2015 Coll.), following the valid wording of the Administrative Court Order. By laying down the lawsuit the prosecutor initiates the proceeding of the generally binding regulation made by the municipality, city, city district or the autonomous region with the law compliance, government authorization compliance, and the compliance with the ministries generally obliged legal rulings and other state administration official central bodies. By § 357 Act No.162/2015 Coll., the procedure in matters, such as the breaking of public interest concerning the environmental area where the public is interested, the prosecuting attorney is likewise justified to require the regional court to pronounce the verdict on the discrepancy of the generally binding regulation delivered by the municipality, respectively by the higher territorial unit. By the procedure following the Aarhus agreement as well, it concerns the following cases:

- a) whether the local territorial self-governing is in concord with law,
- b) if the duties fulfillment of the state administration are in accordance with law, government regulations, and with the ministries generally binding regulations and other official central bodies of the state administration.

What 'more, the objectionable discrepancy can rest not only in the contents of the generally binding regulation, but it might be occurred in breaking its procedure just at the beginning of its acceptance. The lawsuit in question stands for the second legal institute providing the foundations for the investigation of the generally binding regulation.

In case when the regional court declared that there is a discrepancy between the general binding regulation of the local self-governing and law, or in case of the state administration obligations accomplishment is found out the contradiction with the government enactment, or if there is a contradiction with the generally binding legal regulations delivered by ministries or any other central state administration bodies, then the general binding regulation lost its force as a whole or in some of its enactments, respectively in one of its parts. The court verdict becomes in force since the time when the court judgement has been pronounced. The

municipality, which has made such a generally binding regulation, is obliged to furnish its contents in such a way as to be in accordance with the objected legal regulation up to the time of six months since the court decision force pronouncement. If the municipality in question has not apply the mentioned objections, then the generally binding regulation or one of its parts or some of its enactments lost their validity after the time of six months when the proclaimed court authorization became in force. The mentioned provision is equally valid for the generally binding regulations released by the higher territorial unit.

The third tool rests in the generally binding regulation examination by the Slovak Republic Court proceeding as it is stated by Article 125 paragraph 1 letter c) and d) of the Constitution. Within the sense of the stated Constitution Article, the Slovak Republic Constitution decide on the compliance of the original generally binding regulation with the Constitution, or with the constitution acts, and the international agreements approved by the Slovak Republic National Council having been ratified and declared by means as it stated by law and laws, but only in case when there are not judged by any other court. Concerning the derivative provisions, the Constitution Court resolves likewise on their compliance with the governmental rulings and the generally binding ministries legal rulings, and accordingly with other central official administrative bodies in case if any other court does not resolve otherwise.

Considering the subject proceeding specification at the Constitution Court stated by Article 125 paragraph 1 letter c) and d) of the Constitution and in connection with the pronouncement „*if they are not judged by any other court*”, we can consider the justified question if it is at all necessary to judge the compliance of the generally binding regulations made by the local self-governing bodies, e. g. with acts, respectively any other legal regulation of the lower legal power. The raised question comes out from the mutual overlap of the proceeded subject in this area. The Slovak Republic Constitution Court as well as the regional court (§ 357 Act No. 162/2015 Coll.) can examine the compliance of the generally binding regulation released by the municipality or the higher territorial unit with laws and other legislative rules of the lower legal power. In this connection, the authors express the reasonable conviction concerning a certain legal duplicity of the legal amendment, and that's way it calls for the more precise investigation.

Proceeding on the compliance of the generally binding regulation adjudicated by the regional court was included among the special proceedings of the administrative justice having been already in force since the 15<sup>th</sup> of October 2008 by means of the amendment to Act No. 99/1963 Coll., The Civil Procedure Code (further on Act No 99/1963 Coll.) provided by Act No. 384/2008 Coll., at that time, the authorized provision § 250zfa Act No. 99/196 3 Coll., was based on the above-mentioned Article 125 paragraph 1 letter c) and d) of the Constitution. By this it was constituted the alternative rested in the fact that the compliance of the rulemaking activities provided by the municipality and the higher territorial unit have been able to be

adjudicated not only by the Constitution Court but likewise by the general court, in this case it was the regional court (§ 250zfa paragraph. 3 Act No. 99/1963 Coll.). According to the explanatory report accompanied to the Act No. 384/2008 Coll., the change had been called by the demand to adjudicate preferably the most substantial cases by the Constitution Court. The presented argumentation of the lawmaking body seemed to be logically acceptable and reasonable. As a matter of course, the adjudication was motivated by the determination to diminish the number of cases which have to be judged by the Slovak Republic Constitution Court. On the other hand, it must be taken into consideration several theoretical and applicable problem-questions connected with the mentioned legal amendment.

Enactments of the Article 125 paragraph 1 letter c) and d) of the Constitution had been supplemented into the constitution text coming into the force 1<sup>st</sup> January 2001 by the Constitution Act No. 90/2001 Coll. as amended. In this way the Slovak Republic Constitution has been modified and changed by Article 460/1992 Coll. as amended. The wording of the subparagraph 58 of the explanatory report concerning the mentioned Constitution Act resulted in the aim of the constitution maker to create a constitution base as it is expressed by the changed wording of the Article 125 of the Constitution. The aim enabled the legislator to bestow the powers to the local self-governing bodies to make decisions on the compliance of the generally binding regulations with the legal regulations of the higher legal power in order to be in accordance with law.

On the foundations of what was said, it is necessary to comprehend that by the amended marked articles the legislator followed not only the authorization of the new powers delegated to the Slovak Republic Constitution Court, but what's more, the legislator wanted to create, and we have to say that they have managed to do it, the constitution foundations which would be valid for the further legal amendment regarding the evaluation of the conformity of the local self-governing generally binding regulations. By the new amendment it was decided to entrust primarily the powers to the general courts to scrutinise the generally binding regulations delivered by the municipalities and the higher territorial units. Besides that, the mentioned realities are in consensus with the above-mentioned Civil Court Order amendment and the administrative justice.

The presented facts lead us to the logical considerations what would be the most appropriate procedure as regards the evaluation of the generally binding regulations made by the municipality and the higher territorial unit.

Having in mind the principle of subsidiarity regarding the proceeding at the Constitution Court, the authors are of the opinion that the prosecutor should primarily act by implementing the prosecutor protest institute as regards the examination conformity of the generally binding legal regulations released by the local self-governing bodies. In case when the protest was not accepted, then the prosecutor should submit the lawsuit addressed to the administrative

court in order to initiate the proceeding as it is declared by § 357 and subsequently by Act No. 162/2015 Coll. Under the conditions in such a case, it is firstly submitted to be proceeded by the Slovak Republic Constitution Court on the matter of conformity following the Article 125 paragraph 1 letter c) and d) of the Constitution, afterwards it can result in the refusal on the grounds of the lack of its powers as it is stated by § 56 paragraph 2 letter a) Act No. 314/2018 Coll., regarding the Slovak Republic Constitution Court as amended, as it is evident by its clear and valid formulation (Act No. 314/2018 Coll.) More specifically expressed, we can add that it can be rejected in the part of the assessment compliance with laws or any other legal regulations of the lesser legal power.

Subsequently, the Slovak Republic Constitution Court would adjudicate the objected general binding regulation released by the local territorial self-governing bodies only within the optics of its conformity with the Constitution, constitution laws and the international agreements approved by the Slovak Republic National Council, ratified, and declared in congruence with law. However, if the Constitution Court pronounced the discord of the objected general binding regulation with the Constitution, constitution laws and the international agreements approved by the Slovak Republic National Council, ratified, and pronounced by law, then it is without saying that the occasional conformity or discord with laws, and any other legal regulations of the lesser legal power is absolutely pointless (Ondrová - Úradník 2022, p. 111). Besides that, the mentioned application is closely connected with the implemented doctrine concerning the constitution conformity of the legal regulations of the lesser legal power and the Constitution as well.

The authors support the opinion based on the reference to the finding of the Slovak Republic Constitution Court PL. US 2/2013 dated 12st November 2014 regarding the presented legal estimation concerning the secondary investigation of the self-governing bodies and its generally binding regulations. By the Constitution Court formulation "*if they are not judged by another court*" Article 125 paragraph 1 letter c) and d) of the Constitution, the constitution maker had an intention to establish the subsidiarity of powers of the Constitution Court to decide on the compliance of the generally binding regulations according to the Article 68 and Article 71 paragraph 2 of the Constitution, it means that the general courts might be delegated the mentioned powers by law. By enactments No. 125 paragraph 1 letter c) and d) of the Constitution, it is implicitly expressed the constitutional entrustment to allow the legislator to set up by law the general courts right to adjudicate cases in the stated areas.

In conclusion of what was said, we can summarize that the generally binding regulations made by the municipalities and the higher territorial units in relation to the assessment compliance with law, or the legal regulation of the lesser legal power primarily belongs to the administrative justice and to the regional courts' authorities. Only if the objected compliance of the generally binding regulation is in contradiction with the Constitution, the

constitution laws and the international agreements approved by the Slovak Republic National Council and ratified and proclaimed by means of law, then subsequently the Slovak Republic Constitution Court powers come into the force to open the procedure as it is stated by Article 125 paragraph 1 letter c) and d) of the Constitution. Only under the situation when in the proceeding by Article 125 paragraph 1 letter c) and d) of the Constitution the objection arises concerning incompatibility of the general binding regulation not only against the Constitution, but e. g. against laws, or legal regulations of the lesser power, then the principle of the proceeding economic efficiency comes into consideration, the authors assume that by § 56 paragraph 2 letter a) Act No. 314/2018 Coll., the Constitution Court should not exclude their power. Contrariwise, the Constitution Court should screen the objected generally binding regulation ad effectum the submitted motion including its compliance with laws and the legal provisions of lesser power as well.

And besides that, the authors point to the enactment of the Slovak Republic Constitution Court Collection of Laws IV. US 248/2012 dated 10<sup>th</sup> May 2012 as regards the regional court authorization to adjudicate on the base of the prosecutor attorney's submitted motion on the discordance of the municipality or the higher territorial unit generally binding regulation with the Act having been in force at that time by § 250zfa Act No. 99/1963 Coll. According that Act declaration of the Constitution Court powers to adjudicate on the delay bills has to be provided following the Article 125 paragraph 1 letter c) and d) of the Constitution. Besides that, the reason rests in the fact that authorization of certain subjects to initiate proceeding at the Constitution Court comes out directly from the Constitution, in connection with the Act on the Constitution Justice (at present § 74 Act No. 314/2018 Coll.), by the ordinary act the mentioned power cannot be deprived.

In case when the regional court conclude that the examined local territorial body generally binding regulation is not in compliance even with the Constitution, then the process follows § 100 paragraph 1 letter b) Act No. 162/2015 Coll. Afterwards, the procedure is interrupted and the motion to start the proceeding is laid down to the Constitution Court following the Article 125 of the Constitution. The question of the legal consideration arises, how to continue in case when the generally binding regulation of the local territorial self-governing is at the same time the legal proceeding object of the Constitution Court and the regional court as well. By the estimation of the authors the previously mentioned principle of the legal proceeding economy should be applied, and accordingly accompanied by the interruption of the procedure hold by the regional court. The mentioned fact arises mainly from the assumption that in the legal proceeding provided by the Constitution Court the objected unconstitutionality is considered, too. The foundation of the regional court proceeding interruption is acceptable by § 100 paragraph 2 letter a) Act No. 162/2015 Coll. If the administrative court does not apply any other suitable measures, the proceeding can be

interrupted by passing the resolution, e. g. in case of the court proceeding deciding on the question which might be important for the judgement made by the regional court. Further on, it means that when it is investigated not only unlawfulness but likewise the unconstitutionality concerning a certain generally binding regulation, then subsequently the Constitution Court should proceed and pronounced the final verdict. Assuming that the unconstitutionality has been declared as regards the generally binding regulation, the proceeding at the regional court in case of the examination “just“ the accordance with law, then it seems finally to be superfluous. However, every legal regulation of the lesser power must be in accord with the legal regulation of the higher-level power. Under the conditions of the lawful state all legal regulations must be *supte natura* in compliance with the Constitution.

The more complicated situation appears in case when the prosecutor attorney finds out that the generally binding regulation is not in accordance with the Constitution. The problem rests in the statutory regulation while to file protest by the prosecutor is explicitly bound in case of to the violation of law or any other generally binding legal regulation, it is usually concerning a legal regulation of the lesser legal power (§ 23 paragraph 1 Act No. 153/2001 Coll.). Within the mentioned context the authors point out to a certain deficiency of the legislative consistency. By law § 27 paragraph 4 Act No. 153/2001 Coll., the general prosecutor is justified to file a motion to the Constitution Court to start the proceeding on the compliance of the legal regulations. However, it concerns basically the generally binding legal regulations delivered by the state body (§ 27 paragraph 4 Act on Prosecution). Though, in spite of the mentioned commitment of the prosecutor as regards the discrepancy with law or legal regulation of the lesser power, the prosecutor can object the incompatibility with the Constitution (Article 125 paragraph 1 letter b) and by § 74 Act No. 314/2018 Coll. The stated general prosecutor power is not explicitly expressed in relation to the generally binding regulation made by the local self-governing bodies (§ 27 paragraph 5 Act No. 153/2001 Coll.), as the designed legal discrepancy cannot be found in Act on Prosecution until 1<sup>st</sup> July 2016. However, at that time it was declared by the valid § 25 paragraph 4 Act 153/2001 Coll., that if the public administration body had not met the prosecutor protest, the general prosecutor could file a motion to the Constitution Court to start the proceeding on the legal regulation compliance, while by the generally binding regulation it was mainly understood the generally binding regulation of the local self-governing (§ 22 paragraph 1 letter a) point 2 Act No. 153/2001 Coll.), as a possible solution might be to put forward the prosecutor procedure following § 74 Act No. 314/2008 Coll. After the supposed incompatibility of the local territorial self-governing generally binding regulation, the prosecutor informs the general prosecutor who is justified to file a motion to the Slovak Republic Constitution Court to start the proceeding on the compliance of the legal regulation according to the Article 125 of the Constitution.



### **3. Municipality and the Higher Territorial Unit as Unjustified Subjects**

Since 1<sup>st</sup> January 2025, the Slovak Republic Constitution adjustment has been in force provided by the Constitution Act No. 422/2020 Coll., changing and modifying the Slovak Republic Constitution No. 460/1992 Coll. as amended (latter on used only Act No. 422/2020 Coll.). By the mentioned Act and the enactment Article 127 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, it is acceptable to lay down a complaint and the proposal by the natural persons and the legal entities to the Constitution Court Senate to initiate the proceeding on the compliance of the legal regulations following the Article 125 paragraph 1 of the Constitution. The requirement rests in the presumption that the objected legal regulation has to be in accord with the laid down constitutional complaint submitted by the natural person or the legal entity.

If the Constitutional Court Senate conclude that the subjected proposal and the constitutional complaint are justified, then they interrupt the proceeding regarding the complaint and submit the motion to start the proceeding by Article 125 paragraph 1 of the Constitution. In such a case, following the compliance with the enactment § 131a the Act No. 314/2018 Coll., and having been in force since 1<sup>st</sup> January 2025, the Constitutional Court Senate is bound by the extent of the claimant submitted proposal by § 123 section 4 of the mentioned Act, however, the Constitution Court Senate is not bound by the claimant's arguments laid down in his proposal. The proposal to start the proceeding by Article 125 paragraph 1 of the Constitution is submitted to the Constitution Court General Assembly by the Judge Rapporteur. According to the diction of Act § 131a section 3 No. 314/2018 Coll. and coming into force 1<sup>st</sup> January 2025 on the proceeding of the legal regulation compliance, the Judge Rapporteur is that judge who is at the same time the Judge Reporter in the Constitutional Court Senate deciding on the case of the submitted constitutional complaint by Article 127 of the Constitution.

Within the sense of the explanatory report contents concerning the Act No. 422/2020 Coll., in case when the proceeding on the legal regulation compliance before the Constitution Court General Assembly cannot be understood as a conception if it is initiated directly by the complainant. Similarly, the Constitution Court Senate deciding on the constitution complaint have not the mandatory obligation to submit such a complainant proposal to the General Assembly of the Constitution Court.

However, the mentioned amendment of the Constitution has to be considered by taking into account several levels. The positive remains in the fact that the legislator has accepted the possibility of the natural persons and legal entities to file the constitutional complaint together with the proposal, afterwards the Constitution Court Senate deciding on the submitted complaint initiate the proceeding on the legal regulations' compliance by Article 125 paragraph 1 of the Slovak Republic Constitution. As a negative aspect can be the time displacement of coming into the force of that part of amendment which was approved. In spite of the fact that

the amendment was accepted sooner in December 2020, the mentioned part will come into force only 1<sup>st</sup> January 2025.

Besides that, it is the time inadequate determination regarding the examination of the peculiar complainant submission to enquire the Constitution Court Senate to initiate the proceeding on the legal regulation compliance. From the second sentence of the Article 127 paragraph 5 of the Constitution being in force 1<sup>st</sup> January 2025 it follows, if the Constitution Court Senate conclude that the mentioned submission is justified, then the proceeding on the constitution complaint is abandon in order to file a motion to start the proceeding according to the Article 125 paragraph 1 of the Constitution. Therefore, at first the Constitution Court Senate should consider and examine the constitution complaint, and only after its approval it is reliable for the further proceeding, or at least the part connected with the submitted complaint (§ 56 paragraph 5 Act No. 314/2018 Coll.). Besides that, the Constitution Court have to consider the submission of the reasons explanation as regards the submitted complaint. The authors have deduced the aforesaid realities by the contents aimed at the constitutional guarantee of the fundamental human rights and freedoms, and moreover, it is clear from the text wording of the first sentence concerning the submitted complaint articulated by Article 127 paragraph 5 having been in force since 1<sup>st</sup> January 2025. To express differently, if the objected legal regulation must pay attention to the constitutional complaint submission, then it had to be applied in relation to the claimant, and by the provided examination it was found out the reality that it was the application that led to the infringement of the basic human rights and freedoms whose protection now the claimant demands by the constitutional complaint. Finally, referring to what was said before, we can come to the logical conclusion to leave the submitted proposal to the destiny of the constitutional complaint. (Ondrová – Úradník 2022, p. 157-158).

However, by the Slovak legal amendment, being actual at present as well as effective since 1<sup>st</sup> 2025, the authorization of the communal complaint and the right of the local self-governing bodies to submit a proposal to the Constitutional Court Senate to initiate the proceeding on the legal regulations' compliance are absolutely omitted by Article 127a of the Constitution.

In this connection it is necessary to point out to the valid legal amendment effective in the Czech Republic. In order to enable individual people admission to the Czech Republic Constitution Court, the Czech Republic Legal Order introduced the right to submit the proposal to annual some legal regulations accompanied by the constitution complaint within the sense of § 74 Act No. 182/1993 Coll., on the Constitution Court as amended (further on used Act No. 182/1993 Coll.). According to the valid enactment, by the constitutional complaint it is achievable to submit a proposal to annual a legal regulation only under the condition that by its implementation appeared the reality which has become the object of the constitutional

complaint, it is in cases when the claimant asserts that the legal regulation or its enactment is in contradiction with the constitution act or any other regulations of the lesser legal power.

Considering the methodological law system expressed by Act No. 182/1993, it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that the mentioned Act does not strictly make difference between the so-called communal constitution complaint and the complaint laid down by the natural persons or the legal entities. By § 72 section 1 letter b) of the Act No. 182/1993 Coll., the municipal board or the board of the higher territorial unit are justified to submit the constitutional complaint correspondingly with the proposal to annual act or any other legal regulation (§ 74 Act No. 182/1993 Coll.).

Comparison of the Slovak and Czech legal amendment arises the question why the Slovak Republic National Council together with the right entrusted to the natural persons and the legal entities did not give the local self-governing entitlement to proceed their constitution complaint to examine the conformity of the applied legal regulation.

By the explanatory report as regards Act No. 422/2020 Coll., the proposed legal amendment, the so-called individual control of constitutionality, has to fill a legislative hole concerning the protection of constitutionality. As an example of the contemporary status quo might serve when the unconstitutionality is caused by the text wording of the legal regulation. More precisely, it means that it is not in coincidence with the explanation or application of the legal regulation as the priority has been more or less given to the constitutional conformal Legis interpretation. Therefore, in the proceeding carried out by the Constitution Court, it was decided to refuse the scrutiny of the legal regulation in connection with the laid down constitutional complaint as the complainant was not justified to submit a proposal. The reasons presented by the Constitutional Court were based on the contents of the Article 127 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court recommended to complainant to refer to subjects that are justified to initiate the proceeding on compliance of the legal regulations declared by § 74 Act No. 314/2018 Coll. However, the explanatory report does not contain reasons why the permission was not justified to initiate the proceeding on the legal regulation compliance amended within the communal constitution complaint by Article 127a of the Constitution.

There are similar institutes applied in the Czech Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, according to the Act on the Federal Constitution Court § 91 (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz), the municipalities and the municipal associations can file a complaint in which they claim the fact that the Federal law or the law of a Federal country violate the right to administration guaranteed by Article 28 of the rudimentary law. The constitution complaint addressed to the Federal Constitution Court is not justified in case when it is possible to submit it to the Federal Country Constitution Court. By § 93 section 3 if the constitution complaint inclines against the law, then it can be submitted only within one year since the effectiveness of the objected act. If the constitutional complaint aims directly or

indirectly even against a certain legal regulation, afterwards the procedure is applied by the § 77 of the concerned act and the Constitution Court will ask for the legislator posture. In case, despite the occurrence of such situation when the constitutional complaint was laid down under the conditions aimed against the law, the Federal Constitution Court decide positively and meet the constitutional complaint, the Act is declared to be invalid as it is stated § 95 section 3 of the Act on the Federal Constitution Court. The same is valid if the constitutional complaint was met by means of declaring the contested decision annulled as it was based on the unconstitutional law.

## **Conclusion**

The local territorial self-governing constitutes an indispensable institute, and its execution helps the fulfilment of the state functions and obligations. The local territorial self-governing belongs among the most basic lawful state principles expressed not only by the Slovak Republic Constitution but by the documents of an international character, such as, e. g. the European Charter of the Local Self-Governing (Ondrová 2020). The conception of the local self-governing has its sources in respecting the decision-making autonomy as regards the self-governing own territorial corporations. Besides that, the accent is put on the local self-governing responsibility and accountability for all-embracing growth of their localities, and at the same time for satisfying their citizenry needs. (Molitoris 2022, p. 55). The rulemaking activity belongs to the most fundamental capacities of the local self-governing powers. The constitutional and the legal base of the municipality and the higher territorial unit powers rest in issuing the generally binding regulations as it is declared by Article 68 and Article 71 paragraph 2 of the Slovak Republic Constitution. In this connection, it is necessary to note that besides the fulfilment of the constitution imperative, the generally binding regulations must meet the conformity criterium with the legal regulations of the higher level of power. As an example, might serve the interdiction for the rulemaking activity provided by the local territorial self-governing to abridge the fundamental human rights and freedoms beyond the law. That's the reason why there are several institutes in the Slovak Republic Legal Order based on the intention to create a possible foundation for the review of the generally binding regulations made by the municipality or the higher territorial unit. The protest of the prosecutor is one of the used options. The problem of the applicable practise might display certain problems rested in the fact that the potential discovered negative findings placed by the prosecutor and detecting the unconstitutionality of the generally binding regulations delivered by the municipality or the higher territorial unit disable the prosecutor to initiate proceeding at the Slovak Republic Constitution Court according to the Legal Order. However, the only possibility comes into consideration, and that is the procedure of the prosecutor to inform about the findings the general attorney who is authorised to file a motion to the Constitution Court to start

the proceeding on the legal regulation compliance. Another eventually alternative procedure rests in the prosecutor course of action applied within the lawsuit justification addressed to the Regional Court by pronouncing the prosecutor 'assumption of the found unconstitutionality. In case of validation, the Regional Court can abandon the proceeding, and after the exploring the action of suit and fulfilling the legal conditions, the Regional Court can file a motion to the Constitution Court to act as it is declared by the Article 125 of the Constitution. The Court acknowledgement of the generally binding regulation incompatibility with the legal regulation of the higher legal power means the loss of the ruling validity. Besides that, at the same time, the municipality or the higher territorial unit are given the time space to make improvements within the six months since the validity of the declared court decision.

Despite the significant position of the local self-governing, a certain degree of its disadvantage can be found out as a result pronounced by the constitution maker. On the grounds of the above-mentioned facts, the justified question can be deduced why the local self-governing was not conferred the similar powers as the natural persons and the legal entities. Further on, the question arises why the local self-governing cannot submit the communal constitution complaint together with the proposal to the Constitution Court Senate to initiate proceeding on the compliance of the legal regulations. Therefore, the comparison of the chosen legal amendments evokes the authors' proposal de lege ferenda. The National Council of the Slovak Republic should approve the legal amendment to adjust the powers of the local territorial self-governing concerning the submission of the proposal together with the constitution complaint according to the Article 127 and the Constitution.

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# Tridsať rokov vývoja regiónov Slovenska

## Thirty Years of Development of Slovakia's Regions

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<https://doi.org/10.33542/VSS2023-1-2>

### Abstract

*The meaning and purpose of the contribution is to know the trend of regional development in the long-term, 30-year period. We want to reach the knowledge of the mentioned goal based on the analysis of their economic and social level.*

*The contribution has 5 parts: in the first, we present the characteristics of the content of regional differences, regional economic-social differences and their measurement. In the second, based in the creation of the gross domestic product (GDP), we assess the economic level of the regions. In the third, we analyse and evaluate the economic activity of their inhabitants. In the fourth, we express the differences of the regions based on the analysis of the development of their cities and salaries. The fifth part contains an analysis of household net income.*

**Key words:** *subnational region, economic-social indicators, economic performance.*

### Úvod

Názory na posudzovanie ekonomickej a sociálnej úrovne regiónov sa rozchádzajú, nie sú jednotné. Sú odlišné, ani nie tak v tom, že ich úroveň je rozdielna, ale v posudzovaní a hodnotení trendu vývoja ich rozdielov. Sú názory, ktoré hovoria o znižovaní rozdielov medzi nimi, sú ale aj názory tvrdiace, že rozdiely medzi regiónmi sa nemenia, resp. sa zvyšujú.

Zmyslom a cieľom príspevku je na základe analýz štatistických ekonomicko – sociálnych údajov poznať realitu rozdielnosti regiónov a tiež realitu vývoja ich rozdielov. Tridsať rokov vývoja regiónov je dosť dlhá doba na posúdenie ich rozdielnosti a rozdielov z viacerých stránok ich ekonomického a sociálneho rozvoja.

Z výskumov a analýz, ktoré sme doteraz v danej problematike robili, nám vyplynulo, že je potrebné posudzovať regionálne rozdiely podľa viacerých kritérií <sup>(1)</sup>.

V príspevku analyzujeme rozdiely regiónov a ich vývoj na základe štyroch kritérií a to ekonomickej výkonnosti, ekonomickej aktivity, mzdy a čistého príjmu domácnosti. Príspevok má päť častí. V prvej časti uvádzame charakteristiku obsahu ekonomickej rozdielnosti regionálnych ekonomicko-sociálnych rozdielov a ich meranie.

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<sup>1</sup> Na základe doterajšieho výskumu problematiky regiónov vznikol aj tento príspevok

V druhej časti nazvanej Ekonomická výkonnosť regiónov, na základe tvorby regionálneho hrubého domáceho produktu analyzujeme a posudzujeme ekonomickú úroveň regiónov. V tretej analyzujeme a hodnotíme ekonomickú aktivitu obyvateľov regiónov, zamestnanosť a nezamestnanosť. Vo štvrtej hodnotíme úroveň a rozdiely regiónov na základe analýz miezd a plátov obyvateľov regiónu. V piatej časti vyjadrujeme a hodnotíme rozdiely medzi regiónmi na základe analýz mesačných čistých peňažných príjmov domácností.

## **1. Regióny, ich rozdiely a ich meranie**

Hospodárstvo krajiny-štátu a aj jeho regiónov, je súčasťou priestorovej oblasti makrosféry hospodárstva a poznávania ekonomickej teórie makroekonómie. Názory na vyjadrovanie a meranie ich ekonomickej a sociálnej úrovne nie sú ani u ekonómov jednotné. Rozdielne sú aj názory na posudzovanie rozdielov medzi regiónmi.

Rozdiely medzi regiónmi sú ich prirodzenou vlastnosťou. Vznikli a sú dané historickým vývojom ich rozdielných prírodných a spoločenských podmienok. Sú súčasťou vlastného vývoja regiónov a aj ich ovplyvňovania súčasným systémom riadenia.

### **Rozdiely v regiónoch**

Podmienky pre rozdiely v regiónoch majú síce historický charakter, no podieľa sa na nich aj súčasnosť. Je to najmä pôsobenie trhového mechanizmu a uskutočňovaná hospodárska politika štátu. Trhový mechanizmus žičí tým najlepším podmienkam pre súkromné podnikanie a tým aj najvyspelejším regiónom, pretože tie prinášajú podnikateľom najvyššie zhodnotenie ich investícií. Najlepšie podmienky pre podnikanie majú najvyspelejšie regióny. Tie trh využíva a v nich aj podnikatelia najviac investujú a zveľaďujú svoj kapitál. Regióny s horšími podmienkami pre podnikanie sú v nevýhode a zaostávajú. Trhová ekonomika a jej trhové sily v súčasnosti nevytvárajú rovnovážny stav v ekonomike a vo vývoji regiónov, ale naopak pôsobia na zväčšovanie rozdielov medzi nimi.

Problémom medzi regiónmi nie sú ich samotné ekonomické rozdiely. Problémom sa stáva a je veľkosť a miera týchto rozdielov a z nich plynúce hlavne sociálne rozdiely, v ktorých žijú obyvatelia regiónov.

Na znižovanie nežiadúcich narastajúcich rozdielov medzi regiónmi a negatívneho pôsobenia trhového mechanizmu využíva štát nástroje svojej hospodárskej politiky. Milióny eur, ktoré dáva vláda do menej rozvinutých regiónov sú podľa analýz málo efektívne využívané. Pomáhajú regiónom v rozvoji, no neriešia ich zaostávanie.



Slovensko patrí ku krajinám s relatívne veľkými rozdielmi medzi svojimi subnacionálnymi regiónmi. Bohatšie, ekonomicky vyspelejšie regióny sú na západnom Slovensku. Chudobnejšie, ekonomicky menej rozvinuté sú na strednom a najmä na východnom Slovensku.

### **Kritériá a meranie regionálnych rozdielov štátu**

Národné hospodárstvo štátu, jeho existencia a vývoj, je v podstate daná hospodárstvom jeho regiónov. Rovnako je to aj s ich hospodárením, s efektívnym využívaním ich zdrojov a dosahovanými výsledkami. Nedostatočné využívanie potencionálnych zdrojov v regiónoch sa prejavuje v ich malej, nízkej užitočnosti a efektívnosti. Výkonnosť ekonomík regiónov určuje v podstate aj výkonnosť národného hospodárstva štátu. Od ekonomickej výkonnosti regiónov a štátu je odvodená aj sociálna úroveň, uspokojovania potrieb štátu a jeho obyvateľov.

Ako národné hospodárstvo, tak aj ekonomika regiónov má priestorový a makroekonomický charakter. Preto aj výkonnosť ich hospodárstva meriame a vyjadrujeme makroekonomickými ukazovateľmi. Za základný z nich považujeme vytváranú hodnotu hrubého domáceho produktu (HDP). Robíme tak napriek jeho kritike a poznania nedostatkov, ktoré tento ekonomický ukazovateľ má a ktoré ho sprevádzajú.

Podstata jeho kritiky je v jeho nepresnosti a tým v nedostatočnosti vyjadrenia ekonomickej výkonnosti. Jeho nepresnosť spočíva hlavne v tom, že nevyjadruje, nie je adekvátnym ekvivalentom vyjadrenia blahobytu spoločnosti.

Jeho nedostatkom je, že do veličiny hodnoty hrubého domáceho produktu nepatria všetky vyrobené úžitkové produkty a služby, ale len tie, ktoré prechádzajú cez trh. HDP to sú len finálne produkty a služby, ktoré spotrebiteľia, podnikatelia, štát a zahraničie vyrábajú, predávajú a kupujú na konečnú spotrebu a investovanie. V snahe vyhnúť sa nedostatkom, ktoré v sebe má ukazovateľ HDP pri výpočte výkonnosti hospodárstva, ekonomická teória používa na jej vyjadrenie aj kategórie ako je čistý ekonomický blahobyt a reálny ekonomický rozvoj. Obidva tieto ukazovatele sa pre ich zložitosť v praxi málo používajú. O vytvorenie sústavy ukazovateľov, ktorými by sme mohli komplexnejšie merať ekonomickú úroveň krajiny a regiónov sa stále snaží ekonomická teória, no zatiaľ bez väčších úspechov.

V sedemdesiatych rokoch min. stor. Ženevský výskumný ústav pri OSN vypracoval systém merania ekonomickej úrovne s použitím až 73 ukazovateľov. Ukázal sa ako veľmi komplikovaný a aj s problematickými výsledkami.

V roku 1995 navrhla Svetová banka kritériálnu sústavu merania ekonomickej výkonnosti. Navrhovaná sústava zaujala už tým, že ju vypracovala významná banková inštitúcia. Išlo o nekonvenčnú sústavu ukazovateľov v porovnaní so všetkými dovtedy prezentovanými a posudzovanými. Orientovala sa nielen na reálny stav danej ekonomiky, ale

aj na potencionálne zdroje krajín. Zohľadňovala napr. kapitál prírodných zdrojov, technické vybavenie výrobných i nevýrobných oblastí krajiny, hodnoty ľudského kapitálu, hodnoty sociálneho kapitálu. Podľa hodnotenia touto sústavou ukazovateľov sa dostali do popredia vyspelosti a bohatstva najmä krajiny s bohatými prírodnými zdrojmi. Ani táto sústava sa neosvedčila a v praxi neuplatnila.

O lepšom pohľade na ekonomiku sa snažili a snažia aj politici. Za pomoci významných ekonómov by radi nahradili ukazovateľa HDP alternatívnymi ukazovateľmi ako napr. šťastím, spokojnosťou a ich udržateľnosťou. Ide u nich do značnej miery o subjektívne posudzovanie na základe pocitov občanov. Hospodárska prax ani takéto hodnotenie porovnávania ekonomickej vyspelosti krajín neprijala.

Vychádzajúc zo znalostí ekonomickej teórie, doterajšieho poznania a možností, je podľa nášho názoru používanie ukazovateľa HDP pri vypočítavaní a vyjadrovaní ekonomickej výkonnosti aj v súčasnosti opodstatnené. Aj pre Európsku úniu (EÚ) je makroekonomický ukazovateľ HDP na obyvateľa jedným zo základných kritérií čerpania zdrojov z eurofondov pre rozvoj menej rozvinutých regiónov. Neprotirečí tomu ani fakt, že pre budúcnosť uvažuje a počíta aj Ekonomická komisia EÚ o doplnení ukazovateľa HDP ďalšími kritériami, pri rozdeľovaní svojich fondov.

## 2. Ekonomická a sociálna úroveň regiónov Slovenska

### Ekonomická výkonnosť Slovenska a jeho regiónov

Ekonomika regiónov tvorí ekonomiku národného hospodárstva krajiny. Od ekonomickej výkonnosti a vyspelosti regiónov závisí aj hospodárska a spoločenská úroveň krajiny<sup>(2)</sup>.

Slovensko je charakteristické značnými ekonomicko-sociálnymi rozdielmi medzi subnacionálnymi regiónmi.

Po revolúcii v roku 1989 došlo k podstatnému poklesu hospodárstva. Približne desať rokov potrebovala ekonomika na to, aby sa dostala na predrevolučnú úroveň. V roku 1993 predstavovala tvorba HDP len 75 % jeho hodnoty z roku 1989. V roku 1997 dosiahla úroveň 93,4 percenta roku 1989. Rast ekonomiky v nasledujúcich rokoch, meraný tvorbou HDP uvádzame v nasledovnej tabuľke.

**Tabuľka 1: HDP SR na obyvateľa v období rokov 1995 – 2020 v bežných cenách euro**

ROK	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
HDP	3670	5786	9358	12131	14511	16862

Zdroj: ŠÚ SR – vlastné spracovanie

<sup>2</sup> Ekonomickú úroveň ekonomiky štátu a regiónov vyjadrujeme v bežných cenách euro.

Z uvedených údajov vyplynulo, že v období rokov 1995 – 2020, vyjadrených v šiestich päťročných cykloch, sa HDP neustále zvyšoval. Výnimkou bolo obdobie finančnej a hospodárskej krízy v rokoch 2008 a 2009 a tiež rok 2020, kedy sa rast ekonomiky znížil realizáciou opatrení začínajúcej pandémie koronavírusu Covid – 19. V celom uvedenom období vzrástla výkonnosť celoštátnej ekonomiky meraná ukazovateľom HDP 4,59 krát.

Osobitne sme vykonali analýzu vývoja HDP v období rokov 2015 – 2020. Z porovnávaní vždy k predchádzajúcemu roku uvádzame: v roku 2016 vzrástol HDP indexom 100,02. V roku 2017 vzrástol indexom 100,04, v roku 2018 bol rast indexom 100,05 a rovnako aj v roku 2019 bol rast indexom 100,05. V roku 2020 došlo k poklesu tvorby HDP oproti predchádzajúcemu roku o 3,0 percentá. Kumulatívne, v porovnaní k roku 2015 ekonomická výkonnosť vzrástla v roku 2020 indexom 100,16.

### Ekonomická úroveň regiónov

Ekonomická výkonnosť regiónov je rozdielna a jej vývoj je nerovnomerný. Existujú regióny ekonomicky vyspelejšie, ale aj menej rozvinuté.

Každý región je osobitný, špecifický. Jeden od druhého sa odlišuje celým radom znakov, ktoré potom ovplyvňujú ich ekonomickú a sociálnu úroveň. Regióny sa líšia štruktúrou svojej ekonomiky, podielom a úrovňou výroby a poskytovania služieb. Rozdielna je miera sebestačnosti regiónu vlastnou, v regióne vyrábanou produkciou tovarov a služieb a produkciou pre iné regióny a zahraničný trh. Regióny sú odlišné aj v kultúrnej vyspelosti.

Odlišná je ich vnútorná technická a sociálna infraštruktúra. Rozdielna je aj štruktúra obyvateľstva, možnosti jeho vzdelávania v regiónoch a tiež aj vzdelanostná úroveň ich obyvateľov. Vývoj ekonomickej úrovne regiónov a ich ekonomický rast vyjadrujú štatistické údaje vytvárajú hodnoty regionálneho hrubého domáceho produktu (RHDP) na obyvateľa za obdobie rokov 1995 – 2020. Sú uvedené v nasledujúcej tabuľke.

**Tabuľka 2: HDP regiónov Slovenska v období rokov 1995 – 2020 v bežných cenách euro**

Región	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
Bratislavský	7904	12559	22806	29241	35352	38894
Trnavský	3993	6086	10067	13634	15551	18496
Trenčiansky	3455	5461	8268	10744	12590	13954
Nitriansky	3120	4027	8288	10078	12308	14493
Žilinský	2961	4739	7687	10748	12575	14631
Banskobystrický	3041	4810	6726	8974	10520	12098
Prešovský	2380	3524	5593	6861	8631	10291
Košický	3202	5200	7916	9581	11646	13848

Zdroj: ŠÚ SR – vlastné spracovanie

Z analýzy vyplýva :

- vo všetkých regiónoch bol za uvedené obdobie rokov 1995 - 2020 ekonomický rast a vzrástol RHDP na obyvateľa,
- v regiónoch rástol RHDP nerovnomerne. Najvyšší ekonomický rast zaznamenal žilinský región (index 494,12). Po ňom nasledoval bratislavský (492,07), nitriansky (464,51), trnavský (463,21), košický (432,47), prešovský (432,39), trenčiansky (403,87),
- relatívne najnižší ekonomický rast (index 397,82) vyjadrený v raste RHDP na obyvateľa za uvádzané obdobie zaznamenal banskobystrický región,
- najvyššie hodnotové vyjadrenie RHDP na obyvateľa dosiahol počas celého uvádzaného obdobia bratislavský región (38.894 eur). Po ňom nasledoval trnavský región (18.496), potom žilinský (14.631), nitriansky (14.493), trenčiansky (13.954), košický (13.848), banskobystrický (12.098). Prešovský región mal v uvedených rokoch najnižšiu tvorbu RHDP na obyvateľa (10.291 eur).

Výsledky analýzy vývoja RHDP na obyvateľa v poslednom šiestom päťročnom cykle v rokoch 2015 – 2020 potvrdili rast výkonnosti ekonomiky vo všetkých ôsmich regiónoch. V roku 2020 v porovnaní s rokom 2019 poklesla v siedmich regiónoch. Najviac v žilinskom a trnavskom o 6 percent. Nepoklesla v košickom, v ňom bola tvorba RHDP v roku 2020 vyššia ako v roku 2019

Z dlhodobšieho poznania analýz, porovnávaní vývoja ekonomickej výkonnosti regiónov, nám vyplynul nasledovný poznatok: k objektívnejšiemu posúdeniu rastu, resp. poklesu rozdielov medzi regiónmami za určité obdobie dospejeme ani nie tak porovnaním ich ekonomického rastu, ako porovnaním tvorby ich regionálneho hrubého domáceho produktu k tvorbe vytváraného HDP celoštátne.

To, ako sa zmenil podiel vytváraného HDP toho ktorého regiónu v porovnaní k celoštátnej tvorbe HDP na obyvateľa, za obdobie rokov 1995 – 2020, uvádzame v nasledujúcej tabuľke.

**Tabuľka 3: Podiel RHDP k celoštátnemu HDP v bežných cenách euro**

ROK	SR	Bratislava	Trnava	Trenčín	Nitra	Žilina	Banská Bystrica	Prešov	Košice
1995	3670	7904	3993	3455	3120	2961	3041	2380	3202
2020	16862	38894	18496	13954	14493	14631	12098	10291	13848

Zdroj: ŠÚ SR – vlastné spracovanie

Z uvedených údajov nám vyplynulo nasledovné poznanie:

- v roku 2020, v porovnaní s rokom 1995 a v porovnaní s celoštátnou tvorbou HDP vzrástol vytváraný HDP v bratislavskom regióne z podielu 2,15 na 2,30. Vzrástol tiež v trnavskom regióne z 1,08 na 1,09 a v žilinskom z podielu na celoštátnom HDP z 0,80 na 0,86,
- v nitrianskom regióne sa podiel regionálneho HDP na celoštátnom HDP nezmenil. V roku 2020 ostal na rovnakej úrovni 0,85 v porovnaní k celoštátnemu HDP, ako v roku 1995,
- v ostatných štyroch regiónoch, v trenčianskom, banskobystrickom, prešovskom a košickom, došlo k poklesu podielu ich tvorby regionálneho HDP na celoštátnom HDP. V trenčianskom regióne klesol podiel z roku 1995 0,94 na 0,82 v roku 2020. V banskobystrickom bol pokles z 0,82 na 0,71, v prešovskom pokles z 0,64 na 0,61 a v košickom pokles z 0,87 na 0,82.

Z porovnávaní výsledkov analýz sa ukázalo, že regióny s vyšším ekonomickým rastom, bratislavský, trnavský a žilinský, zvýšili aj rast podielu svojho regionálneho HDP na celoštátnom HDP. Naopak, regióny s nižším ekonomickým rastom znížili svoj podiel regionálneho HDP na celoštátnom HDP.

V regiónoch s nižším ekonomickým rastom sa síce zvýšila tvorba HDP na obyvateľa, no poklesol podiel na celoštátnej tvorbe HDP. V nitrianskom regióne, v ktorom bol ekonomický rast relatívne vysoký indexom 100,17, vyšším ako v bratislavskom, v trnavskom a žilinskom, podiel na celoštátnej tvorbe sa nezmenil.

Medzi stredným Slovenskom, najmä jeho banskobystrickým regiónom, východným Slovenskom, regiónmi prešovským a košickým, v porovnaní s ostatnými regiónmi sa prehĺbili rozdiely v ich ekonomickej úrovni. Prehĺbili sa aj v porovnaní s celoštátnou úrovňou.

### **3. Ekonomická aktivnosť obyvateľstva**

Práca je jedným zo základných zdrojov tvorby úžitkových hodnôt, to znamená aj hrubého domáceho produktu. Kategórie ako ekonomická aktivita občanov, zamestnanosť a nezamestnanosť, sú bezprostredne spojené s HDP. Ovplyvňujú veľkosť jeho tvorby ako pozitívne tak aj negatívne.

Vychádzajúc z analýz dostupných štatistických údajov o práci, porovnáme ekonomickú aktivnosť obyvateľov regiónov, ich zamestnanosť, nezamestnanosť s ekonomickou výkonnosťou, tvorbou HDP. Na základe ich porovnávaní prichádzame k ďalšiemu poznaniu rozdielov medzi regiónmi.

## **Ekonomika a sociálnosť regiónov**

Podľa ekonomickej výkonnosti regiónov, na základe ich tvorby HDP, sme hodnotil bratislavský, trnavský a žilinský región ako relatívne vyspelejšie regióny. Banskobystrický, prešovský a košický ako relatívne menej vyspelé. Ich výkonnosť ekonomiky i keď v dlhodobom vývoji rástla, rástla relatívne menej a poklesol aj ich podiel HDP na hodnote celoslovenského priemeru HDP.

Z relatívne ekonomicky najvyspelejších regiónov vyčnieva bratislavský región. Ten svojou tvorbou HDP na obyvateľa prevyšuje nielen všetky regióny Slovenska, ale vyčnieva aj v popredí v rámci regiónov štátov Európskej únie (EÚ). Z analýz ekonomických rozdielov regiónov, prechádzame k poznaniu sociálnych rozdielov, ktoré sú najmä z pohľadu samotných regiónov a ich obyvateľov rozhodujúce. Je tomu tak preto, lebo ak tvorba HDP z pohľadu obyvateľov regiónu môže byť zanedbateľná, tak sociálnosť života a jeho úroveň sa ich bezprostredne dotýka, určuje ich úroveň žitia.

Náplň obsahu sociálnej stránky regiónov ako súčasti ich ekonomicko – sociálnej stránky je pomerne široká. Je to celý rad ekonomických a neekonomických aktivít obyvateľstva regiónu. K nim patrí zamestnanosť, nezamestnanosť, vzdelanosť pracovných síl a možnosti jej zvyšovania, zdravotná starostlivosť a jej zabezpečenie, kultúrna vyspelosť. Nezanedbateľná a dôležitá je aj technická a sociálna infraštruktúra ako je bývanie, právna ochrana.

Medzi ekonomickou a sociálnou úrovňou regiónu je vzájomná závislosť. Vyššia ekonomická vyspelosť regiónu je predpokladom aj pre vyššie zabezpečenie úrovne sociálnej štruktúry, nutnej k uspokojovaniu potrieb života obyvateľov v regióne. Sociálna úroveň regiónu, spätne aktívne ovplyvňuje ekonomickú výkonnosť regiónu.

## **Ekonomická aktivita obyvateľov**

Ekonomická teória pozná a definuje pojem ekonomická aktivita obyvateľstva. Je to relatívne najširší pojem spojený s kategóriou práce, jej vynakladaním na tvorbu tovarov a služieb, HDP<sup>(3)</sup>.

Pojmy, ekonomicky aktívne obyvateľstvo a zamestnanosť, sú veľmi blízke. Je tomu tak preto, lebo aj metodiky ich výpočtu sú takmer totožné. Rozdiel je v tom, že v metodike výpočtu pri ekonomickej aktivite obyvateľstva nie je vymedzená horná hranica obyvateľstva starších nad 15 rokov. U zamestnanosti je horná hranica určená obyčajne vekom odchodu do starobného dôchodku. V súčasnej metodike výpočtu je to 64 rokov. Uvedený rozdiel sa týka obidvoch a to ako ich absolútneho, tak aj relatívneho vyjadrenia.

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<sup>3</sup> Mieru ekonomickej aktivity dostaneme pomerom počtu ekonomicky aktívneho obyvateľstva k celkovému počtu obyvateľstva nad 15 rokov.

## Zamestnanosť

Pojmy zamestnanosť a pracujúci podľa platnej metodiky môžeme v podstate stotožniť. Za pracujúcich sa považujú všetky osoby staršie ako 15 ročné, ktoré vykonávajú akúkoľvek užitočnú prácu vo výrobnnej i nevýrobnej oblasti. K zamestnaným patria aj osoby, ktoré nepracujú z rôznych oprávnených dôvodov, napr. štúdium, ale aj osoby nezamestnané, ktoré hľadajú prácu a sú ochotné nastúpiť do práce, ak sú splnené pre nich zákonom stanovené predpoklady.

Pri analýzach zamestnanosti a jej vývoja porovnávame jednak jej absolútne hodnoty – počet zamestnaných, ako aj jej mieru, relatívne jej vyjadrenie, v percentách.

V nasledujúcej tabuľke uvádzame štatistické údaje miery zamestnanosti v období rokov 2015 – 2020 celoštátne a v regiónoch.

**Tabuľka 4: Miera zamestnanosti v období rokov 2015 - 2020**

Región	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Slovensko	62,70	64,90	66,20	67,60	68,40	67,50
Bratislavský	71,50	74,90	75,20	76,20	77,10	75,40
Trnavský	67,00	70,10	70,10	68,80	70,10	70,30
Trenčiansky	64,40	67,00	69,30	71,00	71,00	70,30
Nitriansky	63,00	65,30	67,50	68,60	69,30	68,50
Žilinský	62,40	64,50	65,70	67,20	68,50	67,50
Banskobystrický	61,80	63,10	64,50	66,50	67,70	67,40
Prešovský	57,10	59,40	61,20	63,10	63,80	62,00
Košický	58,20	58,80	59,80	62,30	62,90	62,10

Zdroj: ŠÚSR – vlastné spracovanie

Výsledky analýzy sú:

- miera zamestnanosti sa pohybovala na celoštátnej úrovni v rozmedzí 62,7 % v roku 2015 a 68,4 % v roku 2019,
- z regiónov najväčšiu zamestnanosť obyvateľstva mal bratislavský región. Jej miera sa pohybovala medzi 71,5 % v roku 2015 a 77,1 % v roku 2019,
- najnižšiu mieru zamestnanosti mal región prešovský a košický. Prešovský v rozmedzí 57,1 % v roku 2015 a 63,8 % v roku 2019. Košický medzi 58,2% a 62,9 % v roku 2019. V roku 2020 poklesla miera zamestnanosti celoštátne i regionálne.

Porovnávali sme aj mieru zamestnanosti s mierou ekonomickej aktivity obyvateľstva. Nie je medzi nimi veľký rozdiel ani na celoštátnej úrovni, kde v roku 2015 bola miera ekonomickej aktivity 60,1 % a v roku 2020 59,0 %. V regiónoch bola miera ekonomickej aktivity obyvateľstva nižšia. Pohybovala v priemere na úrovni 60 %. Výnimkou bol bratislavský región kde bola vyššia približne o 5 %. Najnižšiu mieru ekonomickej aktivity vykazoval košický región.

Podobne ako miera zamestnanosti aj miera ekonomickej aktivity bola nižšia v roku 2020 v porovnaní s rokom 2019 v regiónoch v priemere o 5 - 10 % a celoštátne nižšia približne o 5 percent.

### Nezamestnanosť

Nezamestnanosť je v úzkom vzťahu s veličinami ekonomickej aktivity obyvateľstva a zamestnanosť. Rovnaká spojitosť je aj s ich mierami. Ich výpočet je daný príslušnou metodikou.

Miera nezamestnanosti je jedným z dôležitých kritérií pri hodnotení rozdielov medzi regiónmi. Údaje štatistiky poskytujú možnosť skúmať a analyzovať nezamestnanosť a jej mieru dvoma spôsobmi. Jednak ako nezamestnanosť podľa výberového zisťovania pracovných síl (VZPS) a ako evidovanú nezamestnanosť<sup>(4)</sup>.

V príspevku analyzujeme nezamestnanosť v jej evidovanej podobe. Považujeme ju v porovnaní s nezamestnanosťou podľa výberového zisťovania pracovných síl za reálnejšiu a tiež bližšiu k hospodárskej praxe.

**Tabuľka 5: Miera nezamestnanosti v období rokov 1995 – 2020**

Región	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
<b>Slovensko</b>	13,80	18,60	11,36	12,46	10,63	7,60
<b>Bratislavský</b>	6,00	7,20	2,60	4,63	5,34	4,70
<b>Trnavský</b>	11,80	16,40	7,10	8,20	6,70	5,20
<b>Trenčiansky</b>	7,70	15,00	6,80	9,50	7,70	5,40
<b>Nitriansky</b>	12,10	20,80	11,40	11,80	9,70	5,50
<b>Žilinský</b>	10,50	18,50	9,30	10,90	8,90	6,50
<b>Banskobystrický</b>	15,60	21,90	18,30	18,90	14,90	9,80
<b>Prešovský</b>	16,40	22,10	15,80	17,70	15,50	11,40
<b>Košický</b>	18,70	25,60	17,50	16,80	14,40	10,60

Zdroj: ŠÚSR – vlastné spracovanie

<sup>4</sup> Miera evidovanej nezamestnanosti sa v súlade s dohovorom Medzinárodnej organizácie práce vypočítava z počtu disponibilných uchádzačov o prácu, ktorí môžu po predložení ponuky vhodného im pracovného miesta, môžu hneď nastúpiť do práce.



Z analýzy uvedených údajov vyplynulo, že v celom období rokov 1995 – 2020 sa miera nezamestnanosti znižovala. Ak v prvom uvádzanom období päťročných cyklov v roku 1995 bola miera evidovanej nezamestnanosti celoštátne 13,8 %, v roku 2020 bola 7,6 percenta. Najvyššia bola v druhom období, v roku 2000 a to 18,6 %.

Podobne tomu bolo aj v regiónoch. V každom regióne bola miera evidovanej nezamestnanosti v roku 2020 nižšia ako v roku 1995. Najnižšiu mieru nezamestnanosti počas celého uvádzaného obdobia mal bratislavský región. Pohybovala sa v rozmedzí 6,0 % v roku 1995 a 4,7 % v roku 2020. Vyššia bola v roku 2000. v regióne banskobystričskom, prešovskom a košickom. Prevyšovala mieru nezamestnanosti v ostatných regiónoch, ako aj jej celoštátnu úroveň. Najvyššiu mieru nezamestnanosti 25,6 % zaznamenal v uvádzanom druhom období v roku 2000 košický región.

Z analýzy nezamestnanosti v rokoch 2015 – 2020 vyplynulo, že v roku 2020 bola miera nezamestnanosti na celoštátnej i regionálnej úrovni vyššia ako v roku 2019. Bolo to v dôsledku poklesu ekonomickej aktivity, vyššej nezamestnanosti a poklesu tvorby HDP.

### **Analýza vzťahu nezamestnanosti a vytváraného HDP**

Veličiny, zamestnanosť, nezamestnanosť a HDP, sú v určitom období vždy meniace sa hodnoty a sú tiež vždy v určitom vzájomnom vzťahu

Od ekonomickej aktivity občanov a zamestnanosti sa odvíja aj tvorba finálnej produkcie tovarov a služieb, čiže HDP. Zamestnanosť a HDP sú v priamoúmernom vzťahu. Čím vyššia zamestnanosť obyvateľstva, tým vyššia tvorba HDP.

V analýzach práce obyčajne neskúmame meniaci sa vzťah medzi zamestnanosťou a tvorbou HDP. Z dôvodu väčšej jednoduchosti, väčšej dostupnosti potrebných údajov, skúmame a analyzujeme vzťah nezamestnanosti, zvyčajne jej miery s tvorbou HDP.

Ak pri analýze vzťahu miery zamestnanosti a tvorby HDP platí, že rast zamestnanosti znamená aj rast HDP, pri miere nezamestnanosti a HDP takýto vzťah neplatí. Vyššia tvorba HDP neznamená automaticky zníženie nezamestnanosti a jej miery. Zmena rastu tvorby HDP nevedie automaticky k zníženiu miery nezamestnanosti.

Zmena v miere nezamestnanosti, ktorú skúmal aj americký ekonóm Arthur Okun, nie je v skutočnosti príčinou zmeny reálneho rastu HDP, ale je jej dôsledkom <sup>(5)</sup>.

V nasledujúcich údajoch uvádzame zmeny v miere rastu ekonomiky v HDP a zmeny v miere nezamestnanosti. V dlhodobom vývoji rokov 1995 – 2020 uvádzame zmeny len v koncových rokoch šiestich päťročných cyklov.

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<sup>5</sup> Miera nezamestnanosti podľa VZPS je daná priebežným monitorovaním pracovných síl na základe priameho zisťovania vo vybraných domácnostiach.

**Tabuľka 6: Zmeny v HDP a v miere nezamestnanosti**

ROK	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
HDP	3670	5786	9358	12131	14511	16862
zmena HDP	-	1,58	1,62	1,30	1,20	1,16
miera nezamestnanosti	13,80	18,60	11,40	12,50	10,63	7,60
zmena miery nezamestnanosti	-	1,35	0,61	1,10	0,85	0,71

Zdroj: ŠÚSR – vlastné spracovanie

Z analýzy vyplynulo:

- v druhom období šiesteho päťročného cyklu ekonomiky v roku 2000 vzrástol HDP oproti roku prvého obdobia roku 1995 indexom 1,57 a miera nezamestnanosti sa zvýšila indexom 1,34. Takýto vývoj HDP a aj miery nezamestnanosti bol s najväčšou pravdepodobnosťou dôsledkom relatívne veľkého poklesu ekonomiky po roku 1989,
- v treťom až šiestom období vzrástol HDP indexom od 1,16 po 1,61. Menila sa aj miera nezamestnanosti. Znížila sa v treťom období v roku 2005 indexom - 0,6,
- vo štvrtom období v roku 2010 aj pri raste HDP indexom 1,6, sa miera nezamestnanosti zvýšila indexom 1,1,
- v piatom a šiestom období päťročného ekonomického cyklu pri raste HDP indexom 1,19 a 1,16 sa miera nezamestnanosti znížila indexom - 0,8 a -0,7.

Z analýzy uvedených údajov o zmenách v HDP a v miere nezamestnanosti nám nevyplývalo poznanie, na základe ktorého by sme mohli urobiť zovšeobecnenie o ich jednoznačnej vzájomnej zákonitosti.

Porovnávanie vývoja zmien HDP k vývoju zmien miery nezamestnanosti nie sú jednoznačné. Sú ovplyvňované veľkým počtom faktorov. K nim patrí predovšetkým trh práce a jeho fungovanie v tom ktorom období. V súčasnosti trh práce nie je sférou slobodného automatického pôsobenia ponuky a dopytu po pracovných silách. Vzťah ponuky a dopytu je do značnej miery regulovaný. Je regulovaný nielen hospodárskou politikou a reguláciou štátu, ale aj odborovými organizáciami zamestnancov, dohodami zamestnávateľských združení a aj vonkajšími podmienkami.

K vonkajším podmienkam patrí meniaci sa globalizačný proces, zvyšujúca sa naša závislosť v medzinárodných inštitúciách ako je Európska únia, Svetová banka. V súčasnosti k väčšej závislosti pristúpili aj ekonomické sankcie EÚ, ktorým sa podriadujeme a ktoré tiež do značnej miery vplyvajú na trh práce. Skúmanie vzťahu zmien tvorby HDP na obyvateľa a zmien miery nezamestnanosti neukázalo pravidelnú závislosť a zákonitosť. Obidve veličiny HDP i miera nezamestnanosti mali svoje vlastné cesty vývoja.

Analýzy potvrdili, že aj hodnotenie regiónov podľa kritérií zamestnanosť a nezamestnanosť a ich mier zodpovedá hodnoteniu podľa tvorby veľkosti HDP. Vyššiu mieru nezamestnanosti mali banskobystričský, košický a prešovský región. Tieto tri regióny majú aj nižšiu technickú a ekonomicko-sociálnu úroveň vybavenia a relatívne aj nižšiu životnú úroveň obyvateľstva.

#### 4. Mzda, jej úroveň a vývoj

Analýza mzdy prináša ďalší pohľad a poznanie na rozdiely medzi regiónmi. Príjmy obyvateľov a v nich mzdy sú dôležitým kritériom a ukazovateľom posudzovania ekonomicko-sociálnej vyspelosti regiónov. Od ich veľkosti závisí uspokojovanie celého radu sociálnych, vzdelanostných a kultúrnych potrieb obyvateľov.

Kým rozdielnosť v tvorbe HDP v regióne nevidia jeho obyvatelia ako dôležitý faktor ich postavenia, rozdiely v mzdách patria u nich k rozhodujúcim. Väčšie rozdiely vo veľkosti miezd medzi regiónmi ukazujú ich obyvateľom viaceré možnosti aj pre rozhodovanie a konanie, či zostať v danom regióne, alebo z neho odísť do regiónu s lepšími možnosťami uplatnenia a vyššími mzdami.

#### Analýza vývoja miezd

Mzdy povedľa tvorby hrubého domáceho produktu a nezamestnanosti sú ďalším dôležitým ukazovateľom merania a vyjadrovania rozdielov medzi regiónmi.

Analýza vývoja miezd, regionálne porovnanie a ich porovnanie s celoštátnou úrovňou vychádza z údajov uvedených v nasledujúcej tabuľke.

**Tabuľka 7: Nominálna mesačná mzda v bežných cenách euro**

Región	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
<b>Slovensko</b>	339	375	573	769	883	1133
<b>Bratislavský</b>	366	494	770	991	1122	1412
<b>Trnavský</b>	316	351	534	705	799	1058
<b>Trenčiansky</b>	304	344	502	657	812	1042
<b>Nitriansky</b>	295	321	473	636	736	947
<b>Žilinský</b>	299	339	504	686	786	1007
<b>Banskobystrický</b>	310	329	483	635	751	988
<b>Prešovský</b>	275	302	438	594	683	889
<b>Košický</b>	337	369	557	716	803	1026

Zdroj: ŠÚSR – vlastné spracovanie

Z analýzy údajov vyplynulo:

- v uvádzanom období rokov 1995 – 2020 sa nominálne mesačné mzdy celoštátne a aj v regiónoch z roka na rok zvyšovali,
- celoštátna nominálna mesačná mzda vo výške 339 eur v roku 1995 sa zvýšila za uvádzané obdobie v roku 2020 viac ako trikrát (3,34), na 1133 eur,
- vyššiu mzdu ako celoštátny priemer mal v prvom období v roku 1995 v šiestich päťročných cyklických obdobiach len bratislavský región, 366 eur, Najnižšiu mzdu mal prešovský región, 275 eur,
- v roku 2020 tak isto ako v roku 1995 mal len bratislavský región vyššiu nominálnu mesačnú mzdu ako bol celoštátny priemer. Bola 1412 eur a bola vyššia od celoštátneho priemeru o 279 eur. Najnižšia mesačnú mzdu 889 eur mal v roku 2020 prešovský región Bola nižšia od mzdy v bratislavskom regióne o 523 eur a nižšia od celoštátneho priemeru o 244 eur.

### Vývoj mzdy vo vzťahu k HDP a nezamestnanosti

Zmyslom analýzy bolo porovnať zmeny vo vývoji mzdy, HDP a miery nezamestnanosti a tiež poznanie ich vývoja vzťahu, vzájomnej súvislosti a závislosti. Analýza vychádzala z hodnôt uvádzaných veličín v nasledujúcej tabuľke

**Tabuľka 8: Mzda, HDP a miera nezamestnanosti, ich vývoj, zmeny a závislosť**

ROK	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
<b>mzda a jej rast</b>	339,00	1,10	1,52	1,34	1,15	1,28
<b>HDP a jej rast</b>	3670,00	1,57	1,61	1,30	1,20	1,16
<b>podiel mzdy na HDP</b>	0,09	0,06	0,06	0,06	0,06	0,07
<b>miera nezamestnanosti a jej zmena</b>	13,80	1,34	0,61	1,10	0,85	0,64

Zdroj: ŠÚSR – vlastné spracovanie

Z analýzy údajov vyplynulo:

- priemerná celoštátna nominálna mesačná mzda rástla v uvedenom období nerovnomerne v rozmedzí od 10 do 52 percent,
- rast HDP bol v uvádzanom období vyšší ako rast miezd. Výnimkou bol rok 2010 a posledné obdobie rok 2020, v ktorom rast miezd prevyšoval rast HDP o 12 percent,
- podiel mzdy na HDP bol vzácnne rovnomerný 6,0 percentný. Výnimkou bolo prvé uvádzané obdobie rokom 1995 ,keď bol podiel 9,0 % a posledné, uvádzané rokom 2020, keď bol 7,0 percent,
- vzťah medzi mzdou, nezamestnanosťou a ich zmenami bol v celom období nepravidelný. Z analýz údajov sa nedá hovoriť o opakovateľnosti ich vzájomnej

závislosti, pri ktorej by platila zákonitosť. Mzda v uvádzanom období išla svojim vlastným vývojom, zvyšovala sa. Nezamestnanosť a jej miera mali tiež svoj vlastný vývoj rastu a klesania.

Analýzy potvrdili, že vyššie mzdy, vyššia tvorba HDP a nižšie miery nezamestnanosť boli v ekonomicky a sociálne vyspelejších regiónoch. Nižšie mzdy, nižšia tvorba HDP na obyvateľa a vyššie miery nezamestnanosti boli v regiónoch menej rozvinutých.

Z analýz a porovnaní vyplynulo, že rozdiely v regionálnych mzdách sa zvyšovali. V roku 1995 boli mzdy medzi regiónmi vyrovnannejšie ako po tridsiatich rokoch. Vyrovnannejšie boli aj v porovnaní k celoštátnemu priemeru.

Zo skúmania a analýz vzťahu a vzájomných závislosti hodnôt veličín mzdy, HDP a nezamestnanosti nám vyplynul nasledovný poznatok. Tvorba HDP bola počas celého obdobia rokov 1995 – 2020 vyššia ako rast miezd. Výnimkou bolo obdobie roku 2010, keď došlo k poklesu tvorby HDP v dôsledku hospodárskej recesie v rokoch 2008 a 2009. K poklesu HDP došlo aj v roku 2020, v porovnaní k roku 2019 o 3,0 %, pri raste priemeru nominálnej mzdy na celoštátnej úrovni o 3,0 percentá.

Určité zovšeobecnenie môžeme urobiť o podiele mzdy na hodnote HDP. Podiel sa pohyboval v prevažnej miere na úrovni 6,0 %. Výnimkou bol rok 1995, keď podiel bol 9,0 % a rok 2020, kedy bol 7,0 percentný.

Analýzy vzájomnej závislosti medzi vývojom a zmenami mzdy, HDP a mierou nezamestnanosti nepriniesli poznatky na zovšeobecnenie a vyvodenie zákonitostí. Vyvíjali sa i keď na seba závislé, relatívne ako samostatné. Vykonané analýzy potvrdili zaostávanie a zvyšovanie rozdielov v mzdách najmä v regiónoch na východnom Slovensku.

## **5. Čistý peňažný príjem domácnosti**

Analýzami čistého príjmu domácnosti poznávame jeho vývoj v dlhodobom tridsaťročnom období. Ich zmyslom bolo tiež porovnať jeho vývoj vo vzťahu s vývojom a zmenami v tvorbe hrubého domáceho produktu a s vývojom a zmenami vo mzde.

Čistý mesačný peňažný príjem domácnosti, no najmä jeho úroveň, jeho výška je dôležitým kritériom, podľa ktorého môžeme posudzovať vyspelosť a rozdiely medzi regiónmi. Rozdiely medzi regiónmi podľa výšky čistého peňažného príjmu domácnosti vyjadrujú hlavne ich sociálne rozdiely, ktoré sú veľmi dôležitým ukazovateľom úrovne života obyvateľov regiónu.

### **Analýza čistého peňažného príjmu domácnosti**

Podobne ako nominálna mesačná mzda zamestnanca, aj čistý mesačný peňažný príjem domácnosti vyjadruje ekonomickú a sociálnu úroveň obyvateľov v danom štáte

a v jeho regiónoch. Mzda je pracovným príjmom a má ekonomicko – sociálny charakter. Čistý peňažný príjem domácnosti je síce tiež obsahovo ekonomicko – sociálny, na rozdiel od mzdy, viac zvyrazňuje sociálny aspekt v príjme obyvateľa.

Definovanie obsahu čistého peňažného príjmu domácnosti vychádza z obsahu hrubého peňažného príjmu domácnosti. Ten je daný súhrnom osobných príjmov všetkých členov domácnosti, súhrnom hrubých príjmov domácnosti ako napr. príjem z majetku domácnosti, prijaté príjmy domácnosti od iných osôb a iných domácností .

Čistý peňažný príjem domácnosti je súhrnom pracovných príjmov členov domácností očistených od dane z príjmov, povinných príspevkov do sociálnej a zdravotnej poisťovne. Patrí do neho tiež časť z príjmov zo súkromného podnikania, ktorú podnikateľ vyčlenil na potreby a na chod svojho domu, svojej domácnosti. Jeho súčasťou sú aj sociálne príjmy z dôchodkového zabezpečenia, dávky z nemocenského poistenia, štátne sociálne dávky, dávky sociálnej pomoci a podpora v nezamestnanosti. Patria do neho aj príjmy ako sú príjmy z majetku, príjmy od inštitúcií a súkromných osôb, príjmy z predaja poľnohospodárskych produktov , príjmy zo zahraničia.

Veľkosť, výška čistého mesačného peňažného príjmu domácnosti, je jeho hodnota prepočítaná na jedného člena domácnosti. V nasledujúcej tabuľke uvádzame údaje o vývoji hodnoty čistého mesačného peňažného príjmu domácnosti Slovenska a jeho regiónov. Ide o obdobie rokov 1995 – 2020 <sup>(6)</sup>.

**Tabuľka 9: Vývoj hodnoty čistého mesačného peňažného príjmu**

Región	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2019
<b>Slovensko</b>	173	212,08	251,18	348,95	422,83	495,84
<b>Bratislavský</b>	214	270,36	326,6	449,79	554,09	635,11
<b>Trnavský</b>	149	201,22	253,6	373,21	440,17	517,08
<b>Trenčiansky</b>	160	202,32	242,18	355,47	440,72	513,92
<b>Nitriansky</b>	158	206	254,03	343,98	412,3	482,7
<b>Žilinský</b>	161	201,69	241,15	337,53	395,15	456,99
<b>Banskobystrický</b>	187	211,28	241,98	335,25	420,93	499,14
<b>Prešovský</b>	168	195,01	222,83	305,47	359,36	425,18
<b>Košický</b>	181	212,31	243,71	322,07	393,01	466,06

Zdroj: ŠÚSR – vlastné spracovanie

<sup>6</sup> V poslednom období päťročných ekonomických cyklov z údajov ktoré poskytol Štatistický úrad SR v čase písania príspevku je rok 2019 , preto sme ho uviedli ako posledný rok analýzy.

Z analýzy uvedených údajov vyplynulo, že v celom období rokov 1995 – 2019 ako celoštátne tak aj v regiónoch rástol a zvyšoval sa čistý peňažný príjem domácnosti. Celoštátne vzrástol o 322, 84 eur, čo je 2,86 krát.

V regiónoch rástol nerovnomerne. Viac ako celoštátne vzrástol v bratislavskom, trnavskom, trenčianskom a nitrianskom, v žilinskom, banskobystrickom, prešovskom a v košickom regióne, bol rast čistého peňažného príjmu domácnosti nižší ako bol celoštátny priemer, najvyšší mesačný čistý peňažný príjem domácnosti bol ako v roku 1995 tak aj v roku 2019 v bratislavskom regióne, najnižší čistý peňažný príjem domácnosti bol v roku 1995 v trnavskom regióne a v roku 2019 v prešovskom regióne.

Rast a úroveň výšky čistého peňažného príjmu domácnosti vyjadrujú aj ročné údaje v poslednom šiestom období päťročného ekonomického cyklu v rokoch 2015 – 2019 v nasledovnom tabuľke

**Tabuľka 10: Čistý peňažný príjem domácnosti v bežných cenách euro**

Región	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
<b>Slovensko</b>	422,83	440,91	455,83	473,35	495,84
<b>Bratislavský</b>	554,09	576,47	587,56	609,09	635,11
<b>Trnavský</b>	440,17	458,62	475,82	494,78	517,08
<b>Trenčiansky</b>	440,72	460,27	478,42	497,58	513,92
<b>Nitriansky</b>	412,3	436,35	451,22	469,25	482,7
<b>Žilinský</b>	395,15	410,52	423,79	440,21	456,99
<b>Banskobystrický</b>	420,93	435,52	450,62	467,59	499,14
<b>Prešovský</b>	359,36	375,8	390,3	404,7	425,18
<b>Košický</b>	393,01	406,85	421,27	437,52	466,06

Zdroj: ŠÚSR – vlastné spracovanie

Z analýzy údajov vyplynulo:

- ročné analýzy potvrdili rast a nerovnomernosť rastu čistého peňažného príjmu domácnosti. Celoštátne vzrástol za posledné obdobie šiestich päťročných ekonomických cyklov o 73 eur, o 17,5 %,
- tri regióny, bratislavský, trnavský a trenčiansky mali vyšší rast a úroveň ich čistého peňažného príjmu domácnosti prevyšovala každý rok v období rokov 2015 – 2019 celoslovenský priemer,
- päť regiónov, nitriansky, žilinský, banskobystrický, prešovský a košický, malo nižší rast i úroveň čistého peňažného príjmu domácnosti ako bol celoštátny priemer. Výnimkou bol v roku 2019 banskobystrický región, v ktorom čistý peňažný príjem domácnosti rástol a bol vyšší ako celoštátny.

Analýzu celoslovenského čistého peňažného príjmu domácnosti z roku 1995, jeho podielu na vytváranom HDP, podielu na mesačnej nominálnej mzde a uvedením miery evidovanej nezamestnanosti uvádzame v nasledujúcej tabuľke.

**Tabuľka 11: Čistý mesačný peňažný príjem domácnosti vo vzťahu k HDP a mzde**

Región	ČPPD	PNHDP	PNM	MN
<b>Slovensko</b>	173	0,04	0,51	13,80
<b>Bratislavský</b>	214	0,02	0,58	6,00
<b>Trnavský</b>	149	0,04	0,47	11,80
<b>Trenčiansky</b>	160	0,04	0,52	7,70
<b>Nitriansky</b>	158	0,05	0,53	12,10
<b>Žilinský</b>	161	0,05	0,53	10,50
<b>Banskobystrický</b>	187	0,06	0,60	15,60
<b>Prešovský</b>	168	0,07	0,61	16,40
<b>Košický</b>	181	0,05	0,53	18,70

Zdroj: ŠÚSR – vlastné spracovanie

ČPPD = čistý peňažný príjem domácnosti; PNHDP = podiel na HDP; PNM = podiel na mzde; MN = miera nezamestnanosti

Z analýzy štatistických údajov vyplynulo:

- v roku 1995 celoštátny mesačný čistý peňažný príjem domácnosti bol 173 eur a jeho podiel na tvorbe HDP bol 4 %,
- na úrovni regiónov bol mesačný čistý peňažný príjem rozdielny. Najvyšší 214 eur bol v bratislavskom regióne. Bol vyšší od celoštátneho o 41 eur. Jeho podiel na vytváranom HDP bol 2 %,
- najnižší 149 eur bol v trnavskom regióne. V porovnaní s celoštátnym bol nižší o 24 eur. V porovnaní s bratislavským bol nižší o 65 eur. Jeho podiel na vytváranom HDP bol 4 percentá,
- podiel regionálnych čistých peňažných príjmov domácnosti na vytváranom HDP bol v rozmedzí od 2 do 7 percent,
- podiel čistého peňažného príjmu domácnosti na hodnote nominálnej mesačnej mzde bol v rozmedzí od 47 do 61 percent,
- miera nezamestnanosti bola v roku 1995 relatívne vysoká. Celoštátne 13,8 %, v regiónoch od 6 % v bratislavskom, do 18,7 % v košickom regióne.

Analýzu údajov tých istých, ale hodnotové rozdielných veličín ako v roku 1995, sme urobili aj za rok 2019. Z nej vyplynulo: v porovnaní s rokom 1995 sa v roku 2019 zvýšila



hodnota celoslovenského mesačného čistého príjmu domácnosti o 323 eur zo 173 na 496 eur, 2,86 krát. V regiónoch sa zvýšil rozdielne, najviac v bratislavskom regióne o 421 euro z 214 na 635 euro. Najnižší mesačný čistý peňažný príjem mali domácnosti v prešovskom regióne 425 eur, menej od celoštátneho o 71 eur, o 15 %. V roku 1995 bol rozdiel len 5 eur, 3 percentá. Z analýzy údajov tiež vyplýva, že podiel čistého peňažného príjmu domácnosti na HDP a na mzde sa v uvedenom období podstatnejšie nemenil.

## **Záver**

Výkonnosť ekonomiky Slovenska meraná tvorbou HDP na obyvateľa sa za tridsať rokov samostatnosti sa zvýšila 4,54 násobne. Rast výkonnosti ekonomiky v regiónoch bol nerovnomerný. Najvyšší ekonomický rast a tvorby HDP bol v bratislavskom regióne a na západnom Slovensku. Nižší bol v banskobystrickom, košickom a prešovskom regióne. Tieto tri regióny boli relatívne v tvorbe HDP v roku 2020 v porovnaní k celoštátnemu priemeru HDP v horšom postavení ako v roku 1995.

Analýzy ekonomickej aktivity obyvateľov potvrdili, že ekonomicky vyspelejšie regióny, s vyššou tvorbou HDP mali vyššiu zamestnanosť a nižšiu mieru nezamestnanosti ako regióny menej ekonomicky rozvinuté. Najnižšiu mieru nezamestnanosti mal v roku 2020 bratislavský región 4,7 % a najvyššiu prešovský 11,4 percenta.

Mzda sa zvyšovala celoštátne a aj v regiónoch. Celoštátne vzrástla 3,4 krát. V regiónoch jej rast bol rozdielny, v neprospech menej rozvinutých regiónov. V porovnaní s celoštátnym priemerom z roku 1995 mzda v roku 2020 vrástla v bratislavskom regióne z podielu 1,08 na 1,25. V ostatných regiónoch došlo k jej relatívnemu poklesu. Najviac v banskobystrickom z 0,91 na 0,87, v prešovskom z 0,81 na 0,78, košickom z 0,99 na 0,90.

Mesačný čistý peňažný príjem domácnosti vzrástol na celoštátnej i regionálnych úrovniach. Vyšší ako celoštátny priemer bol v roku 1995 v bratislavskom, v banskobystrickom a košickom regióne. V roku 2020 podiel na celoštátnom priemere k roku 1995 vrástol v bratislavskom regióne z 1,23 na 1,28. V trnavskom z 0,86 na 1,04, v trenčianskom z 0,92 na 1,03, v nitrianskom z 0,91 na 0,97. Poklesol v žilinskom z 0,93 na 0,92, v banskobystrickom z 1,08 na 1,00. V prešovskom z 0,97 na 0,85 a v košickom z 1,04 na 0,93.

Z analýz vyplynulo, že najväčšie rozdiely v regiónoch sú v ich ekonomickej výkonnosti a najnižšie v mesačnom čistom peňažnom príjme domácnosti. Výsledky analýz tiež preukázali zvyšovanie rozdielov v porovnaní k celoštátnemu priemeru vo všetkých analyzovaných ukazovateľoch v banskobystrickom, košickom a prešovskom regióne.

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ŠÚ SR: Štatistická ročenka regiónov Slovenska - roky: 2012 – 2020.

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# Organizační kultura ve veřejné správě Organizational Culture in Public Administration

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<https://doi.org/10.33542/VSS2023-1-3>

## Abstract

*The paper identifies changes in the dimensions of organizational culture in the period before the Covid-19, just after the pandemic, and also identifies the type of organizational culture in public administration institutions as demanded by employees. Respondents were municipal officials randomly selected from all regions of the Czech Republic. The OCAI questionnaire was used for the online survey. After statistical processing of the data obtained from 1,189 respondents, it was confirmed that the clan type prevails in all the periods under study. It was found that there was no statistically significant relationship between gender, age, length of employment, gender of manager and dimensions of organizational culture types. It can be concluded that the pandemic did not have any dramatic effect on the changes in organizational culture in public administration. The practical significance lies in the identification of changes in the location of dimensions in types of organizational culture. Knowing the location of dimensions in different types is essential for managers as it can lead them to create an appropriate organizational culture, which is a condition for the performance of any organization not excluding public administration.*

**Key words:** public administration, organisational culture, OCAI, Covid-19.

## Úvod

Mezi autory nepanuje shoda v definici organizační kultury (dále OK). Přesto autoři uznávají, že organizační kultura je důležitým subsystémem organizace, který určuje efektivitu organizace a kvalitu pracovního života jejích členů (např. Trice a Beyer, 1990; Schein, 1992; Cameron a Quinn, 1999; Schein a Schein, 2016; Miranda-Wolff, 2022). Organizační kultura je definována jako fenomén sestávající z jednotlivých prvků. Základní hodnoty, postoje a přesvědčení, které v organizaci existují, vzorce chování, které z těchto sdílených významů vyplývají, a symboly, které vyjadřují spojení mezi přesvědčením, hodnotami a chováním členů organizace (Denison, 1990). Organizační kultura je výsledkem procesu učení. Je výsledkem kumulace zkušeností předávaných jednotlivcům v procesu socializace, zajišťuje kontinuitu, snižuje nejistotu zaměstnanců a ovlivňuje jejich pracovní spokojenost a emocionální pohodu, je zdrojem motivace a může být konkurenční výhodou. Na OK lze nahlížet z různých hledisek a vztahů (např. Handy, 1993; Deal a Kennedy, 1982; Trompenaars, 1993; Hall, 1995;

Goffee a Jones, 1998). Pro zde prezentovaný výzkum byla zvolena typologie Camerona a Quinna (1999).

Účel a cíle veřejné správy se od podnikatelských objektů liší. Co mají společné, je existence organizační kultury. Ta ve veřejné správě, stejně jako v podnikatelských subjektech, významně ovlivňuje výkonnost a dosahování cílů, i když rozdílné povahy.

Pandemická situace měla dopad na osobní i profesní život každého z nás. S protiepidemickými opatřeními dochází také ke změně organizační kultury. Management musí být schopen reagovat na změny a přijímat nová řešení, aby mimo jiné nedošlo k oslabení organizační kultury.

Byla formulována výzkumná otázka: Měla pandemie vliv na organizační kulturu veřejné správy? Postup zpracování je následující. Nejprve je představena problematika organizační kultury s klíčovým aspektem veřejné správy a modely organizační kultury. Po popisu použitých metod jsou prezentovány a diskutovány statisticky zpracované výsledky získané z dotazníkového šetření. Nakonec jsou shrnuty klíčové závěry výzkumu a diskutována omezení a přínosy výzkumu.

## **1. Teoretická východiska zkoumané problematiky**

Organizační kultura je obrazem vedení a je považována za důležitý cíl vedoucích pracovníků. Nejde jen o jednotlivce nebo jen o organizaci. Mezilidské vztahy, prostředí, seberealizace a rozvoj lidské osobnosti, výkonnost a spokojenost zaměstnanců, image a značka organizace, to vše je organizační kultura. Souvisí s chováním a přístupem vedení, výkonností organizace a chováním organizace a zaměstnanců. Pochopení pojmu organizační kultura je klíčem k pochopení organizace a všeho, co s ní souvisí. Konkrétní vymezení obsahu tohoto pojmu se liší, ale rámec pro pochopení konceptu organizační kultury je podobný (viz např. Denison, 1990; Hall, 1995; Drennan, 1992; Schein, 1992; Brown, 1995; Sackmann, 2006).

Pro účely tohoto výzkumu je pojem organizační kultura chápán jako soubor základních předpokladů, hodnot, postojů, norem chování, které jsou v organizaci sdíleny a které se projevují v myšlení, cítění a chování členů organizace a v artefaktech materiální i nemateriální povahy.

Prvky organizační kultury nepůsobí izolovaně. Snahy o objasnění strukturálních vztahů vedly některé autory k formulaci modelů organizační kultury. Nejcitovanějším a nejpoužívanějším modelem je pravděpodobně Scheinův model (1992). Svým pojetím organizační kultury jako fenoménu strukturovaného do tří úrovní (artefakty, hodnoty a normy a základní přesvědčení) ovlivnil Schein celou generaci vědců. S tímto pojetím se ztotožňuje řada autorů (např. Schneider a Barsoux, 1997). Někteří jej dále rozpracovávají, např. Lundberg (1996). Jiní autoři strukturují obsah organizační kultury odlišně (např. Kotter a Heskett, 1992;

Hall, 1995; Hofstede, 2001). Síla organizační kultury je ovlivněna řadou faktorů. Autoři věnují jednotlivým vlivům různou pozornost a různě je klasifikují (např. Handy, 1993; Drennan, 1992; Brown, 1995).

Pokud chtějí manažeři řídit organizaci s ohledem na její kulturní aspekty a cíleně utvářet obsah kultury tak, aby podporoval výkonnost, musí kulturu své organizace znát a rozumět jí. Na základě znalosti obsahu kultury mohou identifikovat její silné a slabé stránky a cíleně volit účinné taktiky řízení. Zde se ukazuje praktický význam typologií organizačních kultur. Typologie mohou manažerům pomoci porovnat obsah kultury jejich organizace s typickými případy, a tím ji lépe poznat a pochopit. Autory první typologie jsou pravděpodobně Harrison (1972) a Handy (1993). Základem typologie Trompenaara (1993) jsou dvě dimenze: orientace na úkoly versus orientace na vztahy a hierarchie versus rovnost. Zatímco Deal a Kennedy (1982) formulovali svou teorii z hlediska vztahu mezi organizační kulturou a vlivy prostředí, Ansoff a kol. (2018) rozlišují typy organizační kultury podle toho, jak organizace reaguje na požadavky prostředí. Bridgesova (1992) typologie zahrnuje až šestnáct organizačních typů. Dvě dimenze, sociabilita a solidarita tvoří základ "dvojitě S kostky" Goffeeho a Jonese (1998).

Model Camerona a Quinna (1999), který byl zvolen pro tento výzkum, vychází z modelu konkurenčních hodnot (Quinn a Rohrbaugh, 1999). Tento model byl vybrán proto, že vystihuje atmosféru v organizaci, styl vedení a kritéria úspěchu organizace. To souvisí s tím, že model byl formulován v souvislosti s hledáním podmínek efektivnosti organizace.

Základními dimenzemi modelu jsou flexibilita versus stabilita a vnitřní versus vnější zaměření. Typy kultury definované autory pomocí těchto dimenzí jsou označovány jako klanová, hierarchická, adhokratická a tržní. Každý typ se vyznačuje cíli, ke kterým organizace směřuje, a nástroji, které k jejich dosažení používá.

Klanovou kulturu charakterizuje přátelské pracovní prostředí, sdílené hodnoty a cíle a týmové myšlení. Má spíše charakter rozšířené rodiny než organizace. Závazek vůči organizaci je vysoký. Zdůrazňuje se přínos rozvoje každého jednotlivce, zákazníci jsou vnímáni jako partneři. Týmová práce, účast a konsensus jsou v organizaci považovány za prvořadé.

Kultura hierarchie představuje formalizované a strukturované pracovní prostředí, klade důraz na postupy a předpisy, kdy jednotícím prvkem jsou formální pravidla. Hladký chod organizace je považován za prvořadý, cílem je stabilita a efektivita. Úspěch je definován jako spolehlivost dodávek, dodržování termínů a nízké náklady. Řízení zaměstnanců je zaměřeno především na zajištění jejich stability.

V adhokracii je pracoviště dynamickým podnikatelským a tvůrčím prostředím. Lidé jsou ochotni riskovat, manažeři jsou vizionáři a inovátoři. Inovativní přístupy a experimentování organizaci stmelují. Důraz je kladen na to, aby organizace byla lídrem ve svém oboru nebo vyvíjela nové produkty. Inovace a schopnost přizpůsobit se turbulentnímu prostředí jsou

považovány za zdroj ziskovosti a v tomto smyslu je posuzována úspěšnost organizace. Hlavním úkolem manažerů je podporovat individuální iniciativu a kreativitu.

Tržní kultura je charakteristická pro organizaci orientovanou na výsledky, v níž jsou lidé soutěživí a soustředění na své cíle. Organizaci stmeluje orientace na oboustrannou výhodu, přičemž úspěch je definován získáním tržního podílu. Konkurenci je věnována dlouhodobá pozornost, převládá ostrá soutěživost.

Funkce a úkoly veřejné správy jsou odvozeny od uznávaných veřejných zájmů. Základní otázkou je, jak veřejná správa plní svou roli, jak a s jakou efektivitou plní své úkoly a funkce a jak ji hodnotí občané. Jak uvádí Nica (2013), byrokracie pomalu reaguje na měnící se požadavky manažerů, zaměstnanců a zákazníků. Podobný názor prezentují i Jabbra a Dwivedi (2004). Podle těchto autorů je sektor veřejné správy nepružným systémem, který podporuje nepotismus, problémy s odpovědností, korupci a lhostejnost úředníků. Důležitým bodem jsou zde personální omezení (Brewer a Walker, 2013).

Goodsell (1989) identifikoval pět hodnot, kterými se veřejná správa zabývá: orientace na prostředky (účinnost, efektivita a odbornost), morálka (rovnost, poctivost, spravedlnost, férovost), orientace na mnohost (pluralita, inkluzivita, vstřícnost vůči občanům), orientace na trh (podnikavost, volnotržní řešení veřejných problémů) a orientace na poslání (institucionální integrita, prosazování organizačních programů pro obecné dobro a výkon diskreční pravomoci ve veřejném zájmu). DeRosia (2010) přidal transparentnost, odpovědnost a profesionalitu.

Pro dosažení úspěchu na osobní i organizační úrovni ve veřejném sektoru jsou tyto hodnoty úzce spjaty s charakterem organizační kultury. Kvalitu veřejných služeb nepřímo ovlivňují všechny dimenze organizačního klimatu (Belac a kol., 2017). Vrabková (2019) zdůrazňuje význam implementace nových hodnot organizační kultury ve veřejné správě. Za tímto účelem hraje organizační kultura rozhodující roli při podpoře demokraticko-ústavních hodnot ve veřejné správě (DeForest Molina, 2009). Literatura upozorňuje na podobné rysy kultury veřejné správy. Tomuto sektoru je často připisována kultura konformity (Feldman, 1985), technické racionality (Adams a Ingersoll, 1990), procesu (Claver a kol., 1999), kontroly (Parker a Bradley, 2000), pomalého růstu a inovací (Jabbra a Dwivedi, 2004), kultura hierarchie (Ruževićius a kol., 2012; Belac a kol., 2017), nízká profesionalita (Draskovic a kol., 2018), absence měření kvality (Jasarevic a kol., 2017), absence orientace na zákazníky (Wynen a Verhoest, 2015) nebo absence inovační politiky (Maia a kol., 2021). Úředníci vnímají organizační kulturu spíše jako byrokratickou nebo podpůrnou než inovativní (Mohelská a Sokolová, 2018).

Sharma (2017) tvrdí, že pohlaví a věk zaměstnanců ovlivňují způsob, jakým organizační hodnoty ovlivňují jejich pracovní spokojenost. Zaměstnanci mužského pohlaví preferují růst a příležitosti, sdílení informací a značku zaměstnavatele. Zaměstnankyně preferují pravidla a orientaci na lidi. Chen a kol. (2008) zjistili, že ženy častěji než muži

popisují organizační kulturu na svém pracovišti jako přátelskou. Zajímavý je výzkum Mohelské a Sokolové (2018), které došly k závěru, že se genderové rozdíly neprokázaly jako významné u jednotlivých dimenzí organizační kultury.

Mladší zaměstnanci projevují vysoké nadšení pro práci a vyhovuje jim dlouhá pracovní doba. Starší zaměstnanci se již organizaci osvědčili a o konkurenci a změny příliš nestojí (Sharma, 2017). K podobným výsledkům dospěli také Mohelská a Sokolová (2018). Uvádějí, že mladší lidé se častěji zapojují do organizací s inovativní a podpůrnou kulturou, zatímco starší lidé se častěji zapojují do organizací s tradiční byrokratickou kulturou. To může být způsobeno délkou zaměstnání. Mladší lidé vnímají kulturu organizací jako inovativní a podporující, zatímco starší lidé jsou v organizaci déle, mají své zažité stereotypy a naopak nevnímají firemní kulturu jako inovativní.

Éra Covid-19 přináší manažerům výzvy. Jak odolná je organizační kultura? Které její prvky se promění a které se udrží? Jaký dopad bude mít změna organizační kultury na výkonnost?

Výrazným prvkem, který se v pandemii objevil, je práce na dálku. Nové prostředí práce na dálku znamená výzvu nejen z hlediska virtuálního prostředí (McDowall a Kinman, 2017), ale dotýká se rovněž loajality, spokojenosti a angažovanosti zaměstnanců (Camp a kol., 2022).

Pandemie by měla být podnětem k budování schopnosti učit se odolnosti organizace (Orth a Schuldis, 2021). Během organizační krize mají manažeři možnost přebudovat nejen organizační strukturu, ale také organizační kulturu.

## **2. Metodologie a použité metody výzkumu**

Byla formulována výzkumná otázka: Ovlivnila pandemie organizační kulturu institucí veřejné správy?

Autoři vycházejí ze zjednodušeného předpokladu, že pokud dojde ke změnám v organizační kultuře nebo jejích dimenzích, je to v důsledku pandemie.

V rámci výzkumné otázky byly konstruovány hypotézy:

*H1 Převažujícím typem organizační kultury před Covid-19 je kultura hierarchie.*

Vzhledem k úkolům orgánů veřejné správy a obecně chápané charakteristice práce úředníků se jako dominantní nabízí kultura hierarchie.

*H2 Mezi obdobím před Covid-19 a současností došlo ke statisticky významné změně typu organizační kultury.*

Pandemie si vyžádala rychlou změnu, na kterou musela veřejná správa reagovat. Autoři předpokládají, že aby bylo možné plnit funkce v nových podmínkách, musela se změnit organizační kultura.

*H3 Mezi současným a preferovaným typem organizační kultury není statisticky významný rozdíl.*

Pandemie přinesla nové podněty pro fungování úřadů. Přestože se jednalo především o negativní dopady, autoři předpokládají, že vytvořený tlak měl i pozitivní vliv na způsoby výkonu práce, hodnocení a rozhodovací procesy apod. a ty se odrazily v nové organizační kultuře, kterou by si úředníci chtěli udržet i v budoucnu.

Další hypotézy se týkají preferovaných dimenzí.

*H4 Existuje statisticky významný rozdíl v hodnocení dimenzí OK mezi ženami a muži.*

*H5 Existuje statisticky významný rozdíl v hodnocení dimenzí OK podle věkové struktury respondentů.*

*H6 Existuje statisticky významný rozdíl v hodnocení dimenzí OK podle délky zaměstnání ve veřejné správě.*

*H7 Existuje statisticky významný rozdíl v hodnocení dimenzí OK mezi manažery a podřízenými.*

*H8 Existuje statisticky významný rozdíl v hodnocení dimenzí OK mezi manažerkami a manažery.*

Výsledky těchto hypotéz budou použity pro srovnání s již zjištěnými výzkumnými poznatky, které jsou uvedeny v teoretické části.

Je třeba zjistit typ organizační kultury v době před pandemií a v současnosti. Bude také zjištěn preferovaný typ organizační kultury. U preferovaného typu organizační kultury se respondenti zamyslí nad otázkou: Pokud chce být vaše organizace úspěšná řekněme za pět let, jaký typ kultury bude vyžadován?

Pro identifikaci typu organizační kultury vytvořili Cameron a Quinn (1999) nástroj OCAI (Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument). Obsah organizační kultury zkoumaných organizací určuje šest obsahových složek (dále dimenzí), na nichž je dotazník založen. Ty jsou následující:

- dominantní rysy organizace (charakteristiky prostředí a atmosféry panující v organizaci);
- management v organizaci (co se v organizaci chápe jako vedení, co se považuje za vůdčí schopnosti);
- způsob řízení zaměstnanců (co charakterizuje styl řízení, jaké metody se používají);
- organizační soudržnost (co zajišťuje organizační soudržnost);
- prioritní strategické faktory (na co je v organizaci kladen důraz, na co se organizace zaměřuje);
- kritéria úspěchu (jak je v organizaci definován úspěch).




Pro každou ze šesti dimenzí jsou uvedeny čtyři výroky, z nichž každý charakterizuje jeden ze čtyř typů kultury – klan, hierarchie, adhokracie, trh. Respondenti jsou požádáni, aby označili výroky, které nejvíce vystihují jejich organizaci, a to v období před pandemií, v současném období a také jimi preferovaný typ.

Respondenty jsou úředníci krajských úřadů z celé České republiky. Bylo získáno 1 189 platných odpovědí. Průzkum probíhal on-line po dobu tří týdnů v březnu 2022 (CAWI metoda).

Data byla zpracována statistickým programem TIBCO STATISTICA 13. Průměry dimenzí v jednotlivých typech organizační kultury v předpandemickém, současném a preferovaném stavu jsou shrnuty v tabulkách. Zachyceny jsou rovněž změny jejich skóre ve sledovaných obdobích. Pro prvotní orientaci byla data zpracována pomocí absolutních a relativních četností. Pro další postup a jako podmínku pro zjištění vztahů bylo nutné určit zastoupení čtyř typů OK. Za tímto účelem byl na relativní četnosti použit test dobré shody chí-kvadrát. K identifikaci trendů mezi typy organizační kultury ve sledovaných obdobích byl použit McNemarův test a Holm-Bonferroniho korekce na hladinu významnosti. V poslední části byly při zjišťování potenciálních vztahů mezi typem kultury a ovlivňujícími či ovlivňovanými faktory použity chí-kvadrát test nezávislosti a Mannův-Whitneyův test. Byla zvolena hladina významnosti 5 %. Chí-kvadrát test nezávislosti se používá ke zjištění, zda existuje či neexistuje významný vztah mezi dvěma kategoriálními proměnnými. Mannův-Whitneyho U test se používá k porovnání rozdílů mezi dvěma nezávislými vzorky v případě, že rozdělení vzorků není normálně rozložené a velikost vzorků je malá ( $n < 30$ ). Je považován za neparametrický ekvivalent dvouvýběrového t-testu.

### 3. Výsledky a diskuse

Údaje byly získány od 1 189 respondentů. Charakteristiky respondentů jsou uvedeny na obrázku 1.




**Obrázek 1: Charakteristika respondentů**

Zdroj: vlastní výzkum

### 3.1 Typy organizační kultury

Výpočtem průměrů z relativních hodnot dimenzí lze určit preference typů ve sledovaných obdobích. Lze konstatovat, že organizace se více přiklání k internímu zaměření a překvapivě k flexibilitě (Obr. 2).



**Obrázek 2: Typy organizační kultury ve sledovaných obdobích**

Zdroj: vlastní výzkum

V následujícím textu přistoupíme ke zkoumání jednotlivých typů a jejich dimenzí, jejich statistické významnosti a statisticky významných rozdílů mezi nimi. Takto potvrzené skutečnosti mohou manažerům pomoci při volbě strategií pro utváření organizační kultury.

### 3.2 Změny jednotlivých dimenzí v typech organizační kultury ve sledovaných obdobích

Pro zodpovězení hypotéz je nejprve nutné zjistit, k jakým změnám došlo v jednotlivých dimenzích. Ne všechny změny budou statisticky významné.

Srovnání se provádí ve dvou krocích: nejprve se vypočítá chí-kvadrát test dobré shody, aby se ověřilo, zda je zastoupení všech čtyř typů kultur stejné. Pokud je jeho p-hodnota menší než .05, prokáže se na hladině významnosti .05, že zastoupení čtyř typů kultur není stejné. Tato skutečnost se v tomto výzkumu potvrdila ve všech dimenzích.

Ve druhém kroku následuje post-hoc testování, v němž jsou všechny dvojice kultur u každé dimenze porovnány pomocí chí-kvadrát testu shody s Holmovou-Bonferroniho korekcí hladiny významnosti. Statisticky významné rozdíly jsou označeny hvězdičkou a statisticky nevýznamné rozdíly n.s. (= nevýznamné). Počet respondentů je vždy 1 189. V následujících

tabulkách jsou uvedeny údaje v absolutních a relativních četnostech a výsledky testů se značkami významnosti.

Ve všech tabulkách jsou použity následující zkratky pro označení typu organizační kultury: K - klan, A - adhokracie, T – trh, H - hierarchie.

### Dominantní rysy

Před pandemií lze kromě statisticky významných rozdílů v zastoupení dimenze „dominantní rysy“ dále interpretovat, že zastoupení této dimenze je u klanu statisticky významně vyšší než u ostatních typů (označeno hvězdičkou). V současné situaci dochází ke změně ve vztahu k hierarchii, ale rozdíl není statisticky potvrzen (označeno n.s.). V preferované situaci existují statisticky významné rozdíly mezi typem klan a ostatními typy, což je dáno statisticky významně vyšším zastoupením dimenze v klanu (hodnota 85,7) (Tab. 1).

**Tabulka 1: Dominantní rysy**

typ	před Covid-19				současnost				preferovaný			
	K	A	T	H	K	A	T	H	K	A	T	H
Typ OK												
abs.	579	264	132	214	554	132	107	396	1,019	88	6	75
rel.	48.7	22.2	11.1	18	46.6	11.1	9	33.3	85.7	7.4	.5	6.3
p-value	0.000				0.000				0.000			
post-hoc	K	A	T	H	K	A	T	H	K	A	T	H
Klan	-	n.s.	*	*	-	*	*	n.s.	-	*	*	*
Adhokracie	-	-	*	n.s.	-	-	n.s.	*	-	-	*	n.s.
Trh	-	-	-	n.s.	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	*
Hierarchie	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Zdroj: vlastní výzkum

U dimenze „dominantní rysy“ se počet statisticky významných rozdílů v čase zvýšil. Pandemie si vyžádala mírný pokles ve vykazování přátelského prostředí (posun k hierarchii), ale v preferované situaci opět významně vzrostly sdílené hodnoty a cíle a chápání organizace jako rozšířené rodiny.

Dimenze s nejmenším zastoupením a s klesající tendencí je u tržního typu. Respondenti nehodnotí svou organizaci jako organizaci orientovanou na výsledky, v níž jsou lidé soutěživí a zaměřeni na své cíle, ani nepožadují, aby taková byla. U zkoumaného typu organizace je tento výsledek očekávaný. Preferované zastoupení je však stále příliš nízké (pouze 0,5 %).

U ostatních dimenzí jsou uvedeny pouze popisy výsledků získaných statistickým zpracováním.

## **Management organizace**

V období před Covidem-19 je zastoupení dimenze „management organizace“ v typu trh statisticky významně vyšší než zastoupení v klanu a adhokracii, ale statisticky významný rozdíl oproti hierarchii se nepotvrdil. V současném a preferovaném období je zastoupení v typu trh statisticky významně vyšší než v ostatních typech. U této dimenze způsobila pandemie větší počet posunů v typech OK. Tyto rozdíly byly pravděpodobně nežádoucí, protože jejich počet v preferované situaci klesl pod stav před Covid-19.

Respondenti hodnotili management před Covid-19 jako agresivní, orientovaný na výsledky (trh), spojený s koordinací a organizací (hierarchie). Pandemie vytvořila další tlak na výsledky na úkor hladce probíhající efektivity v typu hierarchie. Tato situace zřejmě negativně ovlivnila respondenty, kteří přednostně požadují, aby vedení v organizaci bylo obecně považováno za příklad koordinační, organizační a hladce fungující efektivity.

## **Vedení zaměstnanců**

V situaci před Covidem-19 a v současnosti je zastoupení dimenze „vedení zaměstnanců“ v typu klan statisticky významně vyšší než zastoupení v ostatních typech. V preferované situaci význam dimenze v klanu zůstává, ale nebyl potvrzen rozdíl oproti hierarchii.

Pokud jde o řízení zaměstnanců, respondenti po pandemii nezaznamenali změnu. Rovněž v preferovaném typu by uvítali rovnováhu přátelského mentorského přístupu, týmové práce, konsenzu a participace (klan) v kombinaci s jistotou zaměstnání, konformitou, předvídatelností a stabilitou vztahů (hierarchie).

## **Soudržnost organizace**

Před Covidem-19 a v současném období je zastoupení dimenze „soudržnost organizace“ v typu klan statisticky významně vyšší než v adhokracii a trhu, ale rozdíl s hierarchií se nepotvrdil. Změna nastala u preferovaného typu, kde je zastoupení v klanu významně vyšší než ve všech ostatních typech.

Žádná významná změna se neprokázala v tom, co lidi v organizaci spojuje. Je to loajalita, vzájemná důvěra a oddanost (klan). Zajímavý je vztah klanu a hierarchie v preferovaném typu. Zde, na rozdíl od dimenze „řízení zaměstnanců“, respondenti jednoznačně upřednostnili klan, tj. týmovou práci, participaci a závazek (klan), před formálními pravidly a politikou (hierarchie).

## **Strategické zaměření**

Před Covidem-19 je zastoupení v adhokracii statisticky významně vyšší než v tržní a hierarchické OK, ale rozdíl oproti klanu se nepotvrdil. Během pandemie došlo k posunu, kdy

se neprokázal statisticky významný rozdíl oproti hierarchii. Dochází k návratu u preferovaného typu, kde se opět neprojevuje rozdíl oproti klanu.

Krize obecně nutí k hledání nových zdrojů a nových postupů. Zde to však není tak jednoznačné. Inovativní přístup, zkoušení nových věcí a hledání příležitostí (adhokracie) sice během pandemie nabývalo na významu ve srovnání s lidským rozvojem, vysokou důvěrou a otevřeností (klan), ale nyní je více vázán na kontrolu, stálost a stabilitu (hierarchie). V preferovaném období se strategie zaměřuje jak na inovativnost (adhokracie), tak na rozvoj jednotlivých zaměstnanců (klan).

### Kritéria úspěchu

Zastoupení dimenze „kritéria úspěchu“ je u adhokracie statisticky významně vyšší než u ostatních typů. Toto zjištění platí pro všechna tři zkoumaná období.

Respondenti uvádějí, že jejich organizace definuje úspěch na základě toho, že má co nejvíce unikátních nebo nejnovějších služeb. Tento výsledek by si zasloužil širší diskusi, a to nejen ve vztahu k činnosti zkoumaných organizací, kterou obecně nelze označit za dynamickou či kreativní. Nicméně i v modelu typů byla identifikována převaha flexibility nad stabilitou, i když nebyla statisticky potvrzena (viz Obr. 2). Jako možnou příčinu autoři vidí digitalizaci státního aparátu, tlak na rozšiřování služeb apod.

### 3.3 Hypotézy

Pro potvrzení či zamítnutí formulovaných hypotéz je na základě statisticky významných zastoupení dimenzí v typech organizační kultury zjištěných v předchozím kroku vytvořena následující tabulka (Tab. 2).

**Tabulka 2: Statisticky významné zastoupení dimenzí v typech organizační kultury**

	klan			adhokracie			trh			hierarchie		
	P	S	PT	P	S	PT	P	S	PT	P	S	PT
Dominantní rysy	X	x	X								x	
Management							x	x		x	x	X
Vedení zaměstnanců	X	X	X									
Soudržnost (tmel organizace)	x	x	X							x	x	
Strategické zaměření	x		x	x	x	x					x	
Kritéria úspěchu				X	X	X						

P – před Covidem-19

S – současnost

PT – preferovaný typ

X – statisticky významné vysoké zastoupení

x – významnost rozdílů nebyla statisticky potvrzena

Zdroj: vlastní výzkum

*H1: Převažujícím typem organizační kultury před Covidem-19 je kultura hierarchie.*

Z Tab. 2 je zřejmé, že v době před pandemií je typ hierarchie vyznačen ve dvou dimenzích (management organizace, soudržnost), přičemž není prokázán statisticky významný rozdíl s žádným jiným typem. Lze konstatovat, že statisticky významná dominance kultury hierarchie nebyla prokázána v žádné ze šesti dimenzí.

Hypotézu, že převažujícím typem organizační kultury před Covidem-19 je kultura hierarchie, nelze potvrdit.

*H2: Mezi obdobím před Covidem-19 a současností došlo ke statisticky významné změně typu organizační kultury.*

V období před Covidem-19 byla zjištěna statisticky významná převaha klanové kultury v dimenzích „dominantní rysy“ a „vedení zaměstnanců“. Kromě toho nebyl prokázán statisticky významný rozdíl s hierarchií v dimenzi „organizační soudržnosti“ a s adhokracií v dimenzi „strategického zaměření“. V současném období výrazně převažuje klanový typ OK v dimenzi „vedení zaměstnanců“. V dimenzích „dominantní rysy“ a „organizační soudržnost“ nelze prokázat významný statistický rozdíl s typem hierarchie.

Porovnání zastoupení jednotlivých typů kultur před nástupem Covidu a nyní je provedeno pomocí McNemarova testu s Holm-Bonferroniho korekcí hladiny významnosti. Kromě porovnání podílu zastoupení jednotlivých typů před Covidem a nyní jsou uvedeny i "pohyby" mezi jednotlivými typy (Tab. 3).

**Tabulka 3: Typy organizační kultury a jejich změny v období před Covidem-19 a současností**

Typ	před Covidem-19		současnost		significance
	abs.	%	abs.	%	
Klan	579	48.7	556	46.8	n.s.
Adhokracie	264	22.2	133	11.2	*
Trh	132	11.1	107	9.0	n.s.
Hierarchie	214	18.0	393	33.0	*
před Covidem-19	současnost				
	klan	adhokracie	trh	hierarchie	
Klan (n=579)	388	69	6	116	
	67 %	12 %	1 %	20 %	
Adhokracie (n=264)	106	26	26	106	
	40 %	10 %	10 %	40 %	
Trh (n=132)	13	25	37	57	
	10 %	19 %	29 %	43 %	
Hierarchie (n=214)	45	12	38	119	
	21 %	6 %	18 %	56 %	

*n* – počet respondent  
Zdroj: vlastní výzkum

Podle McNemarova testu na celkové hladině významnosti 0,05 nebyl mezi obdobími před Covidem a současností statisticky významný rozdíl v zastoupení klanu a trhu. Rozdíl byl identifikován u adhokracie a hierarchie. Zastoupení adhokracie bylo statisticky významně vyšší

před pandemií než v současnosti. Zastoupení hierarchie bylo před Covidem statisticky významně nižší než v současnosti.

Hypotézu, že došlo ke statisticky významné změně typu organizační kultury mezi obdobími před Covidem-19 a současností, *nelze potvrdit*.

Vysvětlení ke druhé části tabulky je uvedeno pro typ klan: Respondenti, kteří hodnotili na svém pracovišti organizační kulturu jako typ klan před Covidem (388 respondentů), uváděli klan i v současnosti v 67 % případů. Někteří přešli na typ adhokracie (ve 12 % případů), trh (v 1 % případů) a hierarchii (ve 20 % případů).

*H3 Mezi současným a preferovaným typem organizační kultury není statisticky významný rozdíl.*

V současném období převažuje statistická významnost klanového typu. Klan zůstává statisticky významný i jako preferovaný typ. Opět je provedeno srovnání zastoupení současného a preferovaného typu kultury pomocí McNemarova testu s Holm-Bonferroniho korekcí hladiny významnosti

Podle McNemarova testu na celkové hladině významnosti .05 byl zjištěn rozdíl mezi současným a preferovaným stavem u klanu, trhu a hierarchie. Zastoupení klanu je nyní statisticky významně nižší než preferované. Zastoupení trhu a hierarchie je nyní statisticky významně vyšší než preferované. Dále bylo zjištěno, že 90 % respondentů, kteří v současnosti identifikovali na svém pracovišti OK typu klanu, by zůstalo u stejné volby jako u preferovaného typu.

V dimenzi „kritéria úspěchu“ nebyl zjištěn rozdíl mezi současným a preferovaným stavem u žádného typu kultury. V ostatních dimenzích je patrný statisticky významný nárůst zastoupení klanového typu jako preferovaného typu oproti současnosti.

Hypotézu, že neexistuje statisticky významný rozdíl mezi současným a preferovaným typem organizační kultury, *nelze zamítnout*.

Další hypotézy se pro účely článku týkají pouze preferovaných dimenzí v jednotlivých typech OK.

H4 Existuje statisticky významný rozdíl v hodnocení dimenzí OK mezi ženami a muži (chí-kvadrát test nezávislosti).

H5 Existuje statisticky významný rozdíl v hodnocení dimenzí OK podle věkové struktury respondentů (Mannův-Whitneyho test).

H6 Existuje statisticky významný rozdíl v hodnocení dimenzí OK podle délky zaměstnání ve veřejné správě (Mann-Whitneyho test).

H7 Existuje statisticky významný rozdíl v hodnocení dimenzí OK mezi manažery a podřízenými (chí-kvadrát test nezávislosti).

H8 Existuje statisticky významný rozdíl v hodnocení dimenzí OK mezi manažerkami a manažery (chí-kvadrát test nezávislosti).

Preferované dimenze jsou uvedeny v Tab. 2. Pro ilustraci je uveden jeden výpočet (Tab. 4).

**Tabulka 4: Dimenze „soudržnost organizace“ v typu klanové organizační kultury**

	faktor	varianta	abs.	%	p-value
H4	gender	muž (n=654)	409	62.5	.983 chi-square test of independence
		žena (n=535)	334	62.4	
H5	věk	≤ 30 (n=144)	69	47.8	.065 Mann-Whitney test
		31-45 (n=202)	101	50.0	
		46-55 (n=509)	352	69.1	
		> 55 (n=334)	220	66.0	
H6	délka zaměstnání ve veřejné správě	≤ 10 (n=434)	245	56.5	.160 Mann-Whitney test
		11-20 (n=195)	119	61.3	
		> 20 (n=560)	377	67.4	
H7	pracovní pozice	manažer (n=409)	208	50.8	.017* chi-square test of independence
		podřízený (n=780)	534	68.5	
H8	manažer	muž (n=264)	132	50.0	.867 chi-square test of independence
		žena (n=145)	75	52.2	

*n* – počet respondentů

Zdroj: vlastní výzkum

Zastoupení klanové kultury v dimenzi „soudržnost organizace“ není statisticky významně závislé na pohlaví, věkové kategorii, délce zaměstnání ve veřejné správě a pohlaví manažera ( $p > ,05$ ). Zastoupení klanu je statisticky významně závislé na pracovní pozici ( $p < ,05$ ), přičemž podřízený volí klan statisticky významně častěji než manažeři.

U ostatních dimenzí bylo zjištěno, že neexistuje statisticky významná závislost na pohlaví, věkové kategorii, délce zaměstnání, pracovní pozici ani pohlaví manažera ( $p > ,05$ ).

### 3. 4 Shrnutí

Pro praktické využití je nutné znát nejen typ organizační kultury, ale zejména umístění jednotlivých dimenzí. Podle jejich umístění lze sestavit úspěšnou strategii vytváření vhodné organizační kultury.

Následující obrázek ukazuje, v jakém typu kultury jsou jednotlivé dimenze ve zkoumaných obdobích dominantní. Ukazuje také podíl respondentů, kteří při hodnocení dimenze zůstávají u stejného typu OK, a nejvyšší podíl typu OK, ke kterému se respondenti posunuli (Obr. 3).



Příklad pro dimenzi „dominantní rysy“: tato dimenze byla převládající v typu klan, a to ve všech třech zkoumaných obdobích. Posuny: 68 %, hierarchie 20 %. To znamená, že 68 % respondentů, kteří dimenzi hodnotili jako klan před Covidem-19, ji takto hodnotí i v současném období. Největší odliv hodnocení, a to 20 %, byl do typu hierarchie. Další posun: 90 %, hierarchie 7 % znamená, že v současnosti by 90 % respondentů, kteří dimenzi hodnotili jako klan, ji také preferují jako žádoucí do budoucna. Největší odliv hodnocení, 7 % je opět do typu hierarchické organizační kultury.

	před Covidem-19	současnost	preferance
<b>Dominantní rysy</b>	klan	klan	klan
Lidé na pracovišti fungují spíše jako rodina. Spolupracují, sdílejí své zkušenosti.			
	68 %; hierarchie 20 %		90 %; hierarchie 7 %

<b>Management</b>	trh	trh	hierarchie
Trh: Management je soustředěn na inovace, nebojí se riskovat. Hierarchie: Management je soustředěn na koordinaci a organizovanost aktivit pro zajištění hladkého chodu.			
	70 %; hierarchie 17 %	30 %; hierarchie 41 %	

<b>Vedení zaměstnanců</b>	klan	klan	klan
Vedení zaměstnanců je charakterizováno týmovou prací, participací, hledáním konsensu.			
	75 %; hierarchie 16 %		91 %; hierarchie 6 %

<b>Soudržnost organizace</b>	klan	klan	klan
Co drží organizaci pohromadě je loajalita, důvěra a vzájemný závazek mezi zaměstnavatelem a zaměstnanci.			
	72 %; hierarchie 13 %		84 %; adhokracie 11 %

<b>Strategické zaměření</b>	adhokracie	adhokracie	adhokracie
Organizace hledá nové zdroje, nové výzvy. Zkoušení nových věcí a využívání nových příležitostí je oceňováno.			
	72 %; hierarchie 12 %		58 %; 20 % klan

<b>Kritéria úspěchu</b>	adhokracie	adhokracie	adhokracie
Za úspěch považuje organizace vlastnit unikátní produkty (tedy i služby). Musí mít inovativní manažery i leadery.			
	76 %; trh 11 %		68 %; trh 12 %

### **Obrázek 3: Umístění dominantních dimenzí v typech organizační kultury ve sledovaných obdobích**

Zdroj: vlastní výzkum

Je zřejmé, že ve většině případů zůstává hodnocení organizační kultury u respondentů stabilní. Výjimkou je vedení organizace a jeho hodnocení v období současnost - preference. Zajímavé je, že v období před - současnost respondenti při změně hodnocení volí nejčastěji

hierarchii. Vedení se tak muselo uchýlit k formalizovanějším metodám řízení a hodnocení. Posun k hierarchii v období současnost - preference není tak výrazný, ale stále převažuje. I zde je cítit touha respondentů po pořádku, pravidlech a stabilitě.

Mezi pohlavím, věkem, délkou zaměstnání, pohlavím vedoucího a dimenzemi typů organizační kultury neexistuje statisticky významný vztah. Nelze tedy potvrdit výzkumy Sharmy (2017) a Mohelské a Sokolové (2018) o vlivu věku či délky zaměstnání, He (2013) a Chena a kol. (2008) o vlivu pohlaví, Garcíi Solarte a kol. (2015) a Roebucka a kol. (2019) o vlivu manažerek. Zjištění, že manažeři preferují klan výrazně méně často než jejich podřízení, je vcelku očekávané. Naopak se lze ztotožnit s tvrzením Mohelské a Sokolové (2018), které docházejí k závěru, že genderové rozdíly se neprokázaly jako významné pro jednotlivé dimenze organizačních kultur.

Hypotézu, že převažujícím typem organizační kultury před Covidem-19 je kultura hierarchie, nelze potvrdit, stejně jako hypotézu, že mezi Covidem-19 a současností došlo ke statisticky významné změně typu organizační kultury. Naopak nelze zamítnout hypotézu, že mezi současným a preferovaným typem organizační kultury není statisticky významný rozdíl.

## **Závěr**

Tato studie empiricky prokázala vliv Covidu-19 i v tak specifické oblasti, jakou je organizační kultura. U subjektů veřejné správy lze za vhodnou organizační kulturu považovat takovou, která vede nejen k plnění zákonných povinností, ale napomáhá i k dosažení dalších specifických přínosů, spočívajících zejména ve zvýšení efektivity služeb, zvýšení důvěry veřejnosti a kontrolních orgánů a přiblížení se svému zákazníkovi, tj. občanovi.

Omezení: Retrospektivní hodnocení charakteristik typů organizační kultury v období před pandemií může být vzhledem k časovému odstupu nepřesné. Dále výzkum vychází ze zjednodušujícího předpokladu, že veškeré změny jsou důsledkem pandemie.

Zjištění nabízejí výsledky pro manažery veřejné správy. Manažerské postupy, které příliš zdůrazňují soutěživost a efektivní výkon se zaměřením na získání trvalé pozice na základě výkonu, by mohly být v rozporu s kulturními hodnotami, které zdůrazňují smysl pro rodinné pracovní prostředí a formální postupy, které byly identifikovány jako vnímané hodnoty spojené s klanovou kulturou. Znalost umístění dimenzí v různých typech může manažery nasměrovat k zamyšlení nad hodnotami a podpořit vytváření zdravé organizační kultury prostřednictvím strategií, které zajistí přijetí hodnot úředníky, protože působí v prostředí s nízkou mírou konkurenčních hodnot.

Výsledky týkající se organizační kultury a odporu vůči dalším změnám naznačují výzvy pro další výzkum. Tímto způsobem lze dospět k závěru, které tradiční hodnoty, hodnoty nové organizační kultury a odpor ke změnám jsou skutečně přítomny.

Jak uvádějí Furnham a Gunter (2015), kultury, které jsou „dobré“ v jedné situaci nebo časovém období, mohou být v jiné situaci nebo časovém období nefunkční. Nelze říci, že jedna kultura je lepší než jiná, pouze že je v některých ohledech odlišná. Neexistuje nic takového jako ideální kultura, pouze kultura, která je vhodná či vyhovující. Moderní instituce však musí být flexibilní, inovativní a schopné se vyvíjet a utváření organizační kultury může tento proces podpořit.

### **Poděkování**

Tento článek byl podpořený projektem SGS SP2022/93 Dopad práce na dálku na organizační kulturu a její propojení s dalšími aspekty práce v kontextu pandemické situace.

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# Migration Crisis in The European Union and Hungary's Legal and Political Attitudes Towards Migration

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<https://doi.org/10.33542/VSS2023-1-4>

## Abstract

*This paper delves into Hungary's legal and political attitudes towards migration in the context of the EU's migration crisis. Specifically, it examines Hungary's response to the migration crisis, including its efforts to restrict migration and tighten border controls, and the underlying motivations driving these measures. Additionally, it undertakes a critical analysis of the legal implications of Hungary's approach to migration, including the potential violations of EU law and human rights. The present article directs scholarly attention towards the contentious nature of Hungary's immigration and immigrant integration policies, undertaking law analysis thereof. The study concludes that Hungary's stance on migration poses a broader challenge to the EU's commitment to humanitarian principles and raises important questions about the future of migration policy within the Union. As such, this study highlights the urgent need for a comprehensive and coordinated approach to address the migration crisis which the EU is dealing with.*

**Key words:** Hungary, Migration, Migration Policies, Migrant Integration.

## Introduction

The advent of the Western Balkan Route for mass migration to Europe in 2015 brought about significant changes in Hungary's political stance towards migration. The country experienced an unprecedented influx of immigrants from a non-European, Islamic country. As a result, it was crucial to make prompt decisions regarding the matter of immigrants, not only for the country's socioeconomic stability but also for the union's future. The Hungarian government has taken a harsh position on migration, implementing controversial policies such as building a barrier around the country's southern border and criminalizing people who assist unauthorized migrants and amending relevant criminal and administrative laws. (Politico, 2017) Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has emphasized that the construction of border fences in Hungary serves not only the interests of the Hungarian nation but also benefits the broader European community. Prime Minister Orbán has positioned Hungary as a defender of European Christian values and a protector of the continent, framing its migration policies as critical to preserving these values. Furthermore, Orbán has portrayed Hungary as a savior of Christianity in Europe.

The issue of migration in Hungary affected international interest for two reasons: first, the country was one of the most affected in 2015, with 411,515 recorded crossings, the highest per capita number in Europe. (IOM,2021) Second, the country's leadership quickly developed a clear anti-migration policy, which has remained unchanged since then. The Hungarian case was initially unique in the European Union due to its complete rejection of immigration; however, many European countries later followed the same policy or decided to pursue similar restrictive measures against mass migration.

This study aims to examine Hungary's legal and political attitudes towards migration and its role in the broader migration crisis in the European Union. To achieve this objective, the study employs a qualitative research design that utilizes both primary and secondary data sources. The data collected from primary and secondary sources will be analyzed using thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is a qualitative data analysis method that involves identifying patterns and themes within the data. The analysis will focus on identifying the legal and political attitudes of Hungary towards migration and how these attitudes have contributed to the broader migration crisis in the European Union. The analysis will also explore the factors driving Hungary's migration policy and the impact of this policy on migrants and asylum seekers. In the first part of the study, the definition of migration is made, and short history of migration in Hungary introduced. In the second part of the study, Hungary's position in the refugee crisis evaluated. Furthermore, Hungary's immigration laws, which were adopted before and after joining the European Union, are examined in detail in order to draw a better profile of the country's immigration policy. The current immigration integration of Hungary is included in the last part of the study, and the study is summarized in the conclusion section.

## **1. Migration as a concept**

Human migration has been a prominent feature of history, as people have crossed borders for various reasons for thousands of years. The search for a better life is often the driving force behind migration, which has been a recurrent "problem" throughout history. The reasons for migration can be classified into two main categories: those that threaten the individual's existence directly, such as wars, natural disasters, oppression, and persecution, and those that are motivated by personal reasons, such as unemployment, a better life, or the desire for a better education. According to B.N. Gosh (1985), migration involves a long-term and stable change of residence, implying the crossing of political boundaries from a demographic perspective, temporary relocations do not qualify as migration, as they are not considered a long-term or stable change of residence. Gosh views migration as a process rather than a physical location, emphasizing the notion of shifting home as opposed to relocating to a new house. While Gosh's definition focuses on the requirement of crossing political boundaries and a long-term change of residence, it does not specify the time frame



required to differentiate permanent from temporary migration. In contrast, the European Union (EU) provides a more specific definition of migration regarding duration, characterizing it as the act of moving across an international border (international migration) or within a state (internal migration) for a duration exceeding one year, irrespective of the reasons or methods involved in the migration, whether voluntary or involuntary, and whether carried out through regular or irregular channels. When considering the direction of contemporary significant migration flows, the European continent emerges as the foremost destination. To achieve a deeper understanding of the patterns and dynamics of global migration, an analysis of the interplay between the origin and destination centers that drive migration is imperative. According to Displacement Tracking Matrix upon examination of this dichotomous structure, it becomes apparent that migration flows tend to be characterized by directionalities from east to west, south to north, from underdeveloped to developed regions, from inland to coastal areas, from periphery to center, and from former colonies to colonial centers. Therefore, for centuries, migration has been a significant part of European history, shaping the continent's social, economic, and political landscape. In Europe, attitudes toward migrants and migration are more critical than at any time since World War II, a world without migration and migrants would not exist. (Duszczuk, Pachocka, Pszczółkowska, 2020)

## **2. Short History of Migration in Hungary**

Hungary has a long history of migration, with waves of migration occurring over time. Prior to the twentieth century, different ethnic groups, including Celts, Romans, Huns, and Magyars, migrated, and settled in Hungary. Around the fourth century BC, Celtic tribes migrated to today's Hungary, bringing their language, religion, and culture with them. The Roman Empire seized the area in the first century AD, and Roman colonies and roads were created. Hungary was occupied by the Romans until the fifth century AD. The Huns arrived in the Carpathian Basin in the 4th century AD, bringing with them their nomadic lifestyle and militaristic culture.

The Magyars (Hungarians) moved to the Carpathian Basin in the late ninth century AD, where they settled and created the Kingdom of Hungary. Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, the Ottoman Empire conquered parts of Hungary, leading ethnic Serbs to migrate to Hungary. Throughout the 18th century, the Habsburg Empire encouraged German and Slovak settlers to settle in Hungary to help grow the country's economy. (Kásler, 2017) These migrations have contributed to Hungary's and surrounding countries' cultural variety over time. The Magyar migration in the ninth century was especially significant since it resulted in the founding of the Kingdom of Hungary and the development of Hungarian culture. Following World War I, Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and population as a result of the Treaty of Trianon. Many ethnic Hungarians found themselves residing outside of Hungary's new

borders, resulting in major ethnic Hungarian migration into Hungary from neighboring nations. During WWII, Germany conquered Hungary, and many Jews were sent to concentration camps. Several ethnic Germans were exiled from Hungary after the war. (Cottrell,1931) In 1947, Hungary became a communist state, and mobility inside the Eastern Bloc was significant, with many Hungarians transferring to other Soviet-aligned nations. Following the fall of communism in 1989, a large number of Hungarians fled to Western Europe and North America. In 1990, a wave of migration occurred in Hungary following the crisis in Yugoslavia, resulting in an influx of approximately 40,000 individuals. The majority of these individuals were of Romanian nationality, with roughly 80% of migrants in 1989/1990 identifying as such. Between 1992 and 2002, the number of Romanian citizens entering Hungary decreased significantly, with only 40% of migrants during this period coming from Romania. However, the majority of these Romanian migrants were of Hungarian ancestry. As of 2002, there were a total of 115,000 foreign citizens residing in Hungary with a valid long-term or permanent residence permit. Additionally, since 1990, a total of 179,000 individuals have acquired Hungarian citizenship through naturalization or other means. By the end of 2000, foreign-born individuals comprised 3% of Hungary's population, totaling 294,000 individuals. (HCSO,2002) Hungary has seen a considerable influx of migrants in recent years, particularly during the 2015 migration crisis.

### **3. Hungary and the refugee crisis: Evaluating the position of Hungarian Government**

The conflict that started in Syria in 2011 has caused a refugee crisis in Europe and the Middle East, and this has had a significant impact on migration policies in both regions. The Syrian refugees, who make up the largest refugee movement since World War II, left their homeland to escape the civil war and look for improved living standards in the EU nations. Since 2015 The European Union has encountered challenges in formulating a unified approach to address the issue of irregular migration. During her speech at the European Parliament Plenary in 2019, on the occasion of presenting her College of Commissioners and their program, President Ursula von der Leyen underscored the intractable nature of migration, affirming that it will persist as a pressing issue. She emphasized that Europe has a duty to offer refuge to those who require international protection, and it is of utmost importance to integrate those who remain within our societies. (Leyen, 2020) On the other hand, some member states, such as Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic have adopted a firm anti-immigrant stance, while others, such as Germany and Sweden, have displayed greater openness towards accepting migrants. In 2020, the Hungarian Minister of Justice, Judit Varga, granted an interview to the German liberal weekly, Die Zeit, which was entitled "We Want to Stop Migration." During the interview, she emphasized the Hungarian government's position on

migration, stating that it does not aspire for Europe to transform into an immigrant continent. Rather than managing migration, the government seeks to put an end to it. Minister Varga acknowledged that various countries have distinct views on this issue and the Hungarian government respects them. She argued that the fundamental conflict lies in each country's right to decide autonomously. (Kormany.hu, 2020) In response to the immigration wave that commenced in 2015, the European Union expeditiously implemented a quota system to equitably distribute the burden of the heavy influx of refugees among the member states. This measure was designed to address the pressing need to share the responsibility of accommodating and providing for the refugees, particularly in the larger member states. In more details, The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rendered a noteworthy decision concerning the temporary mechanism designed for the relocation of applicants for international protection, as established in the Council Decision 2015/1601. The purpose of this mechanism was to address the migration crisis that emerged in 2015 in Italy and Greece, both of which became inundated with the arrival of asylum seekers and refugees. Slovakia and Hungary have maintained a persistent refusal to participate in the provisional mechanism for the mandatory relocation of asylum seekers. These countries have argued that the mechanism violates their national sovereignty and presents a security risk. As such, Slovakia and Hungary pursued legal action against the mechanism by challenging its legality before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Despite their efforts, the ECJ has ultimately dismissed their legal challenge, asserting that the EU was justified in implementing the mechanism under its emergency response powers. Upon the issuance of the European Court of Justice ruling, Hungarian officials dismissed the decision and criticized it as a political maneuver. Minister of Foreign Affairs Péter Szijjártó stated that "Politics has raped European law and values." ECJ issued another ruling on April 2nd, 2020, that the governments of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic violated their obligations under European Union law. Nonetheless, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have consistently declined to participate in this mechanism, citing reasons such as security concerns and cultural incompatibility.

#### **4. Migration Policy of Hungary**

The period of political transition in Hungary brought about a pressing need for the establishment of legal provisions to regulate migratory processes. Over the past few decades, Hungary has gradually developed its legal framework for this purpose. By the end of the 1980s, it had become apparent that a new administrative and legislative system was necessary to manage migration effectively:

*1989 Law:*

the Hungarian government passed a law in 1989 aimed at eliminating administrative hurdles to free movement in and out of the country. The 1989 law, which aimed to remove

administrative barriers to travel and residency, was part of a comprehensive set of reforms designed to liberalize Hungary's political and economic systems. As noted by the Migration Policy Institute in a report, the law was crafted to enable greater freedom of movement for Hungarians, both domestically and internationally. By eliminating bureaucratic obstacles, the law enabled the facilitation of movement within and beyond Hungary's borders, thereby supporting the country's transition towards a more liberalized and integrated society. The 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is the cornerstone of Hungarian refugee law. Hungary acceded to the Convention in 1989, becoming the first Eastern bloc country to do so, and also ratified the 1967 Protocol. By acceding to the Convention, Hungary signalled its commitment to accepting the international definition of a refugee. However, it is important to note that Hungary's ratification was made on the condition that it would adhere to a narrow interpretation of the Convention's definition of a refugee. Specifically, Hungary's ratification recognized only those individuals who face persecution within Europe as qualifying for refugee status. This narrow interpretation has been a source of criticism for Hungary and has led to ongoing debates about the country's approach to asylum seekers and refugees. (Goździak,2020)

#### *Act IV of 1991 on Job Assistance and Unemployment Benefits:*

The 1991 law on the regulation of the employment of foreigners in Hungary represented a significant legal development in Hungary's approach to managing foreign labor. The primary objective of the legislation was to improve the control of foreign workers and reduce the inflow of illegal immigrants. To this end, the law introduced new requirements for employers, mandating the acquisition of work permits for foreign workers and imposing penalties for non-compliance. Through these measures, Hungary sought to ensure that foreign workers were employed in compliance with the country's labor laws and regulations, while also addressing concerns related to illegal immigration and labor exploitation. By enacting such stringent measures, Hungary sought to promote greater accountability and transparency in the employment of foreign workers, safeguarding the rights of both foreign workers and Hungarian citizens.

#### *Act LV of 1993*

In subsequent years, strict regulations were put in place to govern the employment of foreigners, culminating in the passage of the Act on Hungarian Citizenship and the Act on the Entry, Stay, and Immigration of Foreigners in Hungary in 1993-1994. The Act on Hungarian Citizenship and the Act on the Entry, Stay, and Immigration of Foreigners in Hungary, enacted in 1993 and 1994 respectively, constituted two crucial legislative measures that shaped Hungary's immigration and citizenship policies. The Act on Hungarian Citizenship established

the legal framework for acquiring and relinquishing Hungarian citizenship, as well as defining eligibility requirements and specifying the associated rights and obligations. Additionally, it introduced provisions permitting dual citizenship in certain circumstances. The Act on the Entry, Stay, and Immigration of Foreigners in Hungary, on the other hand, laid down the legal basis for regulating the entry and residence of foreigners in Hungary. It outlined the conditions for entry and stay, procedures for issuing visas and residence permits, and grounds for permit refusal or revocation. Moreover, the Act established the legal framework for handling asylum seekers and refugees, specifying procedures for granting asylum and the conditions for refugee status. Together, these Acts provided the legal foundation for Hungary's citizenship and immigration approach during the 1990s and beyond, and while subject to periodic revisions, remain fundamental components of Hungary's legal framework for migration and citizenship. (Act LV of 1993)

#### *1997 Act on Borders and the Border Guards:*

The 1997 Act on Borders and the Border Guards Law was a crucial legal development in Hungary's approach to border management. The legislation defined the tasks and responsibilities of the border guards, outlining the procedures for border control, and establishing the Border Guard Directorate as a new administrative body to oversee the work of the border guards. The law also specified the rights and obligations of those crossing the border and provided for the establishment of border crossing points and inspection zones. The Act on Borders and the Border Guards Law was enacted in response to growing concerns about illegal immigration, smuggling, and organized crime, which had become increasingly prevalent in Hungary in the 1990s. The law aimed to strengthen Hungary's capacity to manage its borders effectively and enhance security within the country. (No. 25/1998 (II.18.))

#### *1998 Act CXXXIX on Asylum*

The 1998 Act on Asylum of Hungary was a significant legal development in Hungary's approach to protecting refugees and asylum seekers. The law established the legal framework for the granting of asylum and the protection of refugees, defining who is eligible for protection and specifying the procedures for applying for asylum. The legislation introduced new categories for refugees, including those who fear persecution due to their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. The Act also established the legal framework for the protection of asylum seekers, including the provision of legal assistance and the right to appeal negative decisions. It outlined the procedures for the detention and deportation of asylum seekers, as well as the grounds for refusal of asylum applications. The Act on Asylum aimed to improve Hungary's ability to provide protection to refugees and asylum seekers, while also addressing concerns related to illegal immigration

and national security. It has since been subject to some revisions, including changes made in 2015, which have been criticized by human rights organizations for restricting access to asylum and violating the rights of refugees and migrants.

#### *The Act IV of 2002*

The Act IV of 2002 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Third-Country Nationals was implemented in Hungary to harmonize its migration and refugee law with the European Union's (EU) legislation. This legal framework was introduced in response to Hungary's accession to the EU, which obligated the country to align its national regulations with the EU's *acquis* on migration and asylum. The Act introduced a novel admission and stay mechanism for third-country nationals in Hungary. The provisions outlined the requisite conditions and procedures for obtaining visas, residence permits, and work permits. Additionally, the Act delineated third-country nationals' rights and responsibilities during their stay in Hungary, such as their entitlement to healthcare and education and the imperative to uphold public order and security. The Act also incorporated EU directives on asylum procedures and refugee status determination, creating a definitive legal framework for safeguarding refugees in Hungary. Consequently, the Hungarian Office for Immigration and Nationality (HON) was established, responsible for processing asylum applications and rendering decisions on refugee status.

#### *Act II of 2007 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Third-Country Nationals and Act LXXX of 2007*

Act II of 2007 sets out the legal framework for the entry, stay, and employment of third-country nationals in Hungary, including the conditions and procedures for obtaining visas, residence permits, and work permits. It also establishes the rights and obligations of third-country nationals during their stay in Hungary, as well as the procedures for deportation and removal of individuals who violate Hungarian law or who are deemed a threat to national security. On the other hand, Act LXXX of 2007 focuses specifically on asylum and establishes the procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status in Hungary. It defines the grounds for granting asylum, sets out the rights and obligations of refugees and asylum seekers, and establishes the Hungarian Office for Immigration and Nationality (HON) as the primary authority responsible for processing asylum applications and making decisions on refugee status.

In order to understand the effects of the migration crisis on Hungary in 2015, it is beneficial to have a grasp of the law changes made by the Hungarian government concerning immigrants and refugees in 2015 and beyond. The immigration flow that began in 2015 as a result of the Syrian civil war had a significant impact on Hungary, as well as other European Union countries. Given its geographical position, Hungary's attitude toward immigrants is

critical for the union. The country is the first Schengen point of entry in the Northern Balkans and, with the exception of Greece, the first continental entry point in south-eastern Europe. (Daher,2020) The emergence of the Western Balkan Road for mass migration to Europe in 2015 led to major shifts in Hungary's political attitude toward migration.

#### *The Government Decree 191/2015 (VII.21)*

The purpose of the Government Decree 191/2015 (VII.21) is to establish a system for the national designation of safe countries of origin and safe third countries in Hungary, which aims to expedite the processing of asylum applications. The Decree outlines the criteria that a country must meet to be considered safe, including respect for human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law, as well as effective legal remedies and protection against persecution. The Decree also specifies the procedure for designating safe countries and involves the Minister of Interior and other relevant authorities. It creates a list of designated safe countries, which is periodically reviewed and updated. While the designation system aims to streamline the asylum process, critics have voiced concerns that it may be used to reject valid asylum claims and could potentially violate international refugee law.

#### *The 2015 CXL Act*

The act officially known as Act CXL of 2015 on the Police, is a law in Hungary that governs the organization and operation of the country's police force. It replaced the previous police act from 1994 and introduced several changes, including new provisions on the use of force, the structure of the police force, and the rights and obligations of police officers. One of the most controversial aspects of the law is the provision that allows police officers to use firearms during crowd control situations, even if the crowd is peaceful. This provision has been criticized by human rights groups for potentially leading to excessive use of force and violations of the right to peaceful assembly. The law also establishes the legal framework for the use of surveillance technologies, such as cameras and wiretapping, by the police. It provides for increased data protection measures and oversight mechanisms to prevent abuses of these technologies.

In recent years, Hungary has taken various steps to tighten its immigration policies. Here are some of the policy instruments of Hungary regarding migration:

- 1- *Border fence*: Hungary built a fence along its southern border with Serbia and Croatia in 2015 to keep unauthorized migrants out. (Pollet and Mouzourakis,2015)
- 2- *Asylum restrictions*: Hungary has implemented a number of steps to limit access to the asylum procedure, such as limiting the number of asylum seekers who can enter the country each day and requiring asylum seekers to petition for asylum at a border transit zone. (Pollet and Mouzourakis,2015)

- 3- *Criminalization of unlawful border crossing*: In 2018, Hungary passed legislation making illegal border crossing a crime. Human rights organizations have condemned the measure for criminalizing irregular migration. (Bill no. t/333)
- 4- *Expanded border guard powers*: In recent years, Hungary has dramatically increased the border guard's capabilities, including permitting them to use force to push back migrants at the border and allowing them to conduct searches without a warrant.
- 5- *Closing of refugee camps*: Hungary shuttered its refugee camps in 2017 and relocated asylum seekers to border transit zones, where they are held in detention-like conditions while their asylum petitions are processed.

## **5. Current Migration Situation in Hungary**

To gain a deeper understanding of Hungary's immigration policy, it is significant to examine the available data from 2015 onwards. According to statistics, in Hungary the number of total applications for asylum dropped from 177,135 in 2015 to 29,432 in 2016, with a staggering 92% decline in Syrian applications to 4,979, a 76% decline in Afghan applications to 11,052, and a 99% drop in Kosovar applications to a mere 135. In 2017, these figures plunged even further, with only 1,432 Afghans and 577 Syrians applying for asylum. The number of migrants entering Hungary dropped to 3,397 in 2017, representing an 88% decrease from 2016. In the first quarter of 2018, asylum applications remained low, with only 280 applicants from various nationalities, including Afghans, Iraqis, Syrians, Iranians, Pakistanis, and others. In 2019, data indicated that 197 Afghans and 171 Iraqis applied for asylum, while in 2020, the number of applicants fell to 15 Afghan, 24 Pakistani, and 16 Iraqi nationals. Over the period of 2018-2020, the number of Iraqi and Afghan asylum seekers showed a steady decrease. Notably, since 2017, some nationalities have stopped seeking asylum in Hungary, such as Moroccans (1,033 in 2015), Kosovars (24,454 in 2015), and Palestinians (1,036 in 2015). (IOM, nd.) As per the UN report published in 2022, the total number of individuals crossing the border from Ukraine to Hungary amounted to 1.8 million by 1 December 2022. Among these individuals, a total of 32,564 lodged applications for temporary protection, with 28,379 receiving affirmative decisions. (UNHCR, n.d.) According to the same data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office in 2022, the number of foreign-born Hungarian citizens currently residing in Hungary is estimated to be 417,021, consisting of 201,872 males and 215,149 females. This represents approximately 4.2% of the total population of Hungary. These statistics offer valuable insights into the demographics and immigration trends in Hungary. (Statat, nd.) In recent years, Hungary has implemented a stringent stance on refugee and migration policies, which has been marked by controversial measures such as constructing a border fence, penalizing individuals who provide assistance to undocumented migrants, and limiting access to asylum. The government's approach has been met with



criticism by international human rights organizations and the European Union, given Hungary's status as a member state of the EU, subject to its migration and refugee laws and regulations. However, the Hungarian government has had disagreements with the EU, particularly during the 2015 refugee crisis, over its migration policy. Hungary has also been involved in deliberations concerning EU-wide migration policies, such as the resettlement of refugees. Within Hungary, migration and refugee policies have been highly politicized, with the government framing its position as one of safeguarding national security and sovereignty. The government has used the issue to galvanize its supporters and appeal to anti-immigrant sentiment. The aforementioned situation highlights Hungary's perspective of immigrants as a potential hazard to both Hungarian and European society. Nevertheless, it is imperative to acknowledge proponents who contend that immigrants positively contribute to various domains, particularly the economy, in their host countries. (Kloosterman & Rath, 1999)

## **6. Migrant Integration Policy of Hungary**

Based on data published by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office in 2022, the number of foreign citizens currently residing in Hungary is estimated to be 202,525, of which 115,576 are male and 86,949 are female. (Stadat, nd.) This figure corresponds to approximately 2% of the total Hungarian population. According to the same data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office in 2022, the number of foreign-born Hungarian citizens currently residing in Hungary is estimated to be 417,021, consisting of 201,872 males and 215,149 females. (Stadat, nd.) This represents approximately 4.2% of the total population of Hungary. Based on immigration data for 2021, a total of 49,069 foreign citizens have immigrated to Hungary, with 33,304 originating from European countries (including the United Kingdom, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, and other European countries), 11,635 from Asia, 2,213 from America, and 1,847 from Africa. (Stadat, nd.) Specifically, 74,193 individuals were residing for employment and other income purposes, 23,252 individuals for family unification, 31,531 individuals for education, 34,275 for immigration and settlement, 2,564 for international protection, and 36,710 individuals for other and unknown purposes. Hungary's migrant population is primarily composed of migrant workers from neighboring states, namely Serbia and Ukraine. Additionally, the country has seen a significant influx of Chinese citizens, many of whom are entrepreneurs engaged in a well-established transnational economy. According to data from 2019, out of the 62,073 first-time resident permits issued, 16.4% were issued for the purpose of pursuing studies, while 62.6% were issued for economic activities. The remaining 6.9% of permits were issued for the purpose of family reunification. In my opinion analysis of available statistics indicates that Hungary does not exhibit characteristics of a country of immigration. Nonetheless, Hungary faces significant challenges in the context of migrants, namely the absence of comprehensive

immigration integration policies and laws. (europa, nd.) The MIPEX assessment of Hungary's immigration policies indicates that non-EU citizens face numerous challenges when attempting to integrate into Hungarian society. The country's overall score of 43/100 falls below the MIPEX average of 49/100. Although immigrants in Hungary enjoy certain fundamental rights and protections, they do not have access to equal opportunities. Immigrants face significant obstacles in multiple areas, including education, health, political participation, and access to citizenship. Hungary must focus on investing in long-term security and improving opportunities for immigrants to ensure equality, as the country's current performance in this regard is below average when compared to most other MIPEX countries. (MIPEX,2020)

### **Conclusion**

Hungary's approach to migration policy can be seen as a mixture of efforts to liberalize free movement and tighten controls over foreign labor, entry, stay of foreigners, and border management. However, the country's narrow interpretation of the definition of a refugee has been a source of criticism and debates about its approach to asylum seekers and refugees. In 2015 during an interview with the daily newspaper Napi Gazdaság, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, expressed his opposition to multiculturalism and his determination to prevent the coexistence of Islam, Asian religions, and Christianity in Hungary. He emphasized that Hungary would take all necessary measures to ensure that Hungary is not subjected to multiculturalism. Additionally, he stated that Hungary welcomes non-Christian individuals such as investors, artists, and scientists. We don't want to mix on a mass scale". (Staff,2015) We observe a consistency in Hungary's migration policies that have remained largely unchanged over the years. The underlying objective of these policies has been to limit the influx of illegal immigrants into the country and eradicate unregistered labor. Nonetheless, the measures implemented by the current administration since 2015 reflect Hungary's stance clearly. It appears that the government has established a distinct security policy that disregards decisions made by the Union. It is worth noting that the European Union is a community that welcomes immigrants, and as Hungary has at least half a million permanent migrants, their integration would facilitate the country's future prospects. However, it seems unlikely that the government will make any progress in enhancing both its immigration policies and its integration policies in the near future.

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**DISKUSIE**

# E-Devlet: Service to the Turkish Citizen or a Tool in the Hand of a Centralized Government?

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<https://doi.org/10.33542/VSS2023-1-5>

## Abstract

*E-Devlet (officially E-Devlet Kapisi) is the Turkish equivalent of E-government. It is a digital environment that facilitates the relationship and the problem solving procedures between the Turkish citizens and their government. Citizens can subscribe with their identity number or TC kimlik numarasi using their mobile devices or computers in order to obtain diverse documents ranging from health care or student status verifications to real estate ownership certificates. Though the E-Devlet seems to be a magnificent invention for the ordinary people that lets them arrange these papers hasslefree, and this method is also widespread in the Western hemisphere, in the frame of a more and more centralized and authoritarian rule under the Muslim conservative AKP governments, it is feared to be a way of controlling the Turkish nationals. As the system is not only willing to serve the citizen but also tries to collect the maximum amount of data on them, the gathered information could be misused and turned against the taxpayers. This effort of congregating all personal facts and figures is likewise a challenge for those responsible of the technical background of the project as shown by a 2018 incident of breakdown when the site could not resist the Turks interested in their family trees published by the government on E-Devlet.*

**Key words:** Turkey, government, e-governance, digital transition.

## Introduction

The Turkish public administration has gone through significant changes under the two-decade rule of the Islamist-modernist Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. At the same time, catching up with Western models reveals all the contradictions of a two-faced development model. On one hand, the extensive usage of state-of-the-art tools democratizes the participation of the citizens. They can express their views and opinion more easily and might intervene in domestic politics more frequently than in the past. On the other, these contemporary high tech applied sciences might contribute to a stricter government control in an already more or less authoritarian style of ruling.

The usage of modern infocommunication system is not only a government vs. citizens „game”, it is also a mutual method of processing and proposing ideals, ideas and precise decisions and implementations. This is not only an abstract area of study, but also a modern

way of propaganda for both government, opposition, civil society and the Turkish citizens. Several questions can be asked concerning the establishment of modern infocommunication technologies in Turkish politics:

- a) Who do use these tools more frequently from among the political actors?
- b) What platforms do they use?
- c) What messages do they try to pass and how they present these directives and information?

The correct answers to these and similar questions can permit the researcher to detect the online presence of the politicians and the citizens. Not only the presence itself, but also its frequency and efficiency. This way, it will be possible of speaking of the quantity and the quality of the online presence of Turkish politicians, political parties, civil society organizations and other non-governmental actors as well as ordinary Turkish citizens.

The information obtained during the study of the online presence of political actors in Turkey can also lead to an obvious option to compare it with the presence in real life. So, real life interactions can be contrasted to the dialogue on the Internet.

In fact, Turkey as many other nations worldwide are moving from an old fashioned form of governance towards the modern concept of digital government where the interaction between the state run agencies and the citizens is organized on online platforms. Electronic democracy and electronic government can have an influence on real life democracy and government. Again, this impact might be double faced: might spell more participation from the side of the citizens and civil society organizations, but can also enforce tight government control on the population. The situation in China in this regard is very alarming, so being too naive in this question is not an option.

## **1. Development of pre-conditions for e-governance**

From a political point of view, the basis for the development of e-governance was created by the neo-liberal turn observed at the global level in the 1980s. While in the 1970s the governments of the world were forced to deal with the economic crisis caused by the rise in oil prices, the period before the fall of the Berlin Wall, especially in the West, favored the development of the social market economy. Within this framework, the leaders of the developed countries tried to bring state services as close as possible to the population. The same period, i.e. the 1980s, also brought rapid changes in the IT world. The rudimentary personal computers appeared and became widespread, the first networks were built, and the world wide web, which was still limited at the time, was launched in the United States. (Akcagunduz, 2013:129)

By the beginning of the 1990s, the bipolar world order had ended. Due to the lack of political, economic and military rivals, the developed western countries found themselves in a favorable situation, which made it possible to put the info-communication tools, which were



becoming more and more available to the general public at the time, at the service of the state and the citizens alike. For several political and economic reasons, Turkey has left behind Western countries in the democratization of governance. This cannot be explained simply by the fact that, both economically and technologically, it has accumulated a significant lag compared to the West, serious, systemic problems were also observed in the country throughout the 1990s. One of these problems was the complete lack of political stability, which is very well illustrated by the fact that the multi-party coalition governments were only able to lead Turkey for a very short time. The political crisis was further deepened by the fact that extremist parties were able to gain power and tried to achieve political goals contrary to the ideal of a secular republic. Staging a so-called postmodern coup in 1997, the army also intervened in politics and forced Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign. The political uncertainty was further deepened by the corruption that permeated the entire Turkish state, thus corruption became a systemic source of economic problems. Since Turkey wanted to be a member of the European Union, the Brussels reports on the country found these points to be the most serious challenges. (Akcagunduz, 2013:131)

Indeed, there was a well visible gap between the level of development of the EU member states and Turkey as far as the development of the IT sector was concerned. This difference was, in fact, due to a lower GDP-level, the underdevelopment of the indigenous electronics sector, the lack of support from politicians and lack of consciousness among the general public, and more specifically the public administrators. (Kutlu & Sevinc, 2010:2)

The European Union not only forced the Turkish government to act politically, but also set a good example for the leaders in Ankara. At this time, EU member states not only used e-governance tools separately, but also started to connect their systems. We can call this development E-Europe. E-Europe is „qualified as a network governance in accordance with its own administrative mechanisms”. (Aktel et al., 2017:773)

Turkey was also in great need of European good practices because the Turkish public administration system itself lagged behind global trends due to the turbulent domestic political period of the 1990s. At the turn of the millennium, the majority of the buildings of Turkish central bodies were not yet connected to the Internet, and they did not have their own websites. Before the AKP came to power, roughly at the end of 2000, the turning point occurred and the digital supply of the Turkish public administration began to grow rapidly. At that moment 599 central level government organizations were connected to the web; this figure increased to 830 on November 2001, 858 on December 2001 and to 990 on April 2002. (Bensghir & Yildiz, 2001-2002:43) The complete technological development of the e-government system also required significant development in the communication methods. Instead of cables, which were considered increasingly obsolete by the 2000s, the Turkish government platforms used and continue to use the TURKSAT Turkish satellite. (Yeloglu & Sagsan, 2009:22)

After solving the problem of equipping the central state administrative bodies with the Internet and homepages of these institutions were born, the left-wing government led by Bulent Ecevit took the first steps towards e-governance. The Turkish Informatics Council was convened on May 10, 2002, and it was decided to launch several major projects that laid the foundation for the later "e-devlet kapişi" system. Developments started by the left, such as the E-Europe+ initiative, the National Individual Information System, the Tax Collection Agencies Automation System and the Turkish National Information Infrastructure Main Plan put Euro-Atlantic integration in the focus of political thinking regarding e-governance. The Justice and Development Party, which came to power in November 2002, and its first leader, Abdullah Gul, could already rely on the basic concept that had been developed by the Ecevit cabinet. (Bensghir & Yildiz, 2001-2002:44)

Not only Ecevit, but also other left-wing politicians of the turn of the millennium were enthusiastic about info-communication tools and advocated their use when interacting with citizens. For example, the head of state, Necdet Sezer, known for his secular and Kemalist views, explained that he finds it very entertaining to be able to communicate with voters by email. Mesut Yilmaz, who served as prime minister twice in the 1990s, even called on IT professionals to lobby for the new government to introduce e-governance as soon as possible. (Bensghir & Yildiz, 2001-2002:45)

Over time, in addition to government services, similar initiatives of local governments also appeared on the Internet and on mobile devices. One of the very first mayoral offices to take steps in this regard was the traditionally left-wing and Kemalist Izmir. In the third largest city of Turkey, three developments were started already at the end of the 2000s. Through one, the residents of the settlement had access to local government services in the virtual space, on the other platform they could get to know the announcements of the local authorities, and on the third they could make payments in a completely secure form. (Uste & Guzel, 2012:54)

Shortly after the AKP came to power, in 2004, Law No. 4982 was introduced, which regulates the government's data management system. This legislation created the legal foundations of e-governance, and referring to this normative text, the supply of state bodies with computers and Internet access was accelerated, and from then on, every state and local government organization had its own website. (Carikci & Yavuz, 2010:103)

Essentially, the criticism coming from the EU and the leftist opposition led to a situation, starting in 2005, in which Turkish ministries and state bodies began preparing for the transition to e-governance. In other words, the development of the E-Government Gateway system, called "e-devlet kapişi" in Turkish, can be explained not only by technical progress, but also as a reform of a poorly functioning state organization hit by corruption and political division. A total of 35 different government agencies started to promote not less than 334 various services in the mid-2000s. (Akcagunduz, 2013:131)

The relative backwardness of Turkey at the end of the mandate of the first AKP government, i.e. in 2007, was clearly demonstrated by the e-readiness study organized with the participation of 69 countries, according to which Turkey was ranked 42nd, well behind the majority of developed countries. (Cayhan, 2008:4) Between 2005 and 2008, one can only talk about sporadic development, the Turkish state's digitization experiments finally came together in 2008 into a coherent system, known to the Turkish public as "e-devlet kapisı", i.e. E-Government Gateway. (Bozaslan, 2019:3278)

## **2. E-devlet as a means of frugal governance**

The introduction of e-governance in its initial phase brought many advantages for both the government and the population, so at that time, i.e. in the late 2000s and early 2010s, few people dealt with the possible dark sides of the system. As long as the AKP governments were able to govern without major social tensions, the voters accepted the change more easily. Just as the popularity of the AKP began to decline with the large-scale protest actions in 2013 related to an urban planning project in the famous Gezi Park of Istanbul, a part of society also became increasingly critical of e-government.

Nevertheless, until 2013, it can be said that several positive features of the "e-government" dominated the public discourse about it. The Turkish population was more optimistic, the political elite also believed that this tool would make the Turkish state more democratic, inclusive and cheaper.

In the second half of the 2000s, the Turkish state apparatus accumulated a lot of useful experience in the field of e-governance in a very short time. Thanks to the above-mentioned 334 digital services, the state saved significant amounts of money, which the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government typically spent on infrastructure development. The latter significantly contributed to the fact that, after 2002, the Islamist political formation overwhelmingly won the parliamentary elections in 2007 as well. Economical governance was therefore of interest to the AKP government at this initial stage of their rule because they tried to use the state budget in a manner as to stabilize the economy and raise the standard of living of ordinary citizens in such a way that they would want to vote for the AKP again and again. By 2011, the "e-devlet" system had reached the level where the Data Collection Directorate (Bilgi Toplu Dairesi) belonging to the Ministry of Development was able to carry out a comprehensive cost-saving study and draw up a cost-saving report. This 2011 report showed that since the introduction of the "e-devlet", the state has made demonstrable savings on the operation of the social welfare and the police, and the introduction of electronic invoicing systems has also resulted in significant revenues. (Akcagunduz, 2013:131)

Savings can be demonstrated not only in terms of material gain, but also in terms of environmental protection. According to the 2011 report of the Ministry of Development, only

the SOYBIS e-governance subsystem, which serves state bodies dealing with social support, saved funds in the amount of 205,583,491 Turkish liras. By the way, by not printing the necessary documents out, the lives of 42,053 trees were also spared. (Akcagunduz, 2013:132)

A very good example of cost-effective operation is the National Judicial Network Project (UYAP), within the framework of which 23 different databases were connected between 2008 and 2011 and then integrated with the digitized population registration systems. Thanks to this, a state survey conducted in April 2011 showed that 1.6 billion Turkish Liras were saved in this sector alone. This amount is 16.6% of the IT development budget of Turkey between 2002 and 2011. (Erdem, 2014:740) In addition to the above examples, it is also clear that the Turkish government prioritized the economic operation of the system. In the initial stages of e-government, it is evident that the most basic consideration was not the interest of the citizens, but rather that the state administration processes that generate the most revenues could operate as cost-effectively as possible. (Ogurlu, 2014:24)

The positive effect of the e-governance system on the Turkish economy and budget does not stop at the fact that less has to be spent on running the state administration, but it also helps the country's development in other ways. According to some estimates, the operation of e-government contributes to the growth of GDP in the long term. The use of e-devlet systems over several decades can increase productivity by 1.4% and employment by 0.6%, creating quality jobs. With this, the cheaper and digitized public administration can increase the Turkish domestic product by 2%. (Gokmen & Hamsioglu, 2010:259)

Since the founding of the republic in 1923, Turkey has been rocked by a number of serious corruption scandals. It should be remembered that between December 17 and 25, 2013, the prosecutor's office initiated joint proceedings against a number of leading Turkish politicians, their relatives and their business partners. Since e-governance is more transparent due to its method of operation, it would be expected that the introduction of e-devlet would effectively counter this problem and make the operation of the Turkish state cheaper. In this regard, it is difficult to judge how well this theoretical proposition is realized in practice. (Zangana et al., 2020:1164)

At one point, however, e-governance definitely increases the costs of the Turkish state, and this point is the issue of cyber security. Protecting sensitive and confidential data stored on digital surfaces is more complicated and expensive than protecting paper-based databases. During the construction of the system, it was necessary to spend money preventing the creation of fake user accounts and all similar fraud. The system had to be secured so that foreign spies could not access it. A special mechanism was also developed to ensure that no one can obtain citizens' data for commercial use, and the integration of banks and citizens' bank accounts required special precautions. (Efendioglu, 2007:229)

### **3. E-devlet as a means of social integration and advancement**

It can be said that at the time of the introduction of the "e-devlet", the system was not discriminatory and aimed at society as a whole. At that time, society as a whole still included the bottom decile, the most underprivileged people. This is well exemplified by the fact that the acquisition of the family allowance and the achievement of entitlement were also carried out through e-government tools. In Turkey, the poorest 6% of the population can get extra cash support if they take care of their children's regular health check-ups and send them to school. After 2005, pediatrician visits and school attendance were also registered on the "e-devlet" interface. With this, the AKP, which was still emerging at the time as a ruling party, simultaneously achieved that even the poorest joined the technological leap that was taking place at the time, and that the operation of the social care system placed less and less burden on the central budget. According to the survey, 11,773,127.40 Turkish liras were saved with this step alone. (Akcagunduz, 2013:132)

The extension of "e-devlet" services to the lower classes of society really points in the direction of cohesion, but it should not be forgotten that as of 2019, nearly two million illiterate people still live in Turkey. Unfortunately, they are largely excluded from the system, since the spread of "e-government" is not accompanied by an educational program for the illiterate and digital immigrants. (Bozaslan, 2019:3279)

During the general spread of e-government services, the Turkish government tried to open up to a wider audience. They soon realized that different communities of people with disabilities have special needs and expectations from the system. In order to meet these needs, the AKP governments created the policy called "No Barriers to the e-government Project". Within the framework of this, more than three million hearing impaired people had access to state services. This also means that the sign language version of the e-devlet has also been completed, and a special frequent questions and answers page has been created for deaf people. (Kilic et al., 2019:160)

In 2012, the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) conducted another major public opinion poll, with which it wanted to test how the spread of "e-government" systems affected the digital culture of the Turkish population. This Household Information Technologies Usage Survey (Hane Halkı Bilişim Teknolojileri Kullanım Araştırması) proved that the opening of e-governance interfaces was also a significant step from the point of view of social integration. In 2012, a little less than half of Turkish households had Internet access, to be exact 47.2%. At that time, 48.7% of the adult population regularly used a computer, and the vast majority of them, 97.3% of computer users accessed the World Wide Web. The survey found a clear correlation between the spread of Internet government services and the use of the Internet by the Turkish population. (Akcagunduz, 2013:138) This means that during the long decade between 2001 and 2012, the number of Turkish Internet users increased tenfold in absolute

terms, and eightfold in percentage terms. Turkey joined the World Wide Web in 1993, but even in 2001 there were barely four million users nationwide (this was 6% of the population at the time). Based on TUIK's 2012 survey, it can be stated that this figure was around 40-42 million people in 2012. (Bensghir & Yildiz, 2001-2002:43)

#### **4. E-devlet as a means of simplifying government administration**

The technical development experienced since the introduction of the e-devlet kapisi in 2008 has not only made administration simpler and faster, but the procedure itself has also become more logical. In Turkey, the clearest example of this is the spread of the so-called MERNIS system. Before the MERNIS plan, every Turkish citizen had some different registration numbers. The Ministry of Justice, the police, the Social Security, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Defense, as well as many other sub-systems of the government, registered the Turks under a separate number. Within the framework of the MERNIS project, the General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs (Nüfus ve Vatandaşlık İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü) used the personal number (kimlik numarası) as a basis from 2017, and built a new and partly decentralized registration system using it. As part of this, the data of Turkish citizens is collected at the district level. In order for this to function without problems, the district population registers were modernized and their databases digitized. Data management and data storage related to individuals have been standardized in these district centers. If necessary, this is the level that provides data about the person concerned to other government bodies. (Bozkurt, 2017:94)

The unification of population register data is logical and practical in many cases, but it can sometimes be alarming for the average citizen. These district data providers not only know whether the citizen has already completed his military service or whether he pays for his health insurance, but they can also have information about the person's major purchases, statistical analyzes can be carried out without the person's knowledge, and they can offer targeted government services to the person's attention. According to the narrative of the government, this is of course not about stronger control, but simply about bringing the government and the citizen closer to each other. (Bozkurt, 2017:94)

If we take stock of who benefits from the MERNIS system introduced by the AKP government in 2017, it is clear that the government is the one that gets the most. Thanks to MERNIS, it has become easier to collect taxes and contributions, control tax evaders, and expose fraudsters abusing land registry and bank documents. Based on the MERNIS databases, the government can plan investments and infrastructure developments financed by the central budget in an easier and more targeted way. The public administration is aware of where citizens are and who are crossing the national border. The army organizes the conscriptions with the help of MERNIS, and the Ministry of Education checks here whether the

compulsory students attend school. In contrast, the citizen does not get much. Maybe it's just that now they don't fill out your ID card by hand, so they can't write your name wrong. (Bozkurt, 2017:96)

## **5. E-devlet from the users' side**

It is clear that the political leadership of the country operating the e-government system can and wants to achieve many social, political and economic goals with the digital transition. It is also evident that the system is much more important to the political elite than to the average citizen, but it cannot be denied that the latter are also making more and more use of the convenience provided by the system. A questionnaire survey in 2010 tried to map who and how this opportunity was used during the year or two after the development of the e-government gateway. At this initial stage of the project, the most popular service was the request for information about personal identification numbers. 57.2% of the surveyed users utilized the digital government platform for this purpose. It is not surprising that the young people were the ones who understood the importance of the system the earliest, as the second most common digital interaction with 42.2% can be found in connection with university entrance exams and the results of semester exams. In addition, quite a few people used state databases to access phone numbers, health insurance or tax information. (Carikci & Yavuz, 2010:113)

The users of the initial era made it clear in 2010 that the Turkish state was not sufficiently prepared for the digital transition either at the national or local level. According to the above-mentioned questionnaire survey, neither the expertise nor the infrastructural capabilities of the state bodies were at the level that citizens expected, and they complained that the government agencies and their employees did not help them with the electronic processes. Internet users believe that the Turkish state does not have enough trained and experienced IT staff, and that they do not want to support citizens who are less experienced in informatics. The situation can also be described as the fact that at the beginning of the 2010s, the infrastructure for IT developments was not yet in place. At the same time, the majority was still optimistic and believed that the AKP would be able to cure the childhood diseases of the e-devlet kapisi. (Carikci & Yavuz, 2010:115)

Carikci and Yavuz's 2010 survey also looked for the answer to how the typical profile of users could be drawn. They found that the most active citizens are from the age group of university students to the age of 50, with the demand for digital services falling drastically after the age of 51. By definition, most of the people involved were still among those with a higher education. They were very happy with the possibilities and highlighted the fact that the state administration uses less paper and protects the environment. (Carikci & Yavuz, 2010:116)

In 2015, Celik and Kabakus examined, within the framework of a quantitative analysis, how Turkish users of e-governance relate to the system itself. They were mostly interested in whether the respondents thought the e-devlet would make their lives easier. The result shows that the majority of Turkish users believe that official administration is easier with this new method, but only 15.59% said that they strongly believe that we are facing a positive change. The most skeptical about e-devlet are urban residents, people with primary school education and people working in the public sector. It is shocking that about 48.2% of public employees believe that digital government services do not make our lives better. (Celik & Kabakus, 2015:189) A survey conducted in a rural hospital in 2013 shows better results within the health care professional layer. Within this educated and partly intellectual stratum, the e-government is better known and popular. 58.5% of the respondents were happy that such services exist and that some of them are also available on mobile devices. 88.2% of the people involved also highlighted that the system provides them with useful feedback information and enables them to communicate with their colleagues and patients on different platforms. (Naralan et al., 2013:50)

From the users' point of view, it is a very important consideration that their sensitive and personal data stored in the system is safe. During the construction of the e-devlet system, there were several cases that upset public opinion for a reason. Such was the case in the middle of the 2000s, when the computer of the head of the local government was stolen in the Batikent district of the Turkish capital, Ankara, along with the data of about 45,000 citizens. The case, which also came to light in the mid-2000s, and according to which some municipal and government computers were connected to foreign Internet providers, not Turkish, for economic reasons, also caused a great uproar. In this case, there was a risk that the sensitive and secret data of Turkish citizens could have been leaked out of the country, and some people could even have misused it. (Efendioglu, 2007:227)

In some e-government applications, as a result of an inquiry process, many personal and corporate information unintentionally emerge and this situation poses a significant danger in terms of information security. (Seferoglu et al., 2011:298) This is why some Turkish citizens have approached digital government services with suspicion since the early 2010s, saying that they do not feel the security of their data is guaranteed, and they have complained that the sanctity of their privacy is or may be violated. Many people were reluctant to conduct financial transactions on these platforms. (Kervenaoel & Kocoglu, 2012:359) Although Turkish citizens are remarkably suspicious of those who govern them, in fact the legal environment is given as the 2010 constitutional amendment states that every Turkish citizen is the owner of his own data and that only they can decide on its usability. However, beautiful theory does not always match the practice. (Mamur Isikci, 2017:1903)




Every two years, the European Union examined the development of e-governance in the member states of the community and in the candidate countries. Both the 2013, 2015 and 2017 reports state that the Turkish e-government gateway is user-friendly and provides a good service to the citizens, but in almost all cases the Turkish digital government is criticized from the point of view that communication between the Turkish system and European countries is not well resolved, which would be one of the basic conditions for European integration. (Ekinici, 2018:343)

## **6. E-devlet in the era of mass consumption**

Although Internet use spread worldwide in the 2010s and the web became accessible to most citizens in almost every situation and moment of life in most countries, Turkey still lags behind developed nations. Based on the E-Government Index introduced by the United Nations, Turkey belongs to the middle range of member states. The first such survey was conducted by the UN in 2008. At that time, out of the 192 countries examined, Turkey was in 76th place with a development index of 0.4834. After eight years, in 2016, the international organization showed a higher value, but an index of 0.59 was only enough to take 68th place. (Ekinici, 2018:339)

The fact that Turkey does not occupy a prominent place in the ranking of countries in the world does not prevent the dynamic development of the system, and even in recent years experts have noticed that the number of users is constantly growing, and that access is increasingly transferred to mobile devices. Between May 2018 and February 2020, for example, the number of registered users increased by 22%, which exceeded 45 and a half million people at the beginning of 2020. In the same period, the number of mobile applications connected to the e-devlet Kapisi system increased by 80%. (Karasoy & Babaoglu, 2020:125) The reason for the late spread of applications for mobile phones is that the Turkish government could not start early dealing with the integration of different IT systems, which is a prerequisite for websites running on computers to be stably available on mobile devices as well. One such challenge that Turkish professionals had to solve during the 2010s was that there are dozens of mobile data providers operating in the country, and thanks to them, more than 60 mobile Internet browsers are available to Turkish users. (Kervenaoel & Kocoglu, 2012:357) One of the barriers to interoperability is that Turkish state bodies and the average Turkish citizen often do not use the same file formats due to the fact that the government operates large, comprehensive networks, in which the rapid flow of data is difficult to solve using the extensions that ordinary mortals use. It is in the interest of the Turkish state that in order to protect sensitive data from an economic and IT perspective, the country's system can be independent from worldwide structures. On the other hand, most people prefer the most globally

widespread IT tools. This means that there is a clear difference of interest between the government and the citizens. (Medeni et al., 2009:3)



**Table 1: The number of users of "e-devlet kapisi" and the quantitative change of mobile applications connected to the system in Turkey between 2018 and 2020.**

Source: Karasoy and Babaoglu, 2020:125

The transition to the presidential system significantly influenced the legal background and operation of e-devlet gateway. As in other areas of the Turkish state administration, a strong centralization can be observed in the case of digital services since the 2018 constitutional amendments. A Digital Transition Office was established within the presidential office of the republic, which receives instructions directly from the head of state, i.e. Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself took charge of this key area. (Duman & Aktel, 2021:636)

By the 2020s, e-governance services have become completely natural for Turkish society as a whole. The usefulness and functional errors of the system were mostly demonstrated by the closures caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the overloading of the healthcare system and the virtualization of some healthcare services in 2020, at the peak of the disease. According to the Turkish government portal's own data, out of the estimated 84,740,000 Turkish citizens in 2021, 57,276,122 users have registered for 6,161 different electronic services or use the 3,300 available mobile applications. Although the Turkish "e-devlet" system today offers a wide variety of e-services for doctors, institutions and patients, statistics show that users use only a fraction of them. It is a given that Turks can receive digital prescriptions, but they could also handle matters related to obstetrics, sports medicine or even disability-related procedures on the Internet, prior to the epidemic they were mostly only interested in their general health information, and would like to know what data the system stores about them. (Bostanci et al., 2022:273)

The closures due to COVID-19 changed people's lives to a great extent and forced those who were averse to them until the outbreak of the epidemic to use Internet solutions. Not only did the demand for "e-devlet" services increase, but more and more people ordered

food, made purchases and communicated with their loved ones on the Internet. COVID-19 not only separated people from each other, but also created a serious health risk, especially for the elderly, who until then had less use of the opportunities provided by "e-devlet" services. In 2020, in the changed circumstances, it might be slightly exaggerating, but it is safe to say that these systems were the key to survival. The specialists saw that the Turkish citizens massively generated for themselves the so-called HES code to access digital government information for their own security. (Bostanci et al., 2022:275)

The panic surrounding the pandemic greatly contributed to the fact that the AKP government was able to increase its control over its own citizens from 2020. In this given year, a total of 66,254,113 HES codes were generated on government websites and mobile applications. With their help, users were not only able to filter out risk factors, but also provided sensitive data about themselves to the government, the healthcare professionals and other citizens. The situation became even more acute with the upsurge of vaccination campaigns. The Turkish social security was also able to use the fear and tension in people due to the disease to find a solution to the problem of those who were not paying. 243,258 Turkish citizens who generated codes on the internet and in mobile applications were able to settle their debt to the government on the digital interface. Even more successful was the campaign in which the Turkish social security tried to collect charitable donations from residents in the framework of a central action, the Social Protection Shield. A total of 2,056,442 individual donations were received, which is an outstanding number even in the already generous Turkish society. (Bostanci et al., 2022:276)

After the COVID-19 pandemic, the next challenge that was faced by the Turkish government and the e-government was the gigantic and devastating earthquake that occurred on February 6, 2023 in the Pazarcik and Elbistan districts of Kahramanmaraş County. The government received a lot of criticism for not reacting quickly enough and for the slow progress of the rescue work. At the same time, the e-devlet system tried to introduce certain services as soon as possible. On the fourth day after the earthquake, an application was already available, in which Turkish citizens could search for the technical and static condition of their residential properties with the help of address and personal ID number. In addition, the government has created an internet interface at [hasartespit.csb.gov.tr](https://hasartespit.csb.gov.tr) where the official damage assessment takes place. (Hurriyet, 2023)

## **Conclusion**

Since the introduction of the presidential system, a dual process can be observed in Turkey. On the one hand, due to globalization and the general development of technology, more and more Turkish citizens have access to electronic and mobile devices, more and more people are also registering for the e-devlet system, so thanks to digitalization, everyday reality

and access to information seem to be more and more free and democratic. At the same time, caused by the powerful centralization efforts of politics, not only the citizen learns more and more about the state, but also the state about the citizen. And the experts expect that the government's digital control will only increase in the coming years.

For the Turkish political leadership, the e-devlet system is not only about controlling the citizens, but also about being able to operate the state administration system as cost-effectively as possible. It is expected that this will also be one of the main motivations in the future. The only question is whether the money saved by the citizens will return to the citizens' pockets or whether it will increase corruption and prestige investments.

The e-government systems in Turkey can be said to be quite developed at the national level, but with the exception of a few wealthier metropolitan municipalities, this is not yet the case everywhere at the local level. It is expected that in the coming years the situation will improve in this area as well and "smart cities" can be built.

The 2023 Kahramanmaraş earthquake also proved that Turkey cannot avoid building disaster prevention digital systems that respond to natural catastrophies at record speed. The systems of the government agencies working in the area have not yet been unified, so the system cannot provide an adequate response even in the event of a significant flood or wind disaster, much less during devastating earthquakes.

Above all, the Turkish government must increase the reliability and transparency of the system. Turkish people are inherently critical, so it is not surprising that they have doubts about the functioning of the e-government. The political future of the current AKP government and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also depends on whether it can prove that in the greatest emergencies, the Turkish government stands with the people and not behind them.

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# Elite Teacher Training Institutions of Turkey and Hungary in the Mid-Twentieth Century: A Comparative Aspect (on the Example of Hasanođlan Ky Enstits and Etvs Jzsef Collegium)

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<https://doi.org/10.33542/VSS2023-1-6>

## Abstract

*This paper investigates the similarities and differences between Etvs Jzsef Collegium in Hungary and Hasanođlan Higher Village Institute in Turkey, two distinct higher educational institutions founded at different times yet sharing analogous objectives. Both of them emerged in developing nations striving to advance and refine their educational systems. Utilizing historical inquiry and qualitative research methodologies, the study scrutinizes the social, economic, and cultural circumstances surrounding the establishments' inception, highlighting their shared attributes and divergences. Although employing varying strategies, both higher educational institutions provided higher education, admitted students nationwide, and experienced a degree of institutional and educational autonomy. The paper contends that these higher educational institutions were ahead of their time, fostering a distinguished cohort of educators and scholars, thereby significantly impacting the modernization and professionalization of their respective countries' educational systems. In summary, this research offers valuable perspectives on the historical and societal contexts shaping the foundation and accomplishments of these two exceptional higher educational institutions.*

**Key words:** *Hasanođlan higher village Institute, Etvs Jzsef collegium, elite teachers, higher educational institutions.*

## Introduction

The education sector plays a crucial role in the modernization and professionalization of a country, and the quality of teacher training is a significant determinant of the success of the education system. This article investigates two higher educational institutions (HEIs), Hungary's Etvs Jzsef Collegium and Turkey's Hasanođlan Higher Village Institute, which, despite being established in distinct countries and timeframes, encountered analogous challenges, and employed varying methods to tackle them. Remarkably, both HEIs diverged from traditional establishments in their respective nations, sharing several characteristics: they offered higher education, functioned as boarding schools accepting students nationwide, (Altunya & Kınacı, 2019; Tth, 1995) experienced institutional and educational autonomy for a

period, faced political scrutiny and intervention prior to their dissolution, and maintained secular values (Eşme, 2018; Pukánszky, 2013). Both institutions aspired to create "the university of the future," fostering democratic environments that promoted critical thinking and interactive learning, ultimately aiming to eradicate dual education in their countries.

Admission processes at both of them were comparable, necessitating a two-stage examination and a certain knowledge level. (Altunya & Kınacı, 2019; Garai & Németh, 2018). They educated elite educators and intellectuals who contributed to their countries' modernization, and their graduates assumed significant roles due to the high-quality education received. Nonetheless, some differences existed, such as the Hasanoğlan exclusively admitting students from rural areas (Tonguç, 1943a), whereas the Collegium accepted individuals with adequate knowledge and financial means for tuition fees (Garai, 2019).

This study aims to examine the remarkable similarities between these HEIs by analyzing country profiles, social, economic, and cultural conditions in Hungary and Turkey, and their shared challenges in teacher training. Both countries were developing countries during these institutions' inception, striving to catch up with developed counterparts. Additionally, both countries were successors of empires defeated in World War I, and post-war, they endeavored to establish democratic regimes (Sander, 1991). However, teacher training systems in both countries were plagued with issues, failing to produce the necessary number of teachers (Tonguç, 1943b; Garai, 2019). Consequently, Hungary's Collegium and Turkey's Hasanoğlan were founded to address these problems, and despite employing different methods, their approaches shared similarities.

Although these HEIs played a crucial role, their dissolution transpired during the post-World War II global reorganization. Their inability to adapt to the shifting political environment and new order is posited as the cause for closure (Karaömerlioglu, 1998; Garai, 2019). Further investigation is required to comprehend the reasons behind their termination, especially considering the distinct political contexts in which they operated.

The article culminates with an exploration of the significance of these institutions' legacies in their countries' educational history and their ongoing pertinence to unresolved issues in teacher education in Hungary and Turkey. Despite their closure, their influence on the educational sector persists, and their inventive approaches to pedagogy could serve as a catalyst for future reforms.

This paper highlights the significance of HEIs in society and their influence on various facets of human development and societal advancement. HEIs serve as pivotal centers for the generation and dissemination of knowledge, promoting intellectual growth and enabling innovation. Through research initiatives, HEIs generate new knowledge, contribute to scientific progress, and facilitate the transfer of knowledge through academic programs. A comparative analysis of HEIs enables the exploration of variations in institutional structures and governance



models, and their impact on society. Distinct governance approaches shape the HEIs' responsiveness to societal needs, accountability mechanisms, and adaptability. Comparative perspectives on HEIs investigate access and equity within higher education systems, illuminating factors that significantly affect individuals' educational opportunities. HEIs have profound effects on society, influencing socioeconomic and sociocultural dimensions. Comparative analysis enables the examination of how HEIs contribute to social mobility, economic growth, and social cohesion in different contexts. HEIs play a crucial role in shaping social norms, values, and cultural practices. Comparative analysis investigates their impact on social integration, cultural diversity, and the promotion of democratic values.

This study employs historical research methods, including document analysis, content analysis, and comparative-historical analysis, in accordance with Bill McDowell's definition of historical research as a systematic investigation into the past, discerning factual narratives from fictionalized accounts through meticulous examination of relevant source materials (Mcdowell, 2002). Qualitative research, on the other hand, adopts an interpretative approach, holistically unveiling perceptions and occurrences in a natural context (Yıldırım & Şimşek, 2008). The study relies on an archive of approximately 50,000 pages of documents and pertinent literature. Content analysis is utilized to scrutinize the data, revealing patterns, themes, biases, and meanings (Carley, 1990). Additionally, the article applies a comparative-historical analysis to examine the Collegium and the Higher Village Institute, allowing for explanations that extend beyond specific temporal and geographical constraints and possess wider applicability (Bernhard & O'Neill, 2020). This is achieved by employing various comparative techniques, such as comparisons with other historical events, theoretical development, and connections to contemporary circumstances.

## **1. The analysis of Hungarian and Turkish education system**

The origins of the Hungarian education system can be traced back to the 18th and 19th centuries, a period of significant transformation. In line with prevailing practices in Central-Eastern Europe, Hungary looked to the French and German education systems as models for the professionalization of secondary teachers. The country's political elite adopted elements from these models to implement European reforms at a national level, reflecting a process of adaptation to social and economic conditions. This implementation process was seen as a necessary step in aligning modernization influences with the Hungarian context (Garai & Németh, 2018).

The development of the Hungarian national state was closely intertwined with the evolution of the education system. The emergence of the dual education system in Hungary, as a consequence of the 1848 revolution, played a significant role in the formation of national states in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries. This transformative period in the

Hungarian education system was characterized by the establishment of diverse types of schools with distinct educational objectives and varying governance and monitoring systems. It also witnessed the emergence of separate professional subgroups of teachers, marking the differentiation of modern intellectual groups. Traditional school maintainers also played a role in shaping the new structure, leading to changes in teacher training (Karády, 2005).

Regarding teacher training, Hungary implemented a dual institutional system comprising teacher training institutes and university seminars. The training institutes focused on providing practical training, while the university seminars emphasized subject-oriented scientific training for teachers. This approach aimed to equip teachers with both practical skills and a deep understanding of their subjects. However, the implementation of this system faced challenges, and the scarcity of secondary teachers and evolving qualification standards necessitated reforms in the teacher training system (Garai & Németh, 2018).

A significant milestone in the history of the Hungarian education system was the establishment of the József Eötvös Collegium in 1895. This prestigious teacher training institute offered high-quality training not only for teaching careers but also for academic careers. The institute stood out within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy due to its exceptional standards, surpassing other national sectors of the monarchy (Garai, 2013).

The professionalization of teachers in Hungary was influenced by a combination of Anglo-Saxon and continental models. While the Anglo-Saxon professional models allowed for greater autonomy and less state intervention, the continental professions, such as those in Germany and France, emphasized loyalty to the state and the market. Hungary's teacher training system aligned more closely with the continental model, emphasizing the influence of the state and the necessity of scientific training (Garai & Szabo & Németh, 2020).

In conclusion, the development of the Hungarian education system has a rich history marked by changes and adaptations. It drew inspiration from the French and German education systems, adjusting them to fit national conditions, and placing a strong emphasis on the professionalization of teachers. The dual education system played a pivotal role in the formation of the national state and led to the differentiation of teaching professionals. The establishment of esteemed teacher training institutes, such as the József Eötvös Collegium, further enhanced the quality of teacher training in Hungary. These historical factors have shaped the structure and approach of the Hungarian education system, influencing its present-day landscape.

On the other hand, The Turkish education system has undergone a complex historical evolution. During the Ottoman Empire, access to education was limited, particularly for those in rural areas. The main educational institutions were religious-focused Madrasahs and Ottoman Elementary-Primary Schools, which provided basic religious education but had limited reach. In the 1870s, the Ottoman Empire established "iptidai schools" to provide modern

education under the authority of the Ministry of Education. This resulted in a dualistic education system with traditional and modern institutions coexisting (Gönder & Aydıngüler & Dükal, 2022).

With the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1924, all educational institutions were centralized under the control of the Ministry of Education. This aimed to create a modern, secular, and western-inspired education system. Madrasahs were closed and ties with the Ottoman past were broken (Kapluhan, 2012).

The 1924 Law on the Unification of Education played a significant role in promoting a unified and egalitarian education system in Turkey. However, implementing this centralized system posed challenges, particularly in rural areas where the preexisting dual education system had created divisions within society. The transition to a unified system aimed to bridge this divide, but the complexities of implementation persisted (Sağiroğlu, 2009).

To address the issue of modernizing rural areas and providing quality education in village schools, Village Institutes were established. The first of these institutions, the Hasanoglan Higher Village Institute, was founded in 1941 and developed a curriculum tailored to the needs and characteristics of the village. Despite their brief existence, the Village Institutes made significant achievements in a short period of time and continue to be a topic of discussion in the country's education history (Gönder, 2021b).

In analyzing the Turkish education system, it is important to recognize the historical context and the efforts made to address educational inequalities. The transition from limited access to education in the Ottoman Empire to a centralized and secular system in the Republic of Turkey reflects aspirations for progress and equality. However, the legacy of the dualistic education system and the challenges of implementing centralization in rural areas have had a lasting impact on Turkish society.

## **2. Hasanoglan Higher Village Institute**

The establishment of the Hasanoglan in 1941 near Ankara was a response to the shortage of qualified educators for advanced education. The institute benefited from the expertise of faculty members from Ankara-based universities (Eşme, 2018). Tonguç expressed that the institute aimed to serve as a platform for the development of the future university and the cultivation of individuals equipped to succeed in the 21st century (Başaran, 2019).

A document from İsmail Hakkı Tonguç's archive outlines the objectives of Hasanoglan as follows:

Training teachers who will be employed in Village Institutes (VIs); producing Itinerant Head Teachers (IHTs) and primary education inspectors who will supervise the regions where institute graduates will work; conducting comprehensive research on various topics related to villages, village schools, and institutes; and to disseminate these findings in a manner that

would benefit relevant parties, all with the aim of forming a hub for the study of rural communities (Tonguç, 1943a).

The admission process for Hasanoğlan consisted of a two-phase selection procedure: an initial general entrance examination across all academic disciplines, followed by a specialized theoretical and practical examination at Hasanoğlan based on the candidate's chosen field. Admission was granted exclusively to those who excelled in the latter examination (Altunya & Kınacı, 2019).

Hasanoğlan provided two categories of courses: mandatory culture courses for all students and specialized courses tailored to individual academic departments. The 15-hour weekly culture courses covered topics such as Revolutionary History, the Turkish Republic regime, pedagogical skills, languages (Turkish and foreign), and military service. In contrast, the specialized courses were field-specific, with 29 hours dedicated to them (Tonguç, ca. 1942).

**Table 1: The courses provided were customized to align with the academic specializations chosen by the students**

<b>Fine Arts Branch:</b> Music, histrionism, history of civilization and art, national games and rhythmic gymnastics, painting-modelling, seminar studies	<b>Construction Branch:</b> Architectural knowledge, agricultural construction, mechanical drawing, interior decoration, history of art and civilization, workshop and seminar studies.
<b>Mining Branch:</b> Technology, mechanical drawing, plumbery, technology and practical chemistry, technical historical and artistic mine works, workshop and seminar studies	<b>Animal-Care Branch:</b> Animal science, biology, participation and health information, animal feed information and pasturage, seminars, studies in barns and corrals.
<b>Poultry Farming Branch:</b> Poultry care, biology, child-care, cooking, tailoring, food chemistry, studies in seminar, kitchen and poultry house.	<b>Village Housework and Crafts Branch:</b> Work knowledge of raw materials used in village housework and handicrafts, food chemistry and histochemistry, mechanical painting, child-care, tailoring, embroidery, weaving, knitting, interior decoration, seminar and workshop studies.
<b>Field and Garden Agriculture Branch:</b> Agricultural knowledge and history, botanical and soil biology, mineralogy and agricultural chemistry, economics and cooperatives, economic geography, land surveying and trade arithmetic, seminars, studies in fields and gardens.	<b>Agricultural Management Economy Branch:</b> Agricultural production equipment transport and towing equipment and their knowledge, agricultural machinery and engines, economic geography, business economics, trade arithmetic and land surveying knowledge, economics and cooperatives, seminars, workshops and laboratory studies

Source: Tonguç, 1943a; Tonguç, ca. 1942.

The VIs were unique establishments that emphasized democratic principles in their educational methodology. They prioritized student engagement and democratic decision-making in their management strategies (Eşme, 2018). Academic perspectives on VIs varied, with some asserting that the absence of democratic conditions in society rendered them inauthentic (Gedikoğlu, 1971), while others maintained that VIs were crucial in disseminating

democratic values across Turkey (Türkoğlu, 2019). The establishment of VIs in 1940 marked a substantial transformation in the Turkish education system. All VIs, including Hasanoğlan, were structured as coeducational boarding schools, an innovative concept in Turkey at that time (Baykurt, 2019). The adoption of coeducation in the 1940s confronted traditional gender norms and patriarchal social structures, inciting resistance from conservative factions. Nevertheless, pedagogical techniques were utilized to address potential obstacles stemming from coeducational and boarding education (Sağiroğlu, 2009). The VIs played a significant role in dismantling traditional gender roles and broadening educational opportunities for girls in Turkey.

From 1941 to 1947, the Hasanoğlan produced 213 graduates, comprising 195 men and 18 women (Altunya, 2009). Despite its brief existence, the Hasanoğlan left a lasting impact on Turkey's educational, cultural, and political history. The institute offered underprivileged and gifted village children access to higher education, fostering a new educational paradigm centered on scientific inquiry, democratic engagement, and active citizenship. It cultivated writers, artists, and intellectuals, empowered rural children to participate in social, cultural, and political life, advanced scientific research and innovation in agriculture and rural development, and diversified the educator workforce in VIs, particularly in rural areas (Gönder, 2021a). Moreover, the VIs introduced a new type of staff to education, especially in rural areas, by graduating 213 young people who became new types of teachers within the VIs (Altunya & Kınacı, 2019).

Eyüboğlu contends that the Hasanoğlan, which admitted only forty students annually from tens of thousands of applicants, facilitated access to an exceptional form of enlightenment (Eyüboğlu, 1979). Similarly, Lütfi Engin posits that Hasanoğlan was dedicated to eradicating the poverty cycle that had plagued rural Turkish communities for generations (Köy Enstitüleri ve Çağdaş Eğitim Vakfı, 2005). On the other hand, Tonguç viewed Hasanoğlan as the "brain and heart" of all other VIs and argued that the traditional education system would persist if it lost its purpose and relevance (Arayıcı, 1999). Hasanoğlan was the sole educational institution in the country providing a direct route to higher education for talented rural students. Here, students were educated as proactive citizens striving to challenge conventional structures and propagate democratic values in rural regions, adhering to the core principles of democratic education.

The post-World War II era ushered in a new global order that had far-reaching impacts on politics and societies worldwide (Ahmad, 1993). This order presented unparalleled challenges for the VIs, as their pedagogical and ideological stances were incongruous with the dominant paradigm (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998). Furthermore, the advent of multi-party democracy in Turkey fostered a more diverse and open political climate, which created a favorable environment for opposition groups to level criticisms against the VIs (Başaran, 2019). These

critiques, coupled with the perception of communist affiliations, ultimately culminated in the closure of the Hasanoğlan in 1947.

### **3. Eötvös József Collegium**

The Eötvös József Collegium, established in 1895 in Budapest, Hungary, addressed the persistent issue of teacher shortages in the country. Inspired by the French model and proposed by Loránd Eötvös, the institution was founded to educate elite teachers for the nation (Garai, 2019). The experimental Collegium aimed to resolve teacher training deficiencies through small group seminars and innovative methods (Tóth, 1995), producing highly qualified specialists for governmental needs (Garai & Szabo & Németh, 2020). Graduates from the Collegium predominantly became scholars or elite teachers, enhancing public education quality (Lekli, 1995). While the Collegium drew inspiration from the *École Normale Supérieure* in Paris, it was not a mere replication (Karády, 2005). The Collegium quickly surpassed its initial goals, inspiring other institutions. In 1928, the Collegium's educational objectives shifted towards nurturing academic elites, and similar institutions emerged across the country (Garai, 2013).

The Collegium's foundation consisted of three main pillars: first, subject-specific knowledge from the faculty of philosophy; second, pedagogical courses from the teacher training institute, followed by a year of pedagogical practice; and third, the opportunity for selected students to acquire scientific knowledge at the Collegium, supplementing unsystematic university education (Garai & Németh, 2018). Until 1948, when communists gained control, the Collegium promoted critical thinking and fostered a modest approach to humanities and sciences (Garai, 2013). As the Collegium's primary goal was to cultivate elite teachers, only students with prior knowledge, quality education, and successful entrance exam performance were admitted. Additionally, students were required to pay annual fees, resulting in a predominantly white-collar demographic. The Collegium's acceptance rate was approximately 25-30%, with 274 out of 1045 applicants accepted in the first 15 years (Garai, 2019). Notably, only male students were admitted due to the prevailing patriarchal societal structure.

Within the first 15 years of student admissions, it was observed that 68% of the students opted for humanities specializations, such as Classical Philology, Hungarian-German, French-Hungarian, Latin, History, and Geography, while 23% pursued natural sciences, including Mathematics, Physics, Astrology, Natural History, and Chemistry. Out of 274 students, only 213 successfully completed their education, with the remaining students believed to have left due to the rigorous curriculum or failure in examinations. Additionally, some students had to withdraw from the Collegium due to their families' changing financial circumstances (Garai, 2019).

It is noteworthy that not every student admitted to the Collegium was initially considered a full member of the institution. Students could attain full membership status at the conclusion of their second year of study. Those who achieved full membership were granted voting rights in institutional meetings and awarded the title of 'teacher' (Kucsman, 2006). Until a student obtained full membership, they could only interact with upper-class students and teachers within the library setting. Although the Collegium exhibited a hierarchical structure, transitioning between levels was not particularly challenging (Kosáry, 1989). Conversely, despite the Collegium's subordination to the ministry and reliance on its budget, the Collegium maintained autonomy until the communist takeover in 1948. Garai's doctoral research highlights the emphasis on the autonomous nature of Collegium students within memoirs authored by students and faculty (Garai & Németh, 2018).

Post-1945, Hungary fell within the USSR's sphere of interest, leading to political shifts that impacted the Collegium in 1948. Consequently, the institution experienced a transition towards communist-style education, with the majority of students hailing from working-class backgrounds by 1948 (Fodor, 1991). Following this shift, the Collegium functioned as an extension of the communist party, as pre-1948 members and faculty were forced to resign (Garai, 2019).

Tibor Lutter's discourses reveal that certain Marxists aimed to convert the Collegium into a Marxist doctoral institute (Kósa, 1995). However, in January 1949, the cabinet council established the legal framework for the Collegium's termination. The subsequent parliamentary act dismantled the teacher training system implemented by the Collegium, ultimately leading to the institution's dissolution during the second university reform in 1950. The Eötvös Collegium Former Members' Association, initially disbanded in May 1950, experienced legal closure in 1951 (Ladányi, 1986).

Divergent perspectives exist regarding the closure of the Collegium. Kelevéz posits that the majority of Collegium graduates attribute Lutter's directorship to a deliberate plan to terminate the institution (Kelevéz, 2007). Conversely, Róbert Frankl asserts that the Collegium's closure resulted from its inability to adapt to the post-WWII order (Garai, 2019). I contest Frankl's stance, as the Collegium's voluntary shift towards a communist-style education necessitated the abandonment of its core values and principles, which defined its uniqueness. Consequently, the emergent establishment may not have faced closure as Frankl anticipated, but it would not represent the true 'Collegium' either.

The Collegium's contributions to the country can be encapsulated in the following points: Firstly, it generated highly skilled secondary school teachers for the state until 1948 (Garai, 2019). Secondly, the Collegium facilitated the professionalization of the teaching profession, playing a pivotal role in institutionalizing secondary school education in Hungary (Garai, 2013). Lastly, by 1950, the Collegium enrolled 1204 individuals, with only 730

completing their studies by 1945. An examination of the graduates' subsequent employment reveals their exceptional qualifications. Among them, 115 became university or college professors; 60 engaged in research at scientific institutions; 44 joined the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; 25 served as ministry bureaucrats; 18 found employment overseas; 20 pursued careers as writers or artists; 58 held positions as secondary school principals; and approximately 400 worked as secondary school teachers, elevating Hungarian secondary education standards (Lekli, 1995).

#### **4. The Comparison of Eötvös József Collegium and Hasanođlan Higher VIs**

The Eötvös József Collegium and Hasanođlan Higher VIs, established in distinct time periods and countries due to analogous issues and utilizing diverse methods, share numerous similarities. This study examines these two HEIs in tandem, attributing their resemblance to the structural parallels in the countries where they were founded, including their socio-economic and cultural conditions. Both countries were developing at the time, aspiring to reach the level of more advanced countries. Each succeeded an empire (Hungary from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Türkiye from the Ottoman Empire), experienced defeat in World War I, and attempted to establish democratic regimes post-war, with varying success. The teacher training systems in both countries were fraught with issues, including an insufficient number of trained educators. To address these challenges, Hungary founded the Collegium and Türkiye established the VIs. Despite employing distinct methods, the similarities between these HEIs are noteworthy.

Commonalities include:

- Higher education-level instruction.
- Boarding facilities.
- Nationwide student acceptance.
- Temporary institutional and educational autonomy.
- Vulnerability to political critique and intervention prior to dissolution.
- Analogous social structures with predominantly rural populations.
- The education of elite teachers and scholars.
- The emergence of both HEIs in response to persistent teacher training system issues, such as inadequate numbers of qualified teachers and high retirement rates.
- Both HEIs sought to address teacher training issues in their respective countries by implementing novel approaches and methodologies previously unexplored.
- These HEIs emerged in response to traditional teacher education organizations within their countries, experiencing conflicts with these entities for some time.



- Following the Second World War, both HEIs were closed during similar timeframes due to the emerging new world order (The Collegium in 1948; Hasanoglan Higher VIs in 1946). Their closure was attributed to their democratic nature and strong inclination towards autonomy, which was at odds with their respective blocs.
- Both HEIs adhered to secular principles.
- Frequent study trips within their countries were conducted by both HEIs, aiming for students to familiarize themselves with their homeland.
- Both HEIs promoted critical thinking among their students.
- Despite their closure, both HEIs were periodically proposed as solutions to ongoing educational challenges in their respective countries.
- Both HEIs significantly contributed to their countries by training teachers and scholars, playing a crucial role in the professionalization of teaching.
- Both HEIs enhanced the professionalization of the teaching profession.
- The admission processes for both HEIs were comparable, involving a two-stage examination and requiring a certain level of knowledge.
- In comparison to their contemporaries, both HEIs were more democratic and innovative.
- Dual education, or its remnants, persisted in both countries, with these HEIs aiming to eradicate such systems.
- Both HEIs dismissed students who underperformed in their courses, with the Collegium expelling them and the VIs assigning them to rural teaching positions.
- Some researchers have proposed similar theories for the dissolution of these HEIs, such as their inability to adapt to change and the new order. Despite their distinct post-WWII positions, their simultaneous closure and parallel theories warrant further investigation, particularly considering the differing political contexts and analogous outcomes.
- Both HEIs surpassed the expectations of their organizations and advanced the methods and systems upon which they were established.

The table below delineates the distinctions between these HEIs.

**Table 2: Differences between Eötvös József Collegium and Hasanoğlan Higher VIs**

	<b>Eötvös József Collegium</b>	<b>Hasanoğlan Higher VIs</b>
<b>Enrolment Criteria</b>	Only men	Both men and women
<b>Aims</b>	To raise secondary teachers, elite teachers and scholars	To raise teachers for VIs, inspectors and IHTs
<b>Tuition Fee</b>	There is	There is not- free
<b>Hierarchy</b>	There is	There is not- all equal
<b>Democratic Atmosphere</b>	Limited	There is
<b>Voting Right at the General Assembly</b>	Must be earned	Everyone has an equal say
<b>Method of Education Provided</b>	Classical methods	On the job training
<b>The Access of the Poor and the Villagers</b>	Very limited since most of them could not afford the tuition fee	There is- only students with rural origin were welcomed
<b>To what degree they have contributed the modernization of their country</b>	Low	High

Source: Garai, 2013; Garai, 2019; Garai & Szabo & Németh, 2020; Eşme, 2018; Altunya & Kınacı, 2019.

Evidently, both HEIs significantly impacted the educational history of their respective countries. Their continued relevance and occasional presentation as solutions to contemporary educational challenges underscore their progressive nature. The primary distinction between the VIs and the Collegium lies in their target demographics: VIs catered to rural children, whereas the Collegium admitted individuals' adequate knowledge and financial means. Despite these differences, both HEIs aspired to establish the universities of the future, fostering democratic environments, and utilizing interactive learning tools to train students as scholar-teachers. The graduates' success in securing influential positions attests to the quality education provided.

While these HEIs contributed to the professionalization of teaching, their impact on their countries' modernization was limited. Although VIs aimed to modernize rural areas, the Collegium did not share this objective, resulting in a relatively minor contribution to country's modernization.

It is noteworthy that the Collegium maintained a hierarchical structure, with first- and second-year students granted equal status with teachers and upper-class peers only after proving themselves academically. This hierarchy may have adversely affected the Collegium's internal dynamics. In contrast, Hasanoğlan's egalitarian approach promoted democratic values and a more inclusive atmosphere.

Lastly, the introduction of VIs occurred nearly 40 years after the Collegium's establishment. Implementing coeducation in boarding institutes was challenging due to the era's constraints and prevailing patriarchal family structures in rural areas. This revolutionary practice faced significant criticism and contributed to the institutes' closure. However, the fact that the Collegium kept its doors closed to female students until 1950 reveals that this

institution, which was ahead of its time and provided secular education, was not open to innovation in this matter.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, the Eötvös József Collegium and Hasanođlan Higher VIs were transformative HEIs that significantly contributed to the modernization and professionalization of their respective education systems. Their innovative educational approaches and common features, including admissions processes, institutional autonomy, and secular values, reflect a shared vision for the future of education. Both HEIs aimed to cultivate critical thinking, interactive learning, and democratic values, producing elite teachers and intellectuals who profoundly impacted their countries' modernization. These graduates occupied key positions, exemplifying the enduring influence of their education.

However, despite their shared objective of establishing progressive educational institutions, these two HEIs had distinct differences that shaped their impact and legacy. The primary distinction lies in their target demographics. The VIs prioritized rural children, aiming to modernize underserved areas and address educational gaps. In contrast, the Collegium focused on individuals who possessed sufficient knowledge and financial means, resulting in a more selective and exclusive approach, and limiting its influence on the broader modernization efforts of the country.

One notable distinction between the two HEIs can be observed in the internal dynamics of the institutions, in their approach to inclusivity and egalitarianism. The Collegium maintained a hierarchical structure, where students had to prove themselves academically before gaining equal status with teachers and upper-class peers. This hierarchy may have had a negative impact on the internal dynamics of the Collegium. In contrast, Hasanođlan, representing the VIs, adopted an egalitarian approach that fostered democratic values and created a more inclusive atmosphere.

Furthermore, the timeline of their establishment and the introduction of coeducation revealed further disparities. The VIs were introduced almost four decades after the Collegium was established. The implementation of coeducation in boarding institutes faced significant challenges due to societal constraints and prevailing patriarchal family structures in rural areas. While the VIs embraced this revolutionary practice, it encountered criticism and eventually led to the closure of the institutes. Conversely, the Collegium, despite its progressive stance on secular education, remained closed to female students until 1950, indicating a lack of openness to innovation in this regard. Therefore, a similar institution was closed in Turkey, while in Hungary it continued to operate, although it was completely transformed.

Finally, the post-WWII closures of these HEIs prompt inquiries about their adaptability to shifting political environment and evolving educational needs. Further research is warranted to comprehend their closure, especially considering their distinct political contexts.

In summary, these HEIs represent significant milestones in the evolution of education systems in Hungary and Turkey and both played a significant role in the professionalization of teaching and provided quality education to their students. Their shared challenges, aspirations, and innovative approaches to addressing teacher training issues provide valuable insights and inspiration for future educational reforms. Their differences highlight the complex nature of educational institutions and the various factors that shape their impact on society and their respective countries' educational history. By appreciating their legacies and continuing relevance, we can strive to create more effective and inclusive education systems that cater to the needs of students, teachers, and society at large.

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# Competitiveness of higher education in a changing environment from a technology transfer point of view

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<https://doi.org/10.33542/VSS2023-1-7>

## Abstract

*Technology transfer in higher education institutions has always been a matter of concern, especially how to carry out technology transfer efficiently and effectively (Bower,2018. However, the environment is constantly changing, and how maintaining the core competitiveness of higher education institutions in the changing environment has become a new problem. On the one hand, from a macro perspective, some known and unknown challenges and changes occur from time to time, such as climate change, social equality, and sustainability, etc., which make higher education institutions constantly adjust and update the mission and strategy of universities, thus find a smart role in an ever-changing environment. On the other hand, a higher education institution's research and output reflect its reputation and status. This paper aims to discover the barriers and challenges of technology transfer in higher education institutions and the relationship with stakeholders through literature analysis. And theoretically analyze how to deal with difficulties, especially in the ever-changing environment, how universities should have an adaptive change and maintain competitiveness, and give some framework suggestions.*

**Key words:** *Competitiveness, Higher Education, Changing Environment, Technology Transfer.*

## Introduction

Since the enactment of the Bay-Dole Act in 1980, higher education institutions have been granted the right to retain ownership of inventions and share licensing revenues with inventors (Mowery and Sampat, 2004; Douglass,2021). This policy shift has led university administrators in the United States and other industrialized nations to assert that university technology transfer has the potential to generate significant revenue streams for academic institutions. Concurrently, policymakers have emphasized the potential of technology transfer to foster national and regional economic growth, subsequently subsidizing research joint ventures involving universities and private companies (e.g., the EU's Framework Program (Nepelski and Van Roy, 2021) and the U.S. Department of Commerce's Advanced Technology Program (ATP). These initiatives have catalysed innovation and inspired research and development institutions to become more actively engaged in technology transfer.

The growing discourse surrounding technology transfer can be traced back to Schumpeter's (1942) introduction of the concept of entrepreneurial innovation. Schumpeter posited that

creative destruction ensues when entrepreneurs disrupt established markets with radical, marketable innovations. As a result, innovation becomes an inherently disruptive, risky process that fuels competitive activities. Given the unique role that higher education institutions play in driving innovation and R&D, it becomes increasingly important to understand the extent of their involvement in technology transfer, its impacts, and overall effectiveness. Simultaneously, market stakeholders have turned their attention to higher education institutions for collaboration opportunities to maintain their competitive edge.

In summary, the evolving landscape of technology transfer in higher education has been shaped by a combination of policy shifts, increased emphasis on collaboration between academia and industry, and growing recognition of the role of innovation in fostering competitive advantage (Cunningham,2021). As a result, it is essential to explore the processes, challenges, and outcomes associated with technology transfer within higher education institutions, ensuring that they remain relevant and effective drivers of economic growth and societal advancement.

## **1. Technology transfer**

The existing literature on technology transfer offers a multifaceted and nuanced comprehension of the concept, which has developed and refined over time (Wahab & Rose, 2012). Historically, technology transfer can be traced back to the colonial period, where colonized nations received technology primarily focused on fundamental industries such as mining and agriculture (Ramanathan, 1988). At that time, technology transfer was driven more by geographical factors rather than cultural ones (John & Hanson, 1989). The colonial period accelerated and enforced the global or international dispersion and advancement of technology (Arnold, 2005).

The traditional approach stage of technology transfer emphasizes the close relationship between innovation and technology transfer. Schumpeter (1934) underlined that innovation encompasses many "new" aspects, including new products, new markets, and the application of new methods. Tirole (1988) stressed the competitive advantage of innovation from the viewpoint of industrial organization theory, while the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) offered a more comprehensive classification of innovation types.

In recent years, the emergence of ecosystem-driven technology transfer has been characterized by the growing commercialization of science and technology (Tejero,2019; Yablonsky 2020; Edvardsson 2018), as well as the evolution of technology transfer ecosystems at different organizational levels, such as incubators and technology transfer offices (Good et al., 2020). This has given rise to open innovation models that allow technology to flow among individuals, public education, companies, and industries (OECD & Eurostat,



2018). Open innovation and collaborative cooperation have rendered technology transfer more inclusive and accessible.

## **2. Description of methodology**

Literature analysis is a fundamental method in academic research that involves reviewing, classifying and assessing the available literature on a particular topic. This method is used in a wide range of disciplines, including research into technology transfer in higher education institutions.

The effectiveness and efficiency of technology transfer in higher education institutions in a changing environment is a sustainable area of research, and in particular, the way in which efficiency responds to difficulties and challenges in a changing environment, and how to remain competitive and make adaptive changes is the focus of this paper. The reason for choosing the literature analysis approach is to take advantage of the literature analysis to understand the process of technology transfer to higher education institutions, such as the factors identified as influencing it, as well as the barriers and challenges encountered. This information was collected for further analysis and discussion, and recommendations were made that would be useful to higher education institutions as well as stakeholders.

To achieve this, the paper begins with a relevant search using the Google Scholar database, searching for relevant literature using the keywords 'effectiveness and efficiency', 'higher education' and 'technology transfer'. The literature review focuses on empirical studies and case studies that demonstrate the practical application and the difficulties and challenges encountered in practice for technology transfer in higher education institutions. Factors identified in these case studies that affect the effectiveness and efficiency of technology transfer are then collected, analysed and discussed to identify common difficulties and potential solutions by comparing the challenges faced by different institutions in different contexts in the literature.

## **3. Barriers to the technology transfer process**

The literature on technology transfer has progressed over time, reflecting an increased understanding of its complexity and significance in spurring innovation and economic growth. As ecosystem-driven technology transfer continues to advance, stakeholders from universities, organizations, individuals, and industries can collaborate to establish a virtuous technological economic cycle and foster research commercialization.

However, efficient and effective technology transfer still encounters numerous challenges and depends on the unique circumstances of various institutions. The table1 below showcases some representative literature and illustrates the factors influencing and solutions for technology transfer in higher education institutions.


**Table 1: Literature Survey on Efficient and Effective Technology Transfer**

Author/Year	Research Methodology	Factors Affecting Higher Education Institutions' Technology Transfer Efficiency and Effectiveness	Detailed Reasons (How Higher Education Institutions Are Affected)	Solutions (Author's Suggestions and Conclusions)
Bozeman, 2000	Literature review, conceptual analysis	Public policy, organizational factors, resource allocation	Policies and organizational factors can either facilitate or hinder technology transfer processes; resources allocation affects success	Develop policies that encourage collaboration and technology transfer; improve organizational practices; allocate resources effectively
Bruneel et al., 2010	Survey, quantitative analysis	Barriers to university-industry collaboration	Barriers (e.g., cultural differences, lack of trust, insufficient resources) limit collaboration and technology transfer efficiency	Address barriers through communication, trust-building, and resource allocation; establish collaborative platforms
Chesnais, 1986	Literature review, conceptual analysis	Science, technology, and competitiveness	The interplay between these factors affects the efficiency of technology transfer; competitive pressure drives innovation	Encourage interdisciplinary research and collaborations to enhance competitiveness; support research in cutting-edge fields
Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000	Conceptual analysis	Triple Helix model (university-industry-government relations)	Stronger ties among the three stakeholders lead to more effective technology transfer processes	Foster strong ties between universities, industries, and governments; develop joint projects and collaborative initiatives
Friedman & Silberman, 2003	Quantitative analysis	Incentives, management, location	Incentives affect researchers' motivations; management impacts technology transfer operations; location influences collaboration	Implement effective incentives for researchers; establish competent management teams; strategically locate research institutions and partnerships

<b>Author/Year</b>	<b>Research Methodology</b>	<b>Factors Affecting Higher Education Institutions' Technology Transfer Efficiency and Effectiveness</b>	<b>Detailed Reasons (How Higher Education Institutions Are Affected)</b>	<b>Solutions (Author's Suggestions and Conclusions)</b>
Good et al., 2020	Literature review, case study	Technology transfer ecosystem	The ecosystem, including actors (e.g., incubators, technology transfer offices), influences the success of technology transfer	Develop an effective ecosystem, foster collaborations among actors, and create supportive policies for technology transfer
Gulbrandsen & Smeby, 2005	Survey, quantitative analysis	Industry funding	Funding affects research performance and technology transfer; financial resources enable collaboration and commercialization	Secure more industry funding for university research and technology transfer; develop partnerships with industries
Hertzfeld et al., 2006	Survey, quantitative analysis	Intellectual property protection	Effective IP protection is necessary for successful research partnerships and commercialization of research results	Implement strong IP protection mechanisms in research partnerships; establish clear IP policies within institutions
Huyghe & Knockaert, 2015	Survey, quantitative analysis	Organizational culture and climate	Entrepreneurial culture and climate influence researchers' intentions to engage in technology transfer and commercialization	Foster an entrepreneurial culture and climate within universities; provide training and resources for entrepreneurship
Lockett et al., 2003	Literature review, case study	Universities' spin-out strategies	Effective spin-out strategies contribute to the successful commercialization of research results and technology transfer	Develop and implement effective spin-out strategies; provide support and resources for spin-out ventures
Mowery et al., 2001	Quantitative analysis	Bayh-Dole Act	The Act has affected patenting and licensing by US universities, impacting the commercialization of research results	Evaluate and adjust policies affecting university patenting and licensing practices; promote policy improvements for research commercialization

## 4. Results

From the above literature survey, we can piece together the general challenges and barriers to technology transfer in higher education institutions as Figure 1 shown below.



**Figure 1: Challenges and barriers to technology transfer in higher education institutions**

### 4.1 Importance and necessity of technology transfer for all parties

The importance and necessity of technology transfer for all parties refers to the value, relevance, and essential role that the process of technology transfer plays in the interconnected ecosystem involving universities, industry, technology transfer offices (TTOs), and government. Each party has a vested interest in the process, and its successful implementation can lead to a multitude of benefits for all involved. Each of the different parties is illustrated in the following (Villani, 2021).

From a university perspective, technology transfer is a crucial component of a university's commitment to generating, disseminating, and implementing knowledge for the betterment of society. This process allows academic institutions to leverage their research findings, thereby augmenting their standing in both academic and industrial domains (Mowery et al., 2001). The commercialization of research results through licensing agreements and spin-off companies yields substantial revenue that can be redirected toward further research

and development endeavours. Furthermore, effective technology transfer encourages interdisciplinary research partnerships and solidifies the university's bond with industry collaborators (Perkmann et al., 2013).

From the perspective of industry, technology transfer is indispensable for sustaining competitiveness in an increasingly globalized and knowledge-centric economy (Javed 2022; Shahzad 2021). It provides access to state-of-the-art research, which can be employed to create inventive products and services, thereby fulfilling market demands and efficiently addressing societal challenges (Perkmann et al., 2013). In this sense, technology transfer plays a crucial role in encouraging innovation, supporting sustainable development, and facilitating the adoption of cutting-edge technologies that may give an advantage in the market and lead to long-term growth.

TTOs (technology transfer offices) serve as vital intermediaries in the technology transfer process, connecting universities and industries to streamline knowledge exchange and commercialization (Siegel et al., 2003). They hold a central role in safeguarding intellectual property rights, administering licensing agreements, and supporting spin-off enterprises. Additionally, TTOs help cultivate an entrepreneurial environment within universities, encouraging participation in technology transfer and commercialization activities.

Governments have a keen interest in promoting efficient technology transfer, as it contributes to national and regional economic growth, job creation, and heightened competitiveness (Bozeman, 2000; Ferreira 2019). By backing technology transfer initiatives, policymakers can stimulate innovation, advance technological progress, and tackle global issues such as sustainability, climate change, and social disparities. Hence, technology transfer is consistent with broader policy objectives, such as economic growth and a rise in public welfare.

#### **4.2 The challenges that arise among universities, industries, and governments**

The challenges that arise among universities, industries, and governments in the context of technology transfer typically pertain to various obstacles and difficulties that these entities may encounter in the process of exchanging, implementing, and commercializing knowledge and technologies.

In Figure 1, we can see that different stakeholders exhibit different dimensions and barriers to communicating the value of each other.

Universities often encounter barriers to technology transfer due to cultural differences between academia and industry, leading to conflicting motivations and priorities (Perkmann et al., 2013). Such barriers are not only internal to the university but such as the cultural atmosphere for research and development, incentives and management for producing knowledge, IP policies, and deficiencies in spin-off strategies. When it comes to external collaboration, it again shows differences in value needs, with academic researchers focusing

primarily on producing and disseminating knowledge, while industrial partners prioritise the commercialisation of research results and the generation of profits. Such differences can hinder effective collaboration and impede technology transfer efforts. Furthermore, universities may struggle with a lack of resources and support for start-ups, which may limit their ability to successfully engage in technology transfer (Clarysse et al., 2011). Constraints such as inadequate funding, insufficient mentoring and training, limited access to networks and strategic partnerships can hinder their commercialisation prospects. In addition to this, government policy should not be overlooked in the development of the University. It must be said that government policies play a key role in shaping the technology transfer environment at universities. They can influence all aspects of the process, including research funding, the protection and management of intellectual property, and the formation of collaborations between universities and industry.

When partnering with universities, industries may face several obstacles, including intellectual property conflicts, trust issues, and navigating intricate bureaucratic procedures (Hanel & St-Pierre, 2006). These barriers can disrupt productive collaboration, restrict the commercialization of research findings, and curtail the potential advantages of technology transfer. Moreover, industries may find adapting to the academic culture and language challenging, which can further complicate the collaborative process.

From the government side, there are implications for both universities and industry, which are mainly in the form of policy implications and resource allocation. The main manifestations of government policy are:

- 1) Funding policies: The amount of government funding allocated to research and development (R&D) significantly affects the rate and scope of technology transfer from universities. Adequate funding allows universities to conduct more research, which in turn increases potential technology transfer (Bozeman, 2000). In addition, specific funding schemes may directly encourage technology transfer. For example, the US Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programme provides funding for small businesses to engage in federal R&D with commercialisation potential.
- 2) Intellectual property policies: Government policies around intellectual property (IP) significantly influence technology transfer. For example, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 in the US allowed universities to retain ownership of the IP rights of federally funded research. This act stimulated an increase in patenting activity and technology transfer offices within universities, leading to more active university-industry collaboration (Mowery et al., 2001).
- 3) Collaboration policies: Government can encourage collaboration between universities and industry through various policies. For example, tax incentives can be offered to companies that collaborate with universities on R&D projects. An example of this is the Canadian Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) tax incentive program.

- 4) Regulatory policy: The extent to which governments regulate industries such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and telecommunications can also affect technology transfer. A strict regulatory environment can slow down the transfer process due to the increased costs and risks associated with bringing technologies to market. However, they can also ensure safety and efficacy, which are essential for public acceptance and technology success (Link & Scott, 2017).
- 5) Education and training policies: Policies that support entrepreneurship education and training can also facilitate technology transfer. For example, government initiatives to integrate entrepreneurship training into university curricula can foster a culture of innovation and entrepreneurship, which can lead to a greater likelihood of technology transfer (Etzkowitz, 2003).
- 6) Infrastructure policies: Government investment in infrastructure (e.g. science parks, incubators) can facilitate university-industry collaboration and technology transfer (Link & Scott, 2017).

Governments may inadvertently establish barriers to successful technology transfer through insufficient public policies, a lack of strategic backing, and inadequate funding for research and innovation (Bozeman, 2000). These shortcomings can obstruct the creation of a favourable environment for technology transfer and suppress the expansion of innovation ecosystems.

Additionally, government policies may not effectively tackle the distinct challenges faced by various sectors or regions, further diminishing the efficacy of technology transfer (Geuna & Muscio, 2009). This could lead to a dearth of targeted support and investment in areas with considerable innovation and economic growth potential, thereby worsening regional disparities and slowing overall progress. It is therefore important that policy makers carefully consider the impact of their decisions on technology transfer when designing and implementing these policies.

### **4.3 Analysis**

Identifying and addressing the challenges faced by universities, industry and government is critical to promoting a more streamlined and effective technology transfer process. By building trust, enhancing communication, and providing strategic support, stakeholders can create a collaborative atmosphere that nurtures innovation and drives socio-economic progress.

Through the discussion of the above stakeholders, we can find some common obstacles and challenges manifested as follows.

First, communication and cultural differences. The distinct cultures of universities, industries, and governments can create barriers to effective collaboration. For example,

universities are traditionally open environments that prioritize knowledge creation and dissemination, while industries operate in a competitive market environment that values secrecy to protect business interests (Perkmann et al., 2013). Governments have a policy-driven culture with a focus on public welfare. Bridging these cultural differences requires clear communication protocols, understanding, and mutual respect.

Second, Intellectual property (IP) Issues. The management of IP rights is a significant challenge in technology transfer (Hertzfeld et al., 2006). Universities, in their quest to contribute to public knowledge, might favour open access to their research. In contrast, companies would want to protect IP to gain a competitive advantage. Governments, responsible for legislating IP laws, often have to strike a delicate balance between fostering innovation and ensuring fair competition. Misalignment in IP perspectives can lead to disputes and hinder collaboration.

Different Time Frames and Expectations: The time frames for achieving results in academia, industry, and government are fundamentally different (Bruneel et al., 2010). Academic research might take years or even decades to come to fruition. In contrast, industry is driven by market demands that require quick turnarounds. Governments operate within policy and electoral cycles that might not align with either academia or industry. These divergent timelines can create conflicts and impede effective technology transfer.

Third, resource constraints and allocation. Universities and industries each have their own resource limitations (Geuna & Muscio, 2009). Universities might lack the necessary funding, commercial expertise or infrastructure for technology transfer. Industries might be hesitant to invest in research with uncertain commercial potential.

It is at this point that government comes to the fore as a unique advantage in resource allocation and funding investment. The process involves direct funding, indirect incentives, and the creation of structures that facilitate research activities. The Government may support research purposes through direct grants to universities. These funds may be unrestricted and used at the discretion of the university, or they may be tied to specific projects or areas of research. For example, in the USA, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) are important sources of direct university research funding (Geuna, 2001). Governments can also encourage R&D activities through indirect incentives, such as tax incentives for research expenditures. This indirectly promotes university-industry collaboration, as companies find it economically advantageous to invest in research activities in collaboration with universities (Martin, 2012). Government investment in infrastructure such as science parks, incubators and innovation centres is also a form of support. These facilities provide the necessary physical space and resources for research and innovation activities and often act as a catalyst for university-industry collaboration (Link & Scott, 2017).

However, the allocation of government resources is a complex task that requires balancing competing needs and priorities. It is subject to the ongoing debate around the need



for more strategically directed funding versus the need to maintain academic freedom and support blue sky research (Salter & Martin, 2001).

Forth, regulatory and policy challenges: The role of government as a policymaker is crucial in creating a favourable environment for technology transfer (Bozeman, 2000). Regulations around research funding, taxation, IP rights, etc., significantly impact technology transfer. Government policies need to align with the goals of both academia and industry, which is a challenging task given their diverse interests.

## **5. Suggestions for Universities to remain competitive in a changing environment**

For the above research, we can give suggestions from three aspects to help universities make adaptive changes in the changing environment, find their own position, play their role well, and thus maintain their competitiveness. The first aspect concerns the links between universities and their stakeholders. The second aspect is about dealing with more challenges that still exist in the future. The third aspect is for the university to give suggestions on how to find its own role and position in the changing environment. These three aspects are described below.

### **5.1 Links between Universities and their Stakeholders**

From the literature review above, most higher education institutions currently rely on the triple helix model for technology transfer. The model emphasizes close collaboration between universities, industry and government to foster technological innovation and has been praised for its ability to drive economic growth and social progress. This model remains valid even in recent literature studies (Fidanoski et al., 2022; oSezal et al., 2022). However, this paper argues that this model has several shortcomings that may hinder effective technology transfer.

- 1) Restricted adaptability due to inflexible institutional structures: The triple helix model's efficiency may be limited by bureaucratic procedures and rigid institutional frameworks, resulting in slow decision-making processes (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000; AWLAD-THANI,2019).
- 2) Disproportionate allocation of resources and capabilities: The model often favors well-established organizations possessing robust research and innovation capacities, leading to an unequal distribution of resources and a growing divide between top-tier and lower-tier institutions (Limoges et al., 1994; Taylor,2019).
- 3) Divergent interests and objectives: Universities, industries, and governments may have conflicting goals and interests, complicating collaboration and hindering knowledge and technology transfer (Brundenius & Lundvall, 2011; AL-TABBAA,2019).

- 4) Intellectual property concerns: The model may give rise to disputes over intellectual property rights, as collaborative efforts can create ambiguity regarding the ownership of inventions and innovations, thereby impeding technology transfer (Hanel & St-Pierre, 2006).
- 5) Absence of trust and openness: Partnerships within the triple helix model may be plagued by a lack of trust and transparency, causing hesitance to share critical information and knowledge, and ultimately restricting technology transfer (Ranga & Etzkowitz, 2013).
- 6) Insufficient attention to social and environmental issues: The model's primary emphasis on economic growth may result in inadequate consideration of social and environmental aspects, limiting its potential for sustainable development (Benneworth & Jongbloed, 2010; Lu,2021).

Indeed, universities, as key players in the technology transfer ecosystem, should actively engage in developing strategies to strengthen connections and relationships with all relevant stakeholders (Bailey,2018). As the crux of knowledge generation, higher education institutions have a unique vantage point from which to address issues like communication gaps, cultural differences, and misaligned expectations, thereby fostering a more conducive environment for technology transfer.

A holistic, ecosystem-driven approach to technology transfer should not only focus on academia, industry, and government, but should also include other stakeholders such as investors, entrepreneurs, non-profit organizations, and local communities (Gaile-Sarkane 2021). Their inclusion can help foster a broader and more comprehensive understanding of the technology transfer process. Investors and entrepreneurs, for instance, play a significant role in the commercialization of academic research. By engaging with these stakeholders early on, universities can gain insights into market needs and trends, potentially guiding the direction of research and development to areas of high commercial potential. Non-profit organizations and local communities are often the end users of technologies developed through university research. Including their perspectives in the technology transfer process can ensure that the technologies developed are socially relevant and can effectively address the challenges faced by these stakeholders.

However, expanding the scope of the technology transfer ecosystem also introduces additional complexities, notably in terms of clarifying the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder (Bramwell,2019). This necessitates the development of clear governance structures and mechanisms that can facilitate effective collaboration.

Universities need to take a proactive role in fostering transparency and defining the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder. This can be achieved by creating platforms for regular dialogue and negotiation, establishing clear protocols for IP rights and revenue sharing, and implementing policies that promote trust and mutual respect among all parties involved.

By doing so, higher education institutions can help to create a more inclusive and efficient technology transfer ecosystem.

## **5.2 Unknown challenge**

The demands on higher education institutions to handle difficult global issues including sustainability, climate change, food security, and social equity are growing. Universities will need to adjust to this change in expectations and take on new responsibilities. In the face of evolving challenges, this paper argues that academic institutions can make the following changes:

- 1) Interdisciplinary research: Academic institutions must actively promote collaborative inquiry across various fields of study to generate innovative solutions for intricate and interrelated challenges that modern society faces (Bammer, 2013; Longoria 2021).
- 2) Cooperative endeavours: To effectively address contemporary challenges and foster innovation, it is essential to facilitate increased cooperation among academic institutions, private sector industries, and governmental bodies (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000; Gachie,2020).
- 3) Instruction in sustainable development: Educational establishments should incorporate principles of sustainable development into their curricula, equipping learners with the knowledge and competencies necessary to contribute positively to a sustainable future (Lozano et al., 2015).
- 4) Community involvement: Higher education institutions must enhance their engagement with local and global communities to ensure that their research and innovation pursuits are geared towards promoting environmental sustainability and social welfare (Trencher et al., 2014).
- 5) Modification of technology transfer mechanisms: To align with the contemporary landscape, universities must encourage open innovation, bolster collaborative efforts, and focus on the development and commercialization of sustainable innovations, thereby refining their technology transfer processes (Chesbrough, 2006; Fini 2019).

## **5.3 Further requirements**

Higher education institutions can still function and find their role and position in addressing known and unknown challenges, improving competitiveness, promoting sustainable development, and driving innovation in an increasingly interconnected world. This paper has the following recommendations:

- 1) Aligning incentives:

Higher education institutions should align incentive systems to promote multidisciplinary research, collaboration, and the pursuit of sustainable development goals in order to

increase competitiveness (Perkmann et al., 2013; Wanzenböck,2020). Universities may create an environment that encourages innovation and helps to solve complex societal problems by giving scholars who participate in technology transfer and collaborative activities the proper recognition and rewards.

2) Developing capacities:

Institutions of higher learning that want to compete must invest in developing their interdisciplinary research, teamwork, and technology transfer capacities (Siegel et al., 2003). This entails giving researchers the tools, facilities, and training they need to successfully navigate the challenges of transdisciplinary research and technology commercialization (Hansson,2018). Universities can improve their capability to produce significant research outputs, draw outside financing, and increase their standing in the international research community by developing expertise in these areas.

3) Building partnerships:

Higher education institutions should fortify their alliances with business and government stakeholders in order to stay competitive (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). Universities may support the co-creation of novel solutions to challenging problems by encouraging the interchange of information and resources, which will spur economic growth and improve societal well-being(de Castro Peixoto,2021). Strong collaborations can also give institutions access to more resources and knowledge, improving their overall competitiveness.

4) Good intellectual property management:

Institutions of higher learning that want to compete must strike a balance between transparency, teamwork, and the protection of important research products (Hanel & St-Pierre, 2006; Alam,2022). In order to attract industry partners, obtain funding, and ensure the successful commercialization of research outputs, effective intellectual property management is essential. Universities can preserve their research investments and improve their competitiveness in the global research scene by creating strong intellectual property rules and practices.

5) Promoting an entrepreneurial culture:

In order to compete in a world that is always changing, higher education institutions need to foster an entrepreneurial culture (Clarysse et al., 2011; Guerrero,2019). Encouragement of technology transfer and commercialization activities among academics and students can support the development of new businesses, the creation of jobs, and economic expansion. Universities can improve their capacity to respond to shifting demands and seize new possibilities by encouraging an entrepreneurial mindset, thereby boosting their long-term competitiveness.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper addresses the significant challenges and opportunities in the process of university technology transfer, notably when operating within the triple helix model involving universities, industries, and governments. This model emphasizes close collaboration amongst these three actors, aiming to foster technological innovation and socio-economic progress. Nevertheless, it faces challenges such as communication and cultural differences, IP issues, differing time frames and expectations, resource constraints and allocation, regulatory and policy challenges, and the presence of inflexible institutional structures.

Through extensive literature analysis, the paper identifies opportunities to overcome these challenges, suggesting the promotion of interdisciplinary research, cooperative endeavors, sustainability-focused curricula, community involvement, and modified technology transfer mechanisms. The paper further provides recommendations on aligning incentives, developing capacities, building partnerships, managing intellectual property effectively, and promoting an entrepreneurial culture.

While the discussion presented in this paper offers a comprehensive understanding of the issues at hand, it also opens up several avenues for future research. For instance, how can we effectively measure the impact of improved communication and cultural understanding amongst the stakeholders? What specific strategies can be employed to better manage IP rights in a way that is mutually beneficial to all involved parties? How can the various suggested recommendations be implemented in a practical context, and what might be the challenges and trade-offs in doing so?

Moreover, in light of contemporary global challenges like climate change and social equity, there is a pressing need for research that explores how universities can effectively integrate these concerns into their technology transfer practices and strategies. The dynamic nature of these issues presents an evolving landscape for technology transfer, suggesting that the discourse should be ongoing and adaptive to the changing environment. Further research could also delve deeper into the concept of sustainability in the context of technology transfer and how this can be operationalized in practice.

The exploration of alternative models of technology transfer, beyond the triple helix, also warrants further investigation. This could involve the examination of case studies from different regions and countries, contributing to a more global understanding of effective technology transfer practices. As this field continues to develop, it is expected that this research can serve as a foundation for future studies and practical applications.

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# Scholarships for international students as a way to ensure the right to education (including case studies)

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<https://doi.org/10.33542/VSS2023-1-8>

## Abstract

*Access to education is recognized in several international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.*

*However, for many people, especially those from marginalized communities, access to education can be difficult due to financial, cultural and language barriers.*

*In response to these challenges, there is growing recognition of the importance of scholarships and financial aid in expanding access to education for international students. Previous research has shown that scholarships can play a critical role in overcoming financial barriers and expanding access to education. For example, a study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found that increased investment in education, including scholarships and financial aid, is associated with higher economic growth (below we will write in more detail about this study).*

*In this article, we will take a fresh look at the importance of the right to education and the role that scholarships for international students can play in securing and protecting this right. We will also discuss the challenges international students face in accessing higher education and the impact of scholarships in overcoming these barriers. Ultimately, this article will demonstrate how scholarships for international students can be a valuable tool in ensuring access to education for all and ensuring that everyone has the opportunity to realize their right to education.*

*Moreover, we will also look at several case studies to analyze the impact of scholarships on the lives of specific students from low-income countries.*

*In addition, this article will show the correlation between granting scholarships and the economic growth of the countries (scholarship providers) as well as their receiving additional and unobvious at-first-sight political benefits.*

**Key words:** *Right to education, Right to access to higher education, Human rights, Scholarships, Case study.*

## **Introduction**

The right to education is a fundamental human right that is recognized and protected by various international and regional human rights bodies, including the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2023), the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 2023), and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2023). These bodies play an important role in monitoring the implementation of the right to education and promoting efforts to make education available and accessible to all.

However, for the right to education to be effective, rather than simply guaranteed, measures taken by only international bodies are not enough. It is important that this right is upheld at national and local levels.

The goal of this article is to explore the importance of the right to access higher education in the context of society as a whole, as well as to reflect on the importance of scholarships for foreign students in promoting access to education and protecting the right to education.

Moreover, this article aims to highlight the challenges that people from low-income countries and families face in obtaining an education and how scholarships can help overcome financial, cultural and language barriers.

In addition, the article seeks to demonstrate a positive correlation between education and the economic growth of countries providing it. The article also analyzes case studies of students from low-income countries to illustrate the impact of scholarships on their particular lives.

Finally, the article will touch on the potential policy benefits that scholarship-giving countries can reap beyond the obvious educational benefits and promote one more time the importance of supporting the right to access education among businesses, societies and states showing how it can benefit them in a long-term perspective.

### **1. Methods**

Before commencing, it is important to specify the scientific methodologies applied in this scientific paper.

First of all, the literature review was carried out, which involves gathering and analyzing previous research on the topic to provide background information and context for research.

Thus, we analyzed international legislation, the practice of the international court, as well as the work of various researchers on similar topics. Namely, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, documents prepared by the United Nations Committee

on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and others (more details below).

In addition, the quantitative research method was used, which involves collecting and analyzing numerical data through surveys, experiments, and statistical analysis. The data received was analyzed - The Learning Agency, the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank and others (more details below).

For a more in-depth study of the impact of scholarships on the right to education of international students, due to the limitation of data in open sources, a case study (method involves an in-depth analysis of a single individual, group, or event to gain insights and understanding of complex issues) was conducted using methods of the qualitative research (method involves collecting and analyzing non-numerical data such as observations, interviews, and open-ended responses) and in-depth interviews.

Due to the fact that, as part of the study, it was important for us to understand the complex social and psychological connections of the impact of having scholarships on the right to study, we conducted in-depth interviews, the results of which formed the second part of this research paper (Interviewee\_1, 2023) and (Interviewee\_2, 2023).

## **2. Meaning of the Right to Education**

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26 states that "Everyone has the right to education" (United Nations (General Assembly), 1948).

This is the basic rule that can be found in many documents. For example, according to Article 2 of the First Protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights, all signatory parties (all countries which signed this convention) oblige to guarantee the right to education and de-facto promote and ensure this right in their European countries (Council of Europe, 1950).

In other words, it is a cornerstone of human rights, that is also seen as a means of promoting peace, tolerance, and understanding between different cultures and nations.

However, it is important to define what the right to education is and what it includes, as well as how higher education is related to it and what forms of education it provides.

In addition to Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has issued General Comment No. 13 on the right to education, which elaborates on the obligation of states to ensure the availability, accessibility and good quality of education (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1999). These are the key elements of education, which we are describing below:

### **a) Availability**

The availability of functional educational institutions and programs must be adequate within the boundaries of the state. The requirements for their operation can vary depending on various factors, including the developmental environment in which they are situated. These institutions and programs must have basic needs met, such as proper shelter, gender-separated sanitation facilities, secure drinking water, well-compensated teachers, and necessary instructional materials. Other needs may include a library, computer resources, and technology for information access, depending on the specific institution or program.

In other words, educational institutions must exist with conditions suitable for learning and staying in them.

### **b) Accessibility**

Access to educational institutions and programs must be available to all individuals without discrimination within the jurisdiction of the state. Accessibility encompasses three important dimensions:

**Non-discrimination:** All individuals, including those who are particularly vulnerable, must have equal access to education without any discrimination.

**Physical accessibility:** Education must be within safe and convenient reach, either through physical attendance at a nearby school or through technology-assisted methods, such as distance learning.

### **c) Acceptability**

The format and content of education, including curricula and teaching methods, must be accepted by students and, when applicable, their parents. This must align with the educational goals outlined in Article 13 (1) and meet any minimum educational standards set by the state.

### **d) Adaptability**

Education must be flexible to accommodate the evolving needs of society and communities and be able to respond to the diverse social and cultural backgrounds of students.

To sum up, it is better to highlight that the right to education is not only a matter of access to schools and educational institutions but also involves the quality of education and the availability of educational materials and resources.

In order to ensure that the right to education is fulfilled, states are obligated to take steps to make education available, accessible, and of good quality. This includes providing free and compulsory primary education, ensuring that girls and women have equal access to education as men, and creating programs to help individuals who have been marginalized, such as refugees and individuals with disabilities.

### **3. Access to higher education**

As was mentioned before, the right to access higher education is an integral part of the right to education in general and is also recognized by various international human rights treaties and declarations.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948) says that "technical and professional education shall be accessible to all, and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit" (clause 1 of Article 26) (United Nations (General Assembly), 1948).

Moreover the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Article 13, not just recognizes the right to education and sets out the obligation of states to ensure that the right is fulfilled, but also states that the "higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by the progressive introduction of free education" (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1999).

Access to education at another level (in particular, to higher education) can be restricted, but only on one basis - the ability of the individual. It is from this provision that the competitiveness of admission to institutions of higher education derives. Therefore, in relation to higher education, the content of the right of access is the right to be admitted to a competitive procedure, that is, in a sense, a right to participate in the competition. Thus, the content of the right of access varies according to the level of education and in one case arises with the attainment of a certain age, while in another it may be due to other legal facts.

The European Court's decision in the Belgian case states the following: "The right to education enshrined in the first sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms guarantees everyone within the jurisdiction of the Contracting States 'the right of access to educational institutions existing at a certain time,' but this right of access is only part of the right to education. " (Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium. Safeguarding of employees rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 1986).

It is highly important to note the terminology used by the European Court. The first sentence of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (concluded in Rome on November 4, 1950) is worded as follows "No person shall be denied the right to education." The Court introduces the term "right of access". This position is repeated by the European Court in other cases (Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 1976), (Károly Nagy v. Hungary, 2017). The European Court notes that the right of access requires state regulation ("Despite its importance, this right is not absolute and can be restricted; restrictions are allowed indirectly because the right of access to educational institutions "by its nature requires state regulation " (LEYLA ŞAHİN v. TURKEY, 2005) and a citizen who wants to enter a higher educational institution must comply with

established admission rules and successfully pass entrance exams, that is, pass a competitive procedure (Dmitriy LUKACH v. RUSSIA, 1999).

Thus, both international law and practice of international courts and national legislation allocate within the right to education a separate right - the right of access, and, consequently, the relevant legislative regulation of admission to educational institutions of higher education is an instrumental mechanism of implementation of this right.

Thus, the right to education guarantees the possibility to receive an education of an appropriate level in the presence of certain legal facts (successful completion of a competition for admission) but does not guarantee a particular educational institution or a particular educational program.

The right to education, including higher education, is considered crucial for individuals to fully realize their potential, and for the development of societies as a whole.

However, despite the recognition of the right to higher education, there is still significant inequality in access to higher education, particularly for disadvantaged and marginalized groups, such as women, ethnic minorities, and low-income individuals. This unequal access to higher education can perpetuate existing socioeconomic disparities and limit opportunities for social mobility.

Studies have shown that access to higher education is a key factor in reducing poverty and promoting economic growth (Altbach, 2004; King & Baum, 2003). Furthermore, access to higher education has been shown to improve health outcomes, increase political participation, and contribute to more peaceful and democratic societies (Ziderman, 1990; Brunner & Wils, 2010).

The provision of higher education is often a responsibility of the state, and there is a growing consensus that states have a duty to ensure that all individuals have equal access to higher education. This may involve the implementation of policies and programs aimed at increasing access for disadvantaged groups, as well as addressing the financial barriers to higher education, such as tuition fees and student loan schemes (Arksey & Knight, 1999).

Therefore, the right to access higher education is a crucial component of the right to education and is essential for promoting equality, socio-economic development, and human rights. Despite progress in recognizing this right, much work remains to be done to ensure that all individuals, regardless of their socio-economic background, have equal access to higher education.

To go further and to answer to the question of what higher education it is important to note that the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in 1976 developed the first version of the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Lately, it was revised and improved twice – in 1997 and 2011.



According to the ISCED, there are 9 levels of education (plus the lowest one – 0 level which is including programmes during childhood education) (United Nations, 2011).

Hereby briefly presented the levels of education in table format:

**Table 1: ISCED 2011 briefly**

<b>Lower education</b>	ISCED 0:	Early childhood education ('less than primary' for educational attainment)
	ISCED 1:	Primary education
	ISCED 2:	Lower secondary education
<b>Secondary education</b>	ISCED 3:	Upper secondary education
	ISCED 4:	Post-secondary non-tertiary education
<b>Intermediate stage between secondary and higher education</b>	ISCED 5:	Short-cycle tertiary education
<b>Higher education</b>	ISCED 6:	Bachelor's or equivalent level
	ISCED 7:	Master's or equivalent level
	ISCED 8:	Doctoral or equivalent level
	ISCED 9:	Not elsewhere classified

Thereby according to the ISCED 2011, higher education can be found at levels 6-8: at the undergraduate level, masters level and doctoral level. And it means that analysing the right to access to higher education means the right to undergraduate, masters and doctoral education.

#### **4. Scholarships are a way to ensure access to quality education**

In 2020, the Learning Agency located in Washington conducted research on the correlation between the quality of learning and subsequent income levels in the USA (and economic benefits for the country in general) (Boser, 2020). They tried to calculate and show how increasing the quality of education can benefit businesses, society and states.

The research shows that improved math skills can increase the annual salary by \$21,000. That is \$400,000 in 20 years (Boser, 2020).

Good skills in reading and writing can bring you an additional \$11,000 per year or more than \$200,000 in two decades (Boser, 2020).

It is also interesting that graduating with a high school diploma is equivalent to an additional \$7,000 per year in salary (Boser, 2020).

According to Boser's research, the national and state-level economic benefits of improved education are estimated to be over \$200 billion. It is evident that workers are not the only ones who stand to gain from improved educational outcomes, as wages are the foundation of the economy. As a result, we analyzed the overall impact of salary increases.

Their estimates show that approximately 11 million workers in the U.S. would benefit from improved math skills, resulting in an additional \$235 billion in annual earnings. This translates to a \$235 billion increase for the national economy each year if math education is improved. Over a 20-year period, this amounts to a staggering \$4.7 trillion. It's important to note that this analysis is relatively conservative, as it only takes into account full-time adult workers in the prime of their careers.

The impact of education on economic outcomes is substantial. People with higher levels of education tend to have higher lifetime earnings and pay more taxes. Furthermore, a highly educated population drives national economic growth and can foster greater unity and trust in democratic societies.

Therefore, investing in public education creates a virtuous cycle for the economy. As education standards rise, the economy strengthens, which in turn allows for further investments in education. In some nations, the education sector has even become the primary catalyst for economic development.

The Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea came up with similar results about the impact of education on the country's development in its study (Korea, n.d.).

Other international organizations, such as The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (UNESCO, 2015) and The World Bank (World Bank, 2017), have also conducted research on the relationship between education and economic growth, and have proved that there is a positive correlation between increased investment in education and higher economic growth.

These studies have once again confirmed that education is essential for personal development, economic growth, and social progress, as quality education provides an opportunity to improve the standard of living of the population, and their good income brings a positive impact on the state.

For this purpose, states are obligated to guarantee and ensure that the right is fulfilled for all individuals with skill-based access to education (without financial obstacles) and to do so scholarships play a critical role in providing this access for national and international students, especially from low-income and developing countries.

International scholarships can help to mitigate these barriers and increase access to education for students from all walks of life. In 2018, the Institute of International Education

reported that there were over 1 million international students enrolled in colleges and universities in the United States, representing 5.5% of all students. Of these international students, 39% received some form of financial support, including scholarships (Institute of International Education, 2018).

Below we will give examples of particular benefits of providing scholarships for international students based on existing scholarships or fellowships programs selected for explanatory purposes:

*Ensuring equal access to education:*

The main purpose of scholarships for international students is to provide equal access to education for people from different walks of life. By providing financial support, scholarships help remove barriers and enable students to pursue higher education abroad. It promotes cultural exchange, diversity and global understanding among students.

For example, we can take the Fulbright Program. This project, initiated by the US Department of State, offers scholarships to students from all over the world. Its goal is to promote mutual understanding between the US and other countries through educational and cultural exchange. This program has enabled thousands of international students to study in the US, promoting global collaboration and dialogue (Fulbright Program, 2023).

*Empowering students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds:*

Scholarships play a vital role in empowering students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. Many international students face financial difficulties that hinder their access to quality education. Scholarships help level the playing field by providing financial aid that enables talented students to realize their educational aspirations.

For instance, the Chevening Scholarships, funded by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Chevening Scholarships are for outstanding people from all over the world. These scholarships cover tuition fees, living expenses and other expenses, allowing recipients to complete a master's degree in the UK. This program allows people with leadership potential, regardless of their financial situation (Chevening Scholarships, 2023).

*Promoting Diversity and Cultural Exchange, as well as Research and Innovation:*

Another purpose of scholarships for international students is to encourage diversity and cultural exchange in educational institutions. By attracting students from different countries and backgrounds, scholarships help create a vibrant and inclusive learning environment. This exposure to diverse perspectives enhances the academic experience of students and prepares them to become global citizens.

The Erasmus Mundus program supported by the European Union offers scholarships to students all over the world. It encourages mobility between European universities and

universities in partner countries, promoting academic cooperation and intercultural understanding. The program promotes the exchange of knowledge, ideas and cultural practices, enriching the educational experience of participating students (European Education and Culture Executive Agency, 2023).

*Diplomatic Relations and Alumni Networks/Connections:*

Scholarships for international students provide significant benefits for diplomatic relations between countries. Firstly, they promote cultural exchange by bringing together students from different countries, promoting understanding and respect for different cultures. This exchange of ideas and experiences helps break down stereotypes and prejudices, building bridges between countries.

Secondly, scholarships promote cooperation in the field of education and partnership between educational institutions of different countries. International students bring unique perspectives and knowledge to their host universities, enriching the academic environment. Such cooperation can lead to joint research projects, academic initiatives and the establishment of long-term educational links between countries.

In addition, scholarships create opportunities for networking and personal connections between international students and local communities. When students return to their home countries, they become ambassadors, helping to build goodwill and mutual understanding through face-to-face communication. These ties lay the foundation for long-term bilateral cooperation such as trade agreements and joint initiatives.

Ultimately, scholarships for international students serve as a demonstration of a country's "soft power" by showing its commitment to education, cultural exchange and international cooperation. By developing talented individuals through scholarships, countries build trust, enhance their global reputation, and promote positive diplomatic relations on a broader scale.

For instance, this is implemented through the Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship program. It is a prestigious scholarship initiative offered by the Hungarian government to international students. Its goal is to provide excellent educational opportunities and promote cultural exchange between Hungary and other countries. The program offers fully funded scholarships for undergraduate, graduate and doctoral studies in various specialities at Hungarian universities (Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship program, 2023).

Overall, scholarship programs bring numerous benefits to countries. They enhance the intellectual capital, research capacity and cultural diversity of the countries' higher education institutions. The programs also stimulate economic growth, facilitate international communications and strengthen diplomatic relations. Overall, the scholarship programs play

a vital role in countries development as a knowledge-based economy and a global hub for education and innovation.

## 5. Case studies

In order to explore and understand the impact of scholarships on the ability to access higher education for specific people, in-depth interviews were conducted with scholarship recipients.

The purpose of the in-depth interviews was to gain a deeper understanding of the effects of scholarships on students' ability to pursue higher education. Through these interviews, we aim to explore the real-life experiences and perspectives of scholarship recipients and how scholarships have impacted their journey towards higher education.

The main hypothesis of this study is that scholarships guarantee the opportunity to receive a quality education outside of one's home country, and also provide the right to access higher education, regardless of the financial capabilities of the student and his family.

There were two in-depth interviews conducted as part of the preparation of this research paper. They were conducted anonymously and for scientific/research purposes.

The first part of the conversation with interviewees concerned their experience of studying in their home country, and the second part concerned their experience in another country, as well as the impact of the scholarship on the opportunity to study and how this experience affected the interviewee's life in general.

Below we present general information about the background and education of both interviewees.

**Table 2: Brief information about the interviewees' home countries and education**

Question	Interviewee 1	Interviewee 2
<i>What is your home country?</i>	Ukraine	Russia
<i>Please confirm that you obtained your bachelor's degree in your home country.</i>	Yes, I do confirm.	Yes, I do confirm.
<i>Which university did you attend?</i>	Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv Institute of International Relationships	Moscow State University
<i>Please describe the reputation of your home country's university.</i>	The university is one of the top three universities in the country. The university has a fairly good reputation in the academic world.	Ranked as one of the strongest academic institutions

The first part of the interview focused on the interviewees' experiences at their home country university (on the atmosphere at the university, social life, relationships with faculty and students, etc., quality of education, availability of resources, training programs, opportunities for international cooperation, exchange programmes and career opportunities after graduation).

Interviewee 1 shared her undergraduate experience and expressed regret about the lack of student life during those years. She felt that these were excellent years that were spent solely on studying and using the computer. She acknowledged that financial opportunities were limited at that time, but she still felt that she missed out on experiencing more during those formative years. From the age of 18 to 22, she found herself engrossed in their studies with little room for any other activities.

At university Interviewee 1 had a diverse group of friends including close friends and acquaintances, and never felt isolated. However, there wasn't a lot of student life on campus due to the rigorous academic demands.

One thing that stood out to her was the distance between students and teachers. It was challenging to approach a professor after class with questions, as there was a cult-like reverence for them. While this level of respect was normal in Interviewee 1's home country, Interviewee 1 found it strange, and it hindered the educational process. Despite this, the level of teaching was top-notch, and students were encouraged to read extensively and analyze the material thoroughly.

The workload was heavy, and Interviewee 1 felt overloaded at times. However, the university provided a high level of education and foreign language proficiency, which was valuable. There were many textbooks available in the library, and most materials were also available in electronic form. They utilized tablets to record lectures and prepare for seminars, and some teachers would send them additional information via email.

Although the university had agreements with other European Union universities for exchange programs, it was difficult to participate. Studying abroad was not considered part of their university studies, so students had to attend both institutions concurrently, which was challenging. As a result, few students took advantage of this opportunity. Instead, Interviewee 1 pursued non-formal education through short-term Erasmus training programs during her studies.

While there were no job fairs or employment opportunities on campus, graduates of the University of International Relations in Ukraine were highly regarded in the job market. After completing her bachelor's degree, Interviewee 1 was encouraged to continue her studies at the master's level at the same university, but Interviewee 1 ultimately decided against it due to the repetitive nature of the courses. Instead, she considered pursuing a master's degree

abroad. Later on, Interviewee 1 had the option to attend graduate school, but Interviewee 1 opted to continue her studies abroad instead.

Interviewee 2 had a little different experience at her home country's university. The atmosphere during all education was amicable and cosy due to the relatively small class of approximately 300-400 people. Professors personally knew students since study groups were limited to 15 people.

The quality of education varied depending on the course and professor. Some courses, such as language courses, economics, and regional studies, were taught effectively, while others lacked interest from both professors and students.

The university had the means to provide additional training programs and educational materials, but students, including Interviewee 2, did not actively seek them out, and the university did not promote them much.

Opportunities for international cooperation and exchange programs were limited due to the specificities of the interviewee's studies in a foreign language. However, there was an opportunity to participate in an exchange program during the third year.

Career opportunities after graduation varied, with most students ending up in different sectors not directly related to their studies. Some languages provided more opportunities than others. Interviewee 2 worked with the language but did not enjoy the area itself, working with security services.

Opportunities for further education, including postgraduate studies, were available, but few people pursued them as they were considered repetitive and mostly pursued obtaining an additional diploma. Most people pursued them as a backburner activity while working full-time jobs.

As was mentioned earlier the second part of the conversation with interviewees was about their experience and education abroad.

**Table 3: Brief information about the interviewees' education abroad**

Question	Interviewee 1	Interviewee 2
<i>Have you continued your education after graduating from your home country's university? If so, please reply to the questions below.</i>	Yes, I have.	Yes, I have.
<i>Which university (universities) did you attend? Please provide a brief description of the university's location(s), programme(s) and dates of education. (in mm/yyyy – mm/yyyy format)</i>	1) Master's degree in University of Public Services, Budapest, Hungary, Sept 2016 – Jan 2018	1) Master's degree in Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary, Sept 2019 – June 2021 2) Master's degree in Oxford University, Oxford, UK, Sept 2022 – Sept 2023

	2) Ph.D. in University of Public Services, Budapest, Hungary, Sept 2018 – June 2024 (tentatively)	
<i>Did you obtain a scholarship(s) for these continued studies? If so, please provide your name and a brief description of this scholarship(s).</i>	Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship: awarded to students to get their education in a Hungarian university, covering tuition fees and providing a living stipend (this scholarship was received twice for Master degree education and Ph.D. education)	1) Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship: awarded to students to get their education in a Hungarian university, covering tuition fees and providing a living stipend  2) Weidenfeld-Hoffmann Trust scholarship: The Trust provides around thirty graduate scholarships a year for graduates and early career professionals from developing and emerging countries to study at Oxford and participate in a specially created Leadership Programme which gives them the tools to make a difference in whichever sphere they can. The Weidenfeld-Hoffmann Trust is the largest philanthropic scholarship supported by the University of Oxford.

Interviewee 1 had an amazing experience of studying abroad, especially during her master's program. She found that her program was a breath of fresh air, also the campus and dorms were amazing. Despite financial problems, Interviewee 1 still had a great time in Budapest, which she found to be a charming and attractive city. She had a diverse group of classmates from different countries, which made her feel like she was in a dream.

Introductory events, campus buddies, and mentors helped her adjust well to her new environment. Interviewee 1 was not afraid to fly to another country, because she knew that the university was waiting for her there. Interviewee 1's educational journey began in September 2016 and continued until graduation.

Although she encountered problems during her graduate studies, including subjects she found useless and poor organization, she persevered and was successful in taking charge of her own studies. Although the university's involvement in academia was low, Interviewee 1 valued community life in the university and events organized for international students.

Interviewee 1 also found that the quality of education was lower than at her home country's university. However, the experience was more interesting due to the fact that there were many group projects that she did not do at her home country's university. There was also less pressure as the scholarship was not dependent on her grades.



Interviewee 1 mentioned a lack of books and materials but appreciated that articles and other materials were sent to them electronically. Although the amount of information was less than what she was used to, there were many opportunities at the university, including events and lectures given by ambassadors. As a downside, no one helped her with her employment, and she found it problematic to find a job with her diploma in Hungary.

Overall, the experience of studying abroad has enriched her and given her new experience and skills. Interviewee 1 fondly remembers her time in Hungary and the opportunities it provided.

Interviewee 2 noted that the university atmosphere is intense but enjoyable, providing a once-in-a-lifetime experience. Social life is a significant part of the Oxford experience with a vast number of societies, formal dinners, public lectures, and daily events. Currently, UCU (The University and College Union) strikes are happening, involving professors and being supported by students in solidarity with their faculties.

The quality of education at the program is exceptional and comprehensive, providing a multi-disciplinary and engaging curriculum with academic lectures, discussions, student projects and presentations, field trips, and practitioner meetings.

Resources, training programs, and educational materials are abundant at the university library, providing access to any paper or educational material. Additional training programs are also available for IT and research skills.

Opportunities for international cooperation and exchange programs are likely available, although this has not been personally checked. After graduation, career opportunities are hopeful, and for those interested in pursuing an academic career, there are opportunities to apply for a DPhil (PhD).

The last part of the conversation was aimed at the impact of the scholarship on the opportunity to study and how this experience affected the interviewees' lives in general.

We will go into the details of these interviews below.

**Table 4: Brief information about the interviewees' costs of latest education and impact of scholarships on their ability to study abroad (*due to the comparison the indexes were calculated to the same currency*)**

Question	Interviewee 1	Interviewee 2
<p><i>Do you know how much your current education costs per year and how much you approximately need for accommodation and life per year? If yes, please provide details about the cost of education and living expenses.</i></p>	<p>Tuition fees: about 400,000 forints per semester (around \$1,150 USD)</p> <p>Living expenses: 200,000 forints per month (around \$575 USD) (includes food, 1-2 clothing items, some cosmetics, some entertainment activities).</p> <p>If you do not live in a dormitory, you need extra 160,000 - 170,000 forints per month to rent an apartment (around \$475 USD).</p>	<p>Tuition fees: £29,100 (around \$36,000 USD) Living expenses: £17,500 (around \$21,700 USD)</p>
<p><i>Which university would you have been able to study abroad without a scholarship? Did the scholarship alleviate any issues you might have had in obtaining this education from a financial, documentation and any other perspectives (health insurance, accommodation, etc.)?</i></p>	<p>My family would not be able to pay for any education abroad.</p> <p>Thanks to the scholarship I received tuition fees, money, residence permit, insurance, accommodation. The scholarship was lucky ticket.</p>	<p>I will not be where I am without the scholarship! The scholarship supports me financially (tuition fees, living grant), academically and professionally by giving access to the community of like-minded people and providing training on my soft leadership skills.</p>
<p><i>Do you think that studying abroad significantly contributed to your personal growth? If so, describe how so.</i></p>	<p>Of course, 100%.</p> <p>Life here has changed me a lot. I have become more openminded and interacting with people from so many countries and cultures is a great experience. I think that I got more experience from communicating with people, listening to stories about how they live, what their rules and orders are. Knowledge of other religions has become something new for me. We live in our own world and do not particularly think that people are different, what is</p>	<p>Studying abroad has shaped me significantly by exposing me to a variety of cultures and viewpoints and by making me look at things from different perspectives.</p>

	<p>normal for you, is not for others. This is what life abroad taught me. I think this is colossal personal growth for me.</p> <p>When you understand how diverse the world is and you are open to different things, it makes you very flexible. When you become flexible, you stop worrying about some things, it greatly simplifies your life.</p> <p>The more we see, communicate and travel, what we have gone through and experienced, and when we have new challenges, we are not very afraid of them, as we have a lot of diverse experiences that help us cope with everything. When you are in a bubble, talking with the same people, walking along the same route, it's very scary when the usual rhythm goes astray. Therefore, the experience of living abroad is the expansion of your own borders.</p>	
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Interviewee 1 said the tuition fees at her university were approximately 400,000 forints per semester (around \$1,150 USD), although she couldn't remember the exact amount. As for living expenses, she estimated that it was around 200,000 forints per month (around \$575 USD) for basic necessities such as food, a few purchases, cosmetics, and some entertainment activities. If one does not live in a dormitory, they would need to spend an extra 160,000 to 170,000 forints per month for rent (around \$475 USD).

Interviewee 1 highlighted that without the scholarship she received, her family would not have been able to pay for her education, and the scholarship helped alleviate the financial burden by covering tuition fees, residence permit, health insurance, accommodation, and living expenses.

When asked about the impact of studying abroad on her personal growth, the interviewee said that it had a significant impact. She mentioned that living in a different country and interacting with people from diverse backgrounds had made her more open-minded and flexible. She gained a new perspective on religion and realized that people from different cultures have different rules and orders that are normal for them.

Studying abroad helped her to expand her own boundaries and become more adaptable to new experiences and challenges. She added that having diverse experiences helps to cope with anything and simplifies life. Therefore, studying abroad not only provides academic knowledge but also contributes significantly to personal growth.

Interviewee 2 also provided information about the cost of education and living expenses for her current university, which was £29,100 for tuition fees (around \$36,000 USD) and £17,500 for living expenses (around \$21,700 USD) per year.

Interviewee 2 (same as Interviewee 1) stated that they wouldn't have been able to study abroad without it. The scholarship provided financial support for tuition fees and living expenses, as well as academic and professional support by giving access to a community of like-minded people and providing training on soft leadership skills.

Regarding her personal growth from studying abroad, the interviewee expressed that it had significantly shaped her by exposing her to different cultures and viewpoints, and allowed her to look at things from different perspectives. She felt that this experience had expanded her own borders and made her more flexible, which in turn had made her less afraid of new challenges.

The notion of unaffordability of the programmes mentioned above without scholarships is confirmed by statistics on average wage levels in the home countries of the interviewees. According to the official data the average monthly salary in Russia (Federal State Statistics Service, 2023) and Ukraine (State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2023) from 2019 to 2021 were (Please note that the exchange rates used to convert the salary figures from local currencies to US dollars may fluctuate over time and affect the accuracy of the USD amounts provided):

In Russia:

- 2019: 44,550 rubles (\$572 USD)
- 2020: 49,100 rubles (\$671 USD)
- 2021: 51,600 rubles (\$700 USD)

In Ukraine:

- 2019: 10,461 hryvnias (\$405 USD)
- 2020: 12,030 hryvnias (\$428 USD)
- 2021: 14,100 hryvnias (\$515 USD)

Thus, we can conclude that studying abroad significantly expands opportunities and horizons, but without scholarships it is extremely problematic or even impossible for residents of countries with low monthly average incomes.

Moreover, these case studies support the hypothesis that scholarships play a crucial role in ensuring the opportunity to receive a quality education outside of one's home country. For the interviewees scholarships provided access to higher education, regardless of their financial capabilities or the financial situation of their families. By offering financial support, scholarships enabled these students to pursue educational opportunities that may have otherwise been out

of reach. Therefore we can confirm that scholarships are instrumental in promoting equal educational opportunities and bridging the gap between students' aspirations and their financial constraints.

## **Conclusions**

In conclusion, the interviews and statistics provided demonstrate that studying abroad offers a valuable opportunity for personal and academic growth, but financial barriers can prevent students from low-income countries from accessing these opportunities. Scholarships and financial aid play a crucial role in making higher education and international experiences more accessible and inclusive. By providing support for tuition fees, living expenses, and academic and professional development, scholarships can help students expand their horizons, develop important skills, and ultimately improve their career prospects. It is important for universities and governments to continue investing in scholarships and financial aid programs to ensure that more students have the opportunity to benefit from studying abroad and contribute to a more diverse and globally connected society.

It is worth noting again that access to higher education is a basic human right, as recognized by the United Nations. However, the reality is that financial barriers often prevent students, particularly those from low-income countries, from accessing this right. Scholarships and financial aid programs are essential in addressing this inequality and providing students with the means to pursue their academic and career goals.

The availability of scholarships for students from low-income countries is particularly important in promoting global diversity and equity in higher education. By providing financial support to students from diverse backgrounds, universities and governments can ensure that higher education is accessible to everyone, regardless of their financial background or country of origin. This is not only important for promoting equal opportunities, but also for cultivating a more diverse and inclusive academic community.

Moreover, providing scholarships to students from low-income countries not only benefits the individuals but also has a positive impact on their communities and countries as a whole. By empowering students with the knowledge, skills, and opportunities to succeed, scholarships can help to break the cycle of poverty and contribute to the development of more prosperous and equitable societies.

As such, it is important for universities and governments to prioritize funding for scholarship and financial aid programs, in order to ensure that all students have an equal opportunity to access higher education and pursue their dreams. By doing so, we can work towards a more equitable, diverse, and globally connected society.

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**RECENZIE**

# Sociálna spravodlivosť a starobné dôchodkové sporenie v SR

**Richard Geffert, Denisa Rovenská**

Spravodlivosť možno vnímať ako morálny štandard slušnosti a nestrannosti. Výrazom spravodlivosti v sociálnej oblasti je dobrá distribúcia bohatstva a odmien v spoločnosti. Sociálna spravodlivosť ako základný princíp sociálnej politiky predstavuje súčasť starobného dôchodkového systému každého demokratického a právneho štátu. Autori publikácie, Richard Geffert a Denisa Rovenská, sa problematike sociálnej spravodlivosti venujú dlhodobo, na ktorú nazerajú z pohľadu psychológie, politológie a filozofie.

Vedecká monografia Sociálna spravodlivosť a starobné dôchodkové sporenie v SR sa zameriava na sociálnu spravodlivosť v starobnom dôchodkovom systéme v Slovenskej republike v období rokov 2004 – 2022, pričom svoju pozornosť orientuje na II. dôchodkový pilier. Hlavným cieľom tejto monografie je identifikovať vnímanie sociálnej spravodlivosti v II. pilieri starobného dôchodkového sporenia cez hodnotové orientácie sporiteľov pri rozhodovaní sa o investovaní v jeho jednotlivých fondoch, ako modeloch, ktoré vytvorili relevantné slovenské politické reprezentácie. Monografia je rozčlenená do štyroch kapitol, kde prvé tri zahŕňajú teoretické poznatky a štvrtá, posledná, predstavuje interpretáciu a diskusiu o empirických zisteniach realizovaného výskumu.

Prvá kapitola, *„Sociálna spravodlivosť ako jedna zo základných hodnôt politiky a spoločnosti Západnej civilizácie“*, približuje sociálnu spravodlivosť ako normatívny princíp spoločnosti, ako základ legality a legitimacy demokratickej vlády. Autori poukazujú na to, že sociálna spravodlivosť ako vopred daná entita neexistuje, existujú len naše súdy o nej. Sociálna spravodlivosť je teda relatívna, pričom jej vnímanie a identifikovanie je „v priamom vzťahu s formou štátu, typom politického systému, sociálnou štruktúrou spoločnosti, makro a mikroekonomickými ukazovateľmi, zvykmi, tradíciami, kultúrou, náboženstvom či formou kreovania svetonázoru“ (s. 6). Z pohľadu spoločnosti je definovaná v pojmoch férovosti, rovnosti, rešpektu, dôstojnosti, sociálneho porovnávania, rozhodovania, morálky či svedomia. Politické subjekty participujúce na moci svoje chápanie sociálnej spravodlivosti vtlačajú do samotnej sociálnej politiky. Západná civilizácia preferuje vo vzťahu k vnímaniu sociálnej spravodlivosti utilitaristicko-materialistickú koncepciu, základom ktorej je dôraz kladený práve na ekonomické potreby individua i jednotlivých sociálnych skupín reprezentovaných národnými štátmi. Takéto vnímanie sociálnej spravodlivosti je podľa autorov založené na „výlučne progresívnom vnímaní vývoja času, človeka, spoločnosti, ekonomiky, ale aj dejín...“ (Geffert, Rovenská 2022, s. 15).

Druhá kapitola vedeckej monografie, *„Politicko-legislatívny fundament sociálnej spravodlivosti v starobnom dôchodkovom systéme Slovenskej republiky 2002 – 2022“*, je

zameraná na legislatívne implementovanie princípu sociálnej spravodlivosti do spoločenského systému prostredníctvom II. piliera starobného dôchodkového sporenia. Dôchodkový systém je zložitou, dlhodobou záležitosťou. Je výsledkom zmysluplnej kontinuálnej politickej kooperácie založenej na odbornosti a spoločenského konsenzu. Autori publikácie približujú systém dôchodkového sporenia na Slovensku pred rokom 2004, ktorý sa vyznačoval integráciou vysokej miery sociálnej solidarity. Štátna Sociálna poisťovňa ako dominantný zdroj prostriedkov pre starobný dôchodok slovenských občanov už v tomto období nedisponovala dostatočným objemom prostriedkov, pričom demografický vývoj poukazoval na rastúci nepomer ekonomicky aktívneho a ekonomicky neaktívneho obyvateľstva. Z pohľadu štátu bol starobný dôchodkový systém v tejto podobe neudržateľný.

Schválením zákona o starobnom dôchodkovom sporení č. 43/2004 Z. z. vzniká od 1.1.2005 povinný, kapitalizačne financovaný II. pilier. Dôchodkové dávky nie sú vyplácané z aktuálnych dôchodkových odvodov, ako je to v prípade prvého priebežného piliera, ale do istej miery aj z príspevkov sporiteľa. Tie sú zhodnocované správcom na základe investičného rozhodnutia samotného sporiteľa preberajúceho istú mieru zodpovednosti za zhodnotenie svojich budúcich príjmov. Vzhľadom na to, že politické rozhodnutia vedúcich predstaviteľov štátu sú kľúčové aj v súvislosti s podobou právneho a ekonomického rámca starobného dôchodkového systému, predkladá predmetná monografia podrobný prehľad zmien, uskutočnených v tejto oblasti. V priebehu rokov 2004 – 2022 sa vo vláde vystriedalo 8 vládnych koalícií, s rôznym hodnotovým ukotvením jednotlivých subjektov, ktoré ju tvorili, čo ovplyvnilo samotné prijímané rozhodnutia a zákony v oblasti sociálnej politiky a starobného dôchodku. Tie sa týkali predovšetkým povinnosti, či dobrovoľnosti vstúpiť do II. piliera, možnosti vystúpiť z II. piliera, samotnej doby sporenia i pravidiel investovania v zmysle prehodnotenia pravidiel rozloženia rizika. „Ukázalo sa, že ľavicový politický priestor je charakteristický silným postavením štátu a chápaním sociálnej spravodlivosti cez jeho vyššiu zodpovednosť za výšku starobného dôchodku v komparácii s pravicovými opatreniami, ktoré posilňujú subjektívnu zodpovednosť individua – objektu sociálnej politiky – budúceho starobného dôchodcu za výšku svojho starobného dôchodku“ (Geffert, Rovenská 2022, s. 34). Vnímanie sociálnej spravodlivosti politickými reprezentáciami tak bolo ovplyvnené ich hodnotovým ukotvením a zaradením v rámci politického spektra.

V tretej kapitole monografie *„Ekonomické charakteristiky II. dôchodkového piliera v Slovenskej republike“* sa autori snažia zmapovať výkonnosti II. starobného dôchodkového piliera od jeho vzniku, roku 2005 až do roku 2022, priblížiť vývoj počtu sporiteľov a identifikovať rozloženie financií v jednotlivých fondoch dôchodkových správcovských spoločností (DSS) v spomínanom časovom období. V rámci tejto kapitoly definujú dlhopisové, akciové, zmiešané a indexové fondy, pričom poukazujú na zhodnotenie investícií sporiteľov v rôznych DSS v rozličných časových obdobiach. Autori pritom poukazujú na mieru zhodnotenia úspor

sporiteľov, ktorá je vyššia v negarantovaných fondoch v komparácii s garantovanými fondami. Približujú taktiež vývoj počtu sporiteľov v kapitalizačnom pilieri dôchodkového sporenia podľa jednotlivých správcovských spoločností. Z pohľadu rozloženia finančných prostriedkov v garantovaných a negarantovaných fondoch, „nepomerne väčšia časť sporiteľov má svoje prostriedky, ktoré sú v správe zvolenej DSS v II. dôchodkovom pilieri v SR k 1.1.2022, investované iba v garantovaných alebo nejakej kombinácii garantovaných a negarantovaných fondov, a to celkovo až 1 178 615 sporiteľov. Len v negarantovaných fondoch svoje prostriedky investuje celkovo vo všetkých DSS iba 519 910 sporiteľov“ (Geffert, Rovenská 2022, s. 43). Z celkovej analýzy výkonnosti II. piliera starobného dôchodkového sporenia sú ako najmenej efektívne z hľadiska zhodnotenia investovaných prostriedkov označené dlhopisové garantované fondy, ktorých opodstatnenosť je z hľadiska ekonomickej efektívnosti pri zohľadnení inflácie otázná. V dlhodobom časovom horizonte však kapitalizačný pilier starobného dôchodku v SR predstavuje účinný nástroj na zhodnocovanie prostriedkov, pokrývajúcich v budúcnosti istú výšku starobných dôchodkov. Z pohľadu počtu sporiteľov možno na základe štatistických údajov zaznamenať ich postupný nárast.

Posledná, štvrtá kapitola monografie interpretuje výsledky uskutočneného prierezového, kvantitatívneho výskumu v oblasti vnímania sociálnej spravodlivosti a starobného dôchodkového systému v SR. K najzásadnejším zisteniam možno zaradiť postupný prechod od kolektivismu slovenskej spoločnosti k individualizmu, pričom tu vo vzťahu k vnímaniu spravodlivosti k starobnému dôchodkovému sporeniu dominujú dve hlavné presvedčenia – zásluha a redistribúcia. Občania, preferujúci redistribúciu, sú skôr zameraní na sociálne istoty, distributívnu spravodlivosť a žiadajú „rovnako pre všetkých“. Štát vnímajú ako autoritu a partnera, ktorý sa má podieľať na výške ich starobného dôchodku, za čo má prirodzene niesť istú mieru zodpovednosti. Tá časť spoločnosti, ktorá preferuje princíp zásluh, je riadená výkonom, úspechom a menšou viazanosťou vo vzťahu k štátu a starobnému dôchodkovému systému. Tieto postoje sa odrážajú aj vo vzťahu k jednotlivým vládnym koalíciám v SR.

Vedeckú monografiu „Sociálna spravodlivosť a starobné dôchodkové sporenie v SR“ možno vnímať ako súhrn významných a zaujímavých zistení, ktoré môžu slúžiť ako efektívny nástroj v procese tvorby sociálnych politík odborníkom zaoberajúcim sa problematikou sociálnej spravodlivosti, ale aj širšej verejnosti pre pochopenie dôležitosti a súvislostí týkajúcich sa II. kapitalizačného dôchodkového systému, ktorý je súčasťou každého, politicky vyspelého, právneho a demokratického štátu. Problematike sociálne spravodlivého starobného dôchodku dlhodobo nie je zo strany odborníkov a politických reprezentantov venovaná dostatočná pozornosť. Práve chápanie sociálnej spravodlivosti však ovplyvňuje nielen kvalitu života všetkých jednotlivcov v rámci spoločnosti, ale predovšetkým tú najzraniteľnejšiu sociálnu skupinu, ktorou sú starobní dôchodcovia. Na záver by som chcela

poukázať na slová autorov, ktoré je veľmi dôležité vnímať a pretaviť do reality s cieľom dosiahnuť nielen progres v ekonomickej, ale aj sociálnej oblasti:

„Spravodlivosť je zmyslom bytia, udržiava rovnováhu a harmóniu sveta, spoločnosti, blízkych vzťahov. Dodáva vieru, že zlo bude potrestané. Motivuje a je hnacou silou, prečo byť čestný voči ostatným a brániť neférovu ukrivdených. Dodáva nádej v lepší svet a hodnotnejší zajtrajšok“ (Geffert, Rovenská 2022, s. 14).

### **Údaje o publikácii**

doc. PhDr. Richard Geffert, Ph.D., Mgr. Denisa Rovenská, PhD.

Vydavateľ: ŠafárikPress

Rok vydania: 2022, počet strán: 96

Jazyk: slovenský, anglický

DOI <https://doi.org/10.33542/SJP2022-0136-0>

DOI <https://doi.org/10.33542/SDS2022-0122-3>

ISBN 978-80-574-0122-3 (e-publikácia)

ISBN 978-80-574-0136-0 (e-publikácia)

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# Komunálne právo

**Jozef Tekeli, Lukáš Tomáš**

Učebnica autorov z Katedry ústavného práva a správneho práva a z Ústavu teórie práva Gustava Radbrucha Právnickej fakulty UPJŠ nie je síce prvou, ale doposiaľ najúplnejšou publikáciou svojho druhu u nás.

Učebnica je prehľadne členená na tri časti - na časť všeobecnú, pozičnú a organizačnú.

Prvá, všeobecnú časť učebnice, ktorá má podtitul Teória komunálneho práva, považujeme za významný vklad do systematiky poznania v tejto oblasti predovšetkým jasným vymedzením miesta komunálneho práva v systéme právnych vied, čo je téma, o ktorej sa ešte niekedy vedie diskusia a pojem "komunálny" sa vyčleňuje len pre miestnu úroveň (kde sa navyše niekedy zamieňa s pojmom "komunitný"). Autori jasne deklarujú svoj dobre vyargumentovaný názor, že komunálne právo možno vymedziť ako "samostatné pododvetvie právneho poriadku v Slovenskej republike, ktoré sa skladá (pozostáva) z dvoch relatívne samostatných a zároveň úzko súvisiacich častí, a to z práva obcí (obecné právo) a práva VÚC". Tohoto členenia sa potom autori dôsledne pridriavajú aj v celom ďalšom texte učebnice.

Prvá časť zahŕňa ďalej prehľad vývoja územnej samosprávy na našom území od čias Veľkej Moravy až po súčasnosť (v minimálnom a orientačnom profile, nevyhnutnom pre kontext štúdia), prehľad prameňov a noriem komunálneho práva, vzťahov v komunálnom práve a realizácie komunálneho práva.

Pozičná časť učebnice v jednotlivých kapitolách si všíma pozičné vymedzenie tak obcí a miest ako aj vyšších územných celkov, názvov a symbolov týchto jednotiek územnej samosprávy, troch základných dimenzií územnej samosprávy, teda jej územného, personálneho a ekonomického (v podaní autorov finančného a majetkového) základu oboch základných typov jednotiek územnej samosprávy, ako aj pôsobnosti jednotiek územnej samosprávy, ich normotvorby a napokon aj otázok vnútroštátnej a medzinárodnej spolupráce v územnej samospráve (kde by bolo možné rozšírenie, týkajúce sa širšej škály právnych rámcov, v ktorých sa dnes napríklad medziobecná spolupráca u nás realizuje napr. v kontexte hospodárskeho práva v rôznych formách spoločného podnikania, ale napríklad aj v špecifických právom vymedzených formách spolupráce v oblasti cestovného ruchu, v oblasti regionálneho rozvoja a pod., v prípade vyšších územných celkov zase rozšíriť o formu spolupráce, ktorú predstavujú tzv. euroregióny).

Napokon tretia, organizačná časť sa v jednotlivých kapitolách venuje najprv celkovej organizačnej štruktúre jednotiek územnej samosprávy, následne zastupiteľstvám ako kolektívnym orgánom týchto jednotiek, ich poslancom, ako aj starostom a predsedom VÚC

ako monokratickým orgánom, ale všima si osobitne aj postavenie hlavného kontrolóra. Aj keď by to zrejme presiahlo učebnicový rámec publikácie, možno by bolo vhodné aj tu širšie poukázať na problémy, s ktorými sa v činnosti týchto orgánov u nás v praxi stretávame. V kapitole o priamych formách výkonu si autori všímajú zhromaždenie obyvateľov obce a na miestenej aj regionálnej úrovni referendum. Napokon v bohato členenej poslednej kapitole je pozornosť venovaná iným organizačným štruktúram v územnej samospráve, predovšetkým obecnej a mestskej rade, komisiám, obecnému a mestskému úradu, ako aj niektorým fakultatívnym štruktúram ako napríklad obecnému mládežníckemu parlamentu a rade seniorov ale aj obecnej a mestskej polícii. Na koniec zaradeným výborom mestských častí by sa možno tiež zišla trochu väčšia pozornosť aj vzhľadom k veľmi diferencovanej aplikačnej praxi, ale aj vzhľadom k tomu, že ide o inštitút nedocenený z hľadiska toho, že dnes mestské časti v niektorých prípadoch u nás reprezentujú až desaťtisíce obyvateľov (pričom výbor mestskej časti nie je ani pri takýchto počtoch obligatórny, čo kontrastuje s faktom plnohodnotných obcí s počtom obyvateľov menším ako 20 u nás.).

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Komunálne právo

Vydavateľstvo: Wolters Kluwer ČR

Rok vydania: 2022

Počet strán: 296

ISBN: 978-80-7676-584-9

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Šrobárova 2, 041 80 Košice  
IČO: 00 397 768

**Sídlo vydavateľa:** Šrobárova 2, 041 80 Košice



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Vydanie periodickej tlače: jún 2023

ISSN 2453-9236 (online)  
<https://doi.org/10.33542/VSS2023-1-0>