

**PAVOL JOZEF ŠAFÁRIK UNIVERSITY IN KOŠICE**

**Faculty of Arts**

**Department of British and American Studies**



**ON THE REPRESENTATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL EVENT IN A  
NATIONAL NEWSPAPER**

**Mgr. Karin Sabolíková, PhD.**

**Košice 2020**

*This research was supported by VEGA Project 1/0447/20 The Global and the Local in Postmillennial Anglophone Literatures, Cultures and Media, granted by the Ministry of Education, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic.*

## **ON THE REPRESENTATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL EVENT IN A NATIONAL NEWSPAPER**

*Monograph*

### **Author:**

Mgr. Karin Sabolíková, PhD.  
*Faculty of Arts, Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice*

### **Reviewers:**

Prof. María José Coperías-Aguilar, PhD.  
*University of Valencia, Spain*

Doc. PhDr. Edita Kominarecová, PhD.  
*University of Prešov, Prešov*

### **Science Editor:**

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*Faculty of Arts, Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice*

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The text has undergone a process of proofreading.

Available at: [www.unibook.upjs.sk](http://www.unibook.upjs.sk)  
Publication date: 23.12.2020

ISBN 978-80-8152-951-1 (e-publication)

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AGRs	- Advanced Gas – cooled Reactors
BR	- British Railways
CBI	- Confederation of British Industry
CPS	- Centre for Policy Studies
CEGB	- Central Electricity Generating Board
CGT	- General Confederation of Labour (France)
COSA	- Colliery Officials and Staff Area
GDP	- Gross Domestic Product
IEA	- Institute of Economic Affairs
KGGS	- Kesteven and Grantham Girl’s Grammar School
MFGB	- Miners’ Federation of Great Britain
MPNI	- Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance
MTFS	- Medium Term Financial Strategy
NACODS	- National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers
NCB	- National Coal Board
NDLS	- National Dock Labour Scheme
NUM	- National Union of Mineworkers
OUCA	- The Oxford University Conservative Association
PSBR	- Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
TGWU	- The Transport and General Workers’ Union
TUC	- Trades Union Congress

# Introduction

One of the most obvious properties of media news, both in more traditional and more recent approaches to media reporting, is that news reports constitute a particular type of discourse. However, discourse is not an isolated textual or dialogical structure. Discourse is a complex communicative event that also embodies a social context, featuring participants (and their properties) as well as production and reception processes (Dijk, 1988). Secondly, discourse analysis is an interdisciplinary field which studies language in use or language use in context. Put simply, it is one way of approaching and analysing a problem, and, as such, it might reveal some hidden motivations in the text. Discourse analysis includes a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches from the fields of linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, psychology and sociology and can be applied to any text, situation or issue. Thirdly, critical discourse analysis has been applied to various discourses in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of texts, both in written and spoken form. It represents an outgrowth of the work of the British and Australian pioneers of Critical Linguistics alongside the British discourse analyst Fairclough and the Dutch analyst van Dijk. Critical discourse analysis has been used in the majority of research into media discourse in recent years and has become a framework for studying media texts within European linguistics and discourse studies. Critical discourse analysis is viewed as a shared perspective of a wide range of approaches rather than as one school (Bell, Garrett, 1998), and thus, there is no single standard method by which to perform critical discourse analysis. Last but not least, it is obvious that critical discourse analysis has become more commonly used than ever in the contemporary period in which global media have produced in local languages and integrated local content in various ways.

This monograph provides a brief insight into the theory of news structures in the press and, consequently, the theoretical framework of critical discourse analysis is applied in an examination of the structures of news. Teun van Dijk is one of leading proponents of discourse analysis as an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of texts within their social context. Critical discourse analysis following van Dijk's theory and methods is used to analyse the representation of an industrial dispute, the Miners' Strike of 1984-1985 in the UK, in the Czechoslovak newspaper *Pravda*. The aim of the monograph is to examine the ways in which a single news item dealing with the event was presented in a national newspaper based on its ideological perspective.

The monograph is divided into four chapters. It first introduces the figure of Margaret Thatcher, the first female British Prime Minister. It is undisputable that Margaret Thatcher was a

remarkable figure of international standing who was highly respected in many parts of the world. In assessing the legacy of her three terms in office, the right-wing commentators view her policies as something which made one of the most revolutionary decade in the history of the world after World War I, while commentators on the left view the decade of the 1980s as a time of destruction. Although this monograph does not focus primarily on Thatcher's personality or her policies, I believe that; her greatest political achievements, including the defeat of trade unionism, can be better understood through an analysis of the shaping factors to which she was exposed during her early years and I therefore provide a brief introduction of her family background and education. The chapter continues with a concise account of Thatcher's policies and their development into the ideology of Thatcherism. The second chapter offers an insight into the well-known industrial dispute of the Miners' Strike of 1984-1985. The defeat of the National Union of Mineworkers' strike in 1984-1985 was probably the most significant achievement of Margaret Thatcher's second term as Prime Minister. Thatcher broke the power of the trade unionism, which had done massive damage to the economy throughout the 1970s and had driven Prime Minister Heath and Prime Minister Callaghan from office. Historians agree that while Margaret Thatcher might have been cheered by the few there are many who reacted with dismay. Nevertheless, Margaret Thatcher was convinced that she was doing what was best for the future economic well-being of the United Kingdom. The chapter outlines the main events of the dispute in chronological order. The third chapter gives an insight into the basic theoretical concepts within discourse and critical discourse analysis. In the final part of the chapter, I focus on critical discourse analysis as understood through the use of van Dijk's theory and methods. The fourth chapter presents an implementation of the already mentioned analytical framework. The resulting analysis focuses on an examination of how political ideology can be expressed and reproduced by the structures of a text. Qualitative analysis is established for thematic structures, schematic structures and selected categories of ideological discourse analysis.

While the presented analysis does not, admittedly, cover all possible aspects of van Dijk's approach of critical discourse analysis, a variety of issues remains to be explored in order to develop a richer, more complex analysis of the text structures. At the same time, one of the methodological aims of the monograph is to encourage a more explicit and systematic approach to the study of mass media discourse in general and to news reporting in particular. The monograph also intends to demonstrate that critical discourse analysis can complement more qualitatively the traditional method of quantitative content analysis.

# 1 MARGARET THATCHER

## EARLY YEARS

*“We must take a biographical detour. Don’t skim this part! You must understand where she came from to understand what she accomplished” (C. Berlinski quoted from Berlinski, 2008, p.3).*

Margaret Hilda Roberts was born on October 13, 1925 on North Parade, in Grantham, a town in the east coast county of Lincolnshire. Grantham was a small but successful medieval market town, approximately 91 miles north of London. Margaret Thatcher “came from what is often patronizingly called ‘humble’ stock but what was in effect the hard working, self-employed backbone of Britain who were pulling themselves and their families up the economic and social ladders on their own initiative and had truly great hopes for their children” (Blundell, 2008, pp.17-18). Although it is true that the Roberts’ home had no bath, no toilet, no running water and that Muriel (born in 1921) and Margaret had no bikes, few toys and rarely enjoyed trips to the cinema or theatre, the family was better off than most. In the mid-1930s, “75 per cent of all families were officially designated working class but the Roberts, with two shops, were among the 20 per cent who could be considered middle class” (Beckett, 2006, p. 3). In spite of this, Margaret walked to school, went home for lunch and then walked back to school every day; public transport or school lunches were deemed unacceptable expenses. Alfred Roberts kept his family in an austerity - not “for economic necessity but for religious reasons” (Campbell, 2012, p. 5).

Thatcher’s biographers agree that it was her father Alfred Roberts who was primarily responsible for the discipline and who became the driving force shaping her character and inspiring her political ambition. Aitken (2013, p.20) lists “at least four areas where his example made a profound impact - on her education at home; her spiritual values learned at the Methodist Church; her first experiences of politics; and the development of her personality that was greatly influenced by his principles.” Alfred Roberts and his wife Beatrice owned a grocery shop which served as a general store but also as a post office. They and their two daughters Muriel and Margaret lived over the shop. As the girls grew old, they used to help in the shop, which some scholars have interpreted as Margaret’s first experience with the market in its purest form. Overall, Alfred Roberts “established a respected business” (Moore, 2013, p. 5), which provided him not only with a source of income but also the base from which he could serve the town as a councillor, a Methodist and a Rotarian. Alfred Roberts represented virtues such as self-sufficiency, strenuousness and honesty.

He believed in the power of individualism and he had a strong belief in a free market; values which Margaret accepted and followed throughout her life:

I had grown up in a household that was neither poor nor rich. We had to economize each day in order to enjoy the occasional luxury. My father's background as a grocer is sometimes cited as the basis for my economic philosophy. So it was – and is – ... Before I read a line from the great liberal economists, I knew from my father's accounts that the free market was like a vast sensitive nervous system, responding to events and signals all over the world to meet the ever changing needs of people in different countries, from different classes, of different religions, with a kind of benign indifference to their status (Thatcher, 1993, p.14).

While studying chemistry at Somerville College in Oxford, Margaret joined The Oxford University Conservative Association (OUCA). She was first elected Secretary, then Treasurer and finally President in 1946. Margaret herself described her time at Oxford as an important period of intellectual foundation-building. She read widely : “ C. S. Lewis's *Screwtape Letters* (1942) and *Abolition of Man* (1943)); F. A. Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom* (1944); Colm Brogan's *Who are 'The People'* (1943) and *Our New Masters* (1947), Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* (1940) and Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945)” (Blundell, 2008, p.30). In later years, Margaret Thatcher discerned some pattern in her interests. “As a Methodist in Grantham, I learnt the laws of God. When I read chemistry at Oxford, I learnt the laws of science, which derive from the laws of God, and when I studied for the Bar, I learnt the laws of man” (Moore, 2013, p.49). Undoubtedly, Margaret Robert's “scientific training gave her a clarity and practicality of ...thought. Her study of science at school and university chimed with her strict moral and religious upbringing and reinforced it” (Campbell, 2012, p.15). One may only speculate whether this was a source of the unshakeable sense of strength which many have noted in Thatcher's political career.

Harris (1988, p.44) claims that Margaret Roberts was “a precocious political activist”. As a very young girl she “carried lists of those who had voted from the interviewers standing outside.... She took notes from her father to colleagues on the council. In local elections ...she ran messages. When her father was unable to get to political meetings... Margaret would be sent to bring back a report. ” This anecdote illustrates that being involved in the political life of her father and the political life of Grantham was natural for Margaret. Harris (1988, p.47- 48) adds that by the time Margaret went up to Oxford, “she was oriented towards, if not a political career, at least one in which political activity would play a primary part.” There is no evidence revealing Margaret's desire to become either a Member of Parliament or a Prime Minister. She apprehended politics in terms “of voluntary part-time activity on a local level” (Ibid.). Moreover, young Margaret Roberts

had to consider carefully whether the income as an MP would cover her living expenses – which it would not.

As President of OUCA, Margaret attended her first Conservative Party Conference in early October 1946 at Blackpool. Her perception of the conference was that it was permeated by “an air of the inevitability of socialism and a clear sense that Conservatives had to learn how to accommodate rather than confront such arrant nonsense” (Blundell, 2008, p.31). Moreover, “this unease was further reinforced in May 1947 as she prepared to leave Oxford and her party published its *Industrial Charter*, a dog’s breakfast of socialism and corporatism” (Ibid.). Indeed, the Conservative party began to identify with the policy of consensus and welfare state. Based on her conviction, she understood Churchill’s concept of the Welfare State as one in which “... society needed a ladder and a safety net – a ladder by which people could improve their lot by effort, and a safety net below which nobody could fall. Post-war labour Governments produced the safety net, but cut down the ladder” (Harris, 1988, p. 49).

In the middle of the winter of 1950, Attlee called a General Election. Margaret used this slogan: “Vote Right to Keep What's Left” (Campbell, 2012, p.21). The content of the slogan was intended to show that, the “Conservatives were identified with morality and Labour with ruin and decline” (Ibid.). The “first task” of a new Conservative government, Margaret stated, would be “setting the finances of the nation in order” (Moore, 2013, p.97). Other themes which she mentioned were not different from those which the Tories sounded. She stressed the need for lower taxes, reduced public spending and incentives to enterprise in place of rationing and controls. She described the election as a chance to choose a better way of life – “one which leads inevitably to slavery and the other to freedom” (Campbell, 2012, p. 21); the comparison here is derived from F. Hayek’s *The Road to Serfdom*. Examining her political opinions and activities, she agreed with Hayek’s idea that it is not possible to make compromise with socialism; regardless of the intentions, it always leads to totalitarian outcomes. Margaret’s first parliamentary campaign persuaded her that she was on her way, with her course firmly set. Additionally, as soon as the General Election was over, she applied to the Inns of Court to start reading for the Bar.

In 1957, she began actively seeking a new constituency. Despite her success at Dartford and her positive references from the Central Office, it was not an easy task. Only at the fourth attempt did she succeed, managing to persuade the safe London constituency of Finchley that she could manage two tasks at once - motherhood and a political career. Finchley was a prosperous part of north-west London and was regarded as a safe Conservative seat because it included the prosperous commuter districts of Totteridge, Whetstone, Hampstead Garden Suburb and Friern Barnet. It was

also home to a large Jewish community which made up about 20 per cent of the electorate. “She made the final four with three men all accompanied by well-groomed stay-at-home wives, all in their 40s and all public school (i.e. privately) educated” (Ibid; p. 29). Facing powerful prejudice, it was almost a close-run thing. “She had won the vote, but she had still to win the acceptance of the whole Association. Her sex remained a contentious issue” (Ibid.). *Finchley Press* described her as: “Barrister, Housewife, and Mother of Twins”, while the London *Evening Standard* wrote: “Tories Choose Beauty”. (Ibid.) Even Sir John Crowder, the retiring Finchley MP, could not hide his disappointment when he learned that he was to be succeeded by a woman. Nevertheless, in 1959 Thatcher became MP for Finchley. She was nearly 34, her twins were just 6 and she just was on her way to the Downing Street.

The Conservatives lost the 1964 General Election, PM Douglas-Home resigned (replaced by Wilson) and decided not to run again. Margaret Thatcher continued with pensions, though as a Shadow. Later on, Edward (Ted) Heath who had replaced Harold Macmillan as the Conservative leader, gave Margaret Thatcher the position for Housing and Land. The party lost the 1966 General Election but Margaret Thatcher was given a substantial promotion, being appointed deputy spokesperson on Treasury matters under the Shadow Chancellor Iain Macleod. Peter Walker, who had succeeded her as a candidate for Dartford and had got to know her, stressed her strong points to Ted Heath as: “high intelligence, debating skill, a formidable character, and a high reputation as a constituency representative, as he knew from talk of her in Dartford” (Harris, 1988, p.54). In addition to this, he suggested to Heath that he should bring her into the Shadow Cabinet. In 1967 Heath invited her to become Shadow Minister for Fuel and Power. Her next position was as Shadow Minister for Transport. In 1968 Margaret Thatcher was invited to deliver the Conservative Political Centre annual speech at the annual party conference in Blackpool. The following year she was appointed Shadow Minister of Education.

To sum up, Thatcher started in 1961 as Minister for Pensions (in 1966 the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance was renamed the Ministry of Social Security, in 1968 it merged with the Ministry of Health to become the Department of Health and Social Security), continuing as a Shadow Minister for Pensions; over a six-year period in Opposition, from 1964 to 1970, she mastered five new and varied Shadow departments – two as a junior spokeswoman on housing and land and on tax policy; and three as a Member of the Shadow Cabinet for Fuel, for Transport and for Education. Undoubtedly, her experience of working in different Shadow briefs expanded Thatcher’s horizons and provided her with a wealth of experienced. Moore (2013, pp. 187-188) suggests that Thatcher learned three key lessons during her years in Opposition. She learned that

economic and financial difficulties diminished the personal credibility of political leaders; her anxiety about the rule of law and clarity was confirmed; thirdly, and most importantly, her experience as Shadow Treasury convinced her of the dangers of nationalization, high taxes and government interference. However, as there were so many differences in opinion between the members of the Shadow Cabinet, any serious discussion inevitably led to opinion divisions which she saw as a big disappointment. In addition to this, she wrote in her memoirs that “she felt marginalised as a Member of Heath’s Shadow Cabinet. For Ted and perhaps others I was principally there as the statutory woman whose main task was to explain what women ... were likely to think and want on troublesome issues” (Campbell, 2012, p.46).

In the Heath government, which followed the defeat of Harold Wilson in June 1970, Margaret Thatcher served for nearly four years as Secretary of State for Education and Science. She was the second woman to serve in the Conservative Cabinet, the first being Florence Horsburgh, Churchill’s Education Minister in 1951-1954. Her position at the Department of Education and Science (DES) was Thatcher’s only experience with leading a department before she became Prime Minister. The department was not generally underappreciated, considered to be burdened “with an entrenched culture and a settled agenda of its own which it pursued with little reference to ministers or the rest of Whitehall” (Campbell, 2012, p.54). The Government’s most important role was to get the money but let the education system work its own way. In addition to this, the Secretary had very few executive powers. The real power came “from teachers, administrators and educational academics, all of whom expected to be consulted - and listened to - before any change” (Ibid., p.55). Prime Minister Heath had promised to cut expenditures and eliminate waste, but Thatcher was expected to act to satisfy the demands of the nation as a whole, for whom education had become issue of great concern.

The beginning of Heath’s failure is connected with the years of 1971 and 1972 and is embodied primarily in two major U-turns in economic policy. First, in order to stop rising unemployment, the Government “reversed the policy of not bailing out lame ducks...and started to throw money indiscriminately at industry in a successful (but inflationary) effort to stimulate the economy into rapid growth” (Harris, 1988, p.62). Secondly, the Government “introduced from November 1972, an increasingly complex system of statutory wage and price control” (Ibid.). Both policies worked in the short term, and thus gained the support of the general public and even among the members of the Conservative party. At first appearances, the economy was thriving, and Rolls Royce and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders were bailed out. Nevertheless, a report in *The Times* from 1972 presents Thatcher as a politician who “frankly confess their uneasiness about the socialist

implications, “though, she defended the policy as absolutely necessary” (Ibid., p.63). Looking back at the Conservative Manifesto of 1970, it was a programme stressing “security and independence of personal ownership; greater freedom of opportunity and choice; greater freedom of regulation; freedom from interference”. It included reform of taxes; incentives for saving; cutting public expenditure and a better climate for free enterprise. However, Heath’s policy went in an opposite direction - from 1972 up to 1974.

After a brief successful start, matters continued to worsen for the Prime Minister. His confrontation with the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) ended in submission. The question of the day in Britain was: ‘who rules: the miners or the Government?’ Thatcher initially agreed with the miners’ demands for a pay rise in the range of 13-16 per cent and called on the miners to vote against strike action. Despite that, in February 1974, the miners decided to continue and try to enforce their demands at all costs. A General Election was called for February 28, 1974. “Mrs. Thatcher in all her published and reported statements loyally followed her leader’s line” (Ibid., p.64). The Tories expected to win, in the end, they were unexpectedly defeated by the Liberals. As the blame was put on Edward Heath for the election results and for his consequent failure to form a possible coalition with the Liberals, Heath decided to resign.

To conclude, Thatcher’s time at the Department taught her a number of useful things. Firstly, she learned the scathing power of officials, “to block, frustrate and manipulate all but the most determined ministers” (Ibid.). In addition to this, the failure of the Government convinced her to maintain the sense of direction in spite of the mounting political pressure. “Government must be strong, clear, decisive....not taking responsibility upon itself for every rise in unemployment or inflation” (Ibid.). Edward Heath tried to manage all the financial machinery of prices and incomes; either over-controlling or under-controlling, his Government failed in being able to retain control of the course of events. In this respect, working at the Department gave Thatcher a lesson in how not to govern. In her own accounts she claimed that she had not played a significant role in Heath’s Cabinet. She considered herself a free market economic liberal, alongside Sir Keith Joseph, and although working in spending departments, she claimed she was largely excluded from Heath’s economic policy inner circle.

In February 1975, Margaret Thatcher became the new leader of the Conservatives. The party she had inherited was in some disarray. By 1975, the Conservatives had lost four of the last five general elections, and the party was losing support in all parts of the United Kingdom. Its share of the vote had declined from almost 50 per cent in 1955 to 35.8 per cent in October 1974, and it was in third place behind the Liberals among first-time voters. The party, it seemed, could neither work

effectively with the unions nor impose its authority upon them (Campbell, 2012). Despite this bleak outlook, Margaret Thatcher was a woman of conviction but she was "...conscious of the weakness of her political position, a little frightened of her own inexperience and the heavy responsibility which had suddenly been thrown upon her..." (Ibid., p.92). To her many critics, Thatcher was a suburban housewife with no experience of high office, who seemed neither willing nor able to expand the party's constituency. Moreover, she was outnumbered by Heathites even within the Shadow Cabinet. On the other side, she had the support of some of her party colleagues, who would always stay loyal to their leader, regardless of their popularity. Willie Whitelaw, whom Margaret Thatcher had defeated in the leadership contest, became a deputy leader, Keith Joseph became Margaret Thatcher's number three, in charge of policy and research, and Geoffrey Howe became shadow Chancellor. According to Campbell, (2012) it was primarily Willie Whitelaw's unwavering support over the next thirteen years which became indispensable to Margaret Thatcher's survival and success. Yet the position of Margaret Thatcher remained insecure for much of the period leading up to 1979. Moreover, many party members including Heath's senior colleagues remained conspicuously uncommitted to her. From the very beginning Thatcher advocated for a freer economy and defended inequality: "We must get private enterprise back on the road to recovery, not merely to give people more of their own money to spend as they choose, but to have more money to help the old and the sick and the handicapped ..." (Moore, 2013, p.326).

As parliament went into recess in summer 1978, Thatcher was facing more turbulence among Conservative MPs. The mid -1970s saw Britain as a demoralized, chaotic and confused state. The country was known as 'The Sick Man of Europe', and, none of her politicians seemed to know the cure. Both major parties were trapped in helplessness. Spreading problems of "soaring inflation, union militancy, low productivity and unsustainable levels of public expenditure" (Aitken, 2013, p.209) caused a loss of national self- confidence. Margaret Thatcher came up with solutions to the crisis as Leader of the Opposition, but her authority at the time was weak, her party was not united behind her, and her proposals were seen as insufficiently convincing.

The 'Winter of Discontent' was preceded by a growing division between Heathite and Thatcherite Conservatives, each seeing income policy and trade-union policy from their own, seemingly irreconcilable perspectives. The Heathites spoke in support of the government's 5 per cent pay norm, while the Thatcherites favoured free collective bargaining. The Heathites were for a moderate approach to trade-union reform, while the Thatcherites wanted to legislate for secret ballots before a strike. By the middle of January, the country was in chaos. There was a lack of fuel deliveries, which led to power cuts; many businesses shut down, schools closed, hospitals accepted

only urgent cases. The tension provoked violence on picket lines outside factories. The worst effects of the unrest were the piles of garbage on the streets and dead bodies being prevented from burial due to strikes by waste collectors and grave diggers, respectively. Moreover, the union leaders called out 1.5 million workers for a National Day of Action, the biggest stoppage since the General Strike of 1926. The 'Winter of Discontent' involved innumerable disputes in which the public were made to suffer and the government proved to be powerless and incompetent.

The 'Winter of Discontent' transformed Margaret Thatcher into a potential next prime minister. Aitken (2013) sees the 'Winter of Discontent' as the main force that drove Margaret Thatcher to power in 1979. In the 1979 General Election, the Conservatives proclaimed they had five main tasks - economic and social health, the restoration of incentives, the upholding of Parliament and the rule of law, support for family life, parent power in schools and the strengthening of defence (Ibid.).

## THATCHER'S GOVERNMENTS

*“Where there is discord, may we bring harmony;  
Where there is error, may we bring truth;  
Where there is doubt, may we bring faith;  
And where there is despair, may we bring hope”*  
(Thatcher quoted from Moore, 2013, p.419).

Margaret Thatcher entered Downing Street on 4 May 1979 exposed to weight of public expectation, hope and apprehension. Few had expected her victory and many attributed the election win to factors of luck. “Good fortune contributed at least as much to Margaret Thatcher’s becoming Prime Minister in 1979 as it had to her winning of the Conservative leadership four years earlier” (Evans, 2004, p. 13). On the one side, she was seen as the representative of a new political power and of a decisive break with the politics of the recent past. On the other side, she was a Prime Minister who had come to power with “the odds stacked heavily against her” (Harris, 1988, p. 4). She was the leader of a divided party, and she lacked the confidence of the Tory membership for her ideas, policies, methods, and her personality.

In general, Margaret Thatcher took office in 1979 in a mood of national crisis. The Conservative manifesto had described the recent contest as “the most crucial election since the war” and the last chance to lead the country out of disaster. Thatcher offered her interpretation of the period, her diagnosis of the country, which served as a basis for the response. Adding to this, Margaret Thatcher saw the victory of the Conservatives as follows:

The Government’s defeat in the confidence debate symbolized a larger defeat for the Left. It had lost the public’s confidence as well as Parliament’s. The “winter of discontent”, the ideological divisions in the Government, its inability to control its allies in the trade union movement, an impalpable sense that socialists everywhere had run out of steam. . . . The Tory Party, by contrast, had used its period in Opposition to elaborate a new approach to reviving the British economy and nation. Not only had we worked out a full programme for government, we had also taken apprenticeships in advertising and learnt how to put a complex and sophisticated case in direct and simple language (Thatcher quoted from Evans, 2004, p. 13).

Today, Margaret Thatcher’s standing among Conservatives is higher than that of any PM since the Second World War. Thatcher was the only Prime Minister of the twentieth century to give her name to an ideology, though, there is no agreement on what exactly this ideology is. She served from May 1979 to November 1990, and her term of eleven and a half years was longer than any other Prime Minister achieved in the twentieth century. Thatcher won three general elections, the last two with landslide majorities. She provoked very powerful emotions and stirred equal measures

of hatred and veneration. For her admirers, she was ‘the greatest living Englishwoman’, a new Churchill who had reversed decline, defeated socialism and restored Britain’s place in the world. For her critics, she was a smallminded bigot, who needlessly destroyed British industry, entrenched inequality and unleashed a new era of greed and rampant individualism (Jackson, Saunders, 2012).

Much of what later became known as Thatcherism was articulated by the influential Mont Pelerin Society, founded in the late 1940s as an annual forum for free-market economists from around the world. Milton Friedman and F. A. von Hayek were two of its leading lights, and both became leading intellectuals in the new brand of Conservatism (Ibid.). As a public doctrine, Thatcherism, “in the 1970s was essentially a negative body of ideas, defined more by what it was against than by a specific set of policies”(Ibid., p. 40). The election triumph in 1979 brought about an opportunity to turn those negative ideas into a positive programme for government. It was the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Conservatives’ own policy-making machinery which helped carry Thatcher’s ideas into practice. For Margaret Thatcher the main goal was not a short-term boost in the economy but the elimination of socialism from British political culture. In simple terms, she did not believe in the possibility of leading the country out of the crisis without the precondition of this change. Thatcherism can be viewed through the prism of Thatcher’s anti-communist convictions. In her opinion, it was communism, which she believed was present in popular culture, state bureaucracy and, local government that should be defeated. Mrs. Thatcher talked about “the ideological battle against Socialism” (Ibid., p. 27) and as a conviction politician she was determined to create a new attitude of mind in the country. The roots of Thatcherism might be found in Powellism (named after Enoch Powell, the Conservative right-winger, best known for his infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, criticising Commonwealth immigration and anti-discrimination legislation), some elements of which certainly helped to produce Thatcherism. “As Andrew Gamble put in 1974, Powell aired new grievances, new alliances and a new politics of power that could be harnessed in support of Thatcher” (Ibid., p. 95). However, the coherence between Powell and Thatcherism was rather contingent. While monetarism was a moral crusade for Thatcher, Powell’s monetarism was far less of a moral endeavour. Powell insisted on national economic independence more for reasons of sovereignty in the context of American global power. Thus, both used the same weapons but not against the same enemies.

For reasons of political prudence, Thatcher was forced to pick a Cabinet reflecting all shades of opinion within the Party as well as reflecting the political prestige and seniority of elder statesmen such as Jim Prior, Lord Carrington and Willie Whitelaw. The consensus politicians had a numerical superiority in the new Cabinet; moreover, they occupied the most important posts. Willie Whitelaw

became Home Secretary, Lord Carrington became Foreign Secretary, Jim Prior was Employment Secretary and Francis Pym settled for the Ministry of Defence. Ian Gilmour became Lord Privy Seal and Norman St John – Stevas was made Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Thatcher's conviction politicians formed a minority within the Cabinet, but, they occupied the key economic posts. Thatcher chose Geoffrey Howe to be her Shadow Chancellor (Chancellor of the Exchequer). Geoffrey Howe was joined in the Treasury by John Biffen as Chief Secretary and one of the younger monetarists, Nigel Lawson, as Financial Secretary (outside the Cabinet). Thatcher's intellectual mentor Keith Joseph went to the Department of Industry, John Nott got the Department of Trade and David Howell became Energy Secretary. Thus, Howe, Biffen, Lawson, Joseph and Nott, along with Thatcher herself, formed the central group in charge of the Government's economic strategy. Jim Prior, appointed to the Department of Employment, was the only non-monetarist allowed to intervene in the economic issues. The Cabinet was therefore formed on divided ideological grounds, mainly on the most important issues of the economy and the unions. Retrospectively, some Conservatives saw the first Cabinet as a mistake, arguing that Margaret Thatcher should have formed a much more cohesive Cabinet from the beginning, inclining more strongly to her views (Moore, 2013).

Nevertheless, Margaret Thatcher came up with a solution to deal with such a divided Cabinet. She chose to run her Government through a small group of committees staffed with individuals whom she defined as 'one of us'. The E Committee was established to discuss economic policy and this was chaired by her and dominated by her Cabinet supporters. Weekly breakfast meetings were held with the monetarist inner circle of Howe, Joseph, Biffen and Nott and also included other members of her staff. By the end of 1980 the group had achieved most of their aims and was beginning to unravel. Willie Whitelaw used to chair the Cabinet and Thatcher acted more like a chief executive, driving decisions forward. The consensus members of the Cabinet, soon to be termed the 'Wets' by Thatcher, hoped to moderate Thatcher's radicalism. Yet they were disillusioned. The approach showed that the new Prime Minister was getting policy suggestions from where she wanted to get them and not from where they used to come.

Thatcher's first term was dominated by economic policy. Margaret Thatcher saw her victory as a watershed moment - which justified a decisive rejection of "the all-powerful corporatist state" (Campbell, 2012, p.118). Her main purpose was "to teach British industry to survive by its own competitiveness instead of looking to the Government for its salvation" (Ibid.). The Government's main economic aim was getting inflation under control, followed by trade union reform and the control of public expenditure in accordance with *The Right Approach to the Economy*.

The June 1979 budget was a bold embodiment of this economic policy and set the pattern for all of Howe's subsequent budgets. The first objective was an assault on public spending. Cuts were announced in many areas such as Civil Service recruitment, local government spending, the provision of school meals and rural school transport; the long-term link between pensions and average earnings was broken, cash limits were imposed on departmental budgets, shares in public-sector assets were sold and prices in gas and electricity were increased. All of this was done in order to make room for dramatic tax cuts – regarded by Thatcher and her cohorts as essential in restoring incentive for enterprise and in fostering greater sense of individual financial freedom and personal responsibility. Consequently, Howe was able to cut the standard rate of income tax by three pence in the pound, from 33 to 30 per cent, and reduce the top rate from Labour's penal 83 per cent to a more moderate 60 per cent (Harris, 1988).

The economic policy pursued by Thatcher was kept firmly on the monetarist lines introduced by the Treasury Ministers and Sir Keith Joseph. After the 1979 budget, financial policy was further demonstrated through a focus on public expenditure cuts. The policy involved an increase in indirect taxation, public spending cuts to lessen the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) and the maintenance of tight cash limits on pay deals. The rising number of unemployed which followed the 1979 budget was seen by Thatcherites as a necessary but temporary consequence of monetarism, while the consensus politicians saw it as a warning sign which should have warned Thatcher against pursuing the policy.

Geoffrey Howe's second budget in March 1980 continued the work of the 1979 budget. It introduced the so-called Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) with its main aim of bringing down public spending and monetary growth by announcing fixed targets for several years in advance. In order to meet the targets set in the MTFS for a four-year period, public spending was cut by £1 billion. It was a deflationary, "a severely deflationary budget" (Harris, 1988, p. 103) and caused growing discontent not only in the Cabinet but also within the Party membership. The Thatcher Government was also confronted with negative economic indicators. Inflation continued to rise, unemployment soared and reached 2.8 million by the end of 1980. Thus, The Tories' 1978 poster showing a winding dole queue with the caption "Labour Isn't Working" was ridiculed as hundreds of small companies went out of business and the giant companies struggled.

It was becoming clear that monetarism in the strictest sense was not working. As Campbell (2012) lists, Howe's budget took another 900 million pounds out of planned public spending for 1980-81, mainly from social services. Sickness and unemployment benefit were made liable to income tax, child benefit was raised by less than the rate of inflation and prescription charges were

doubled again. Higher education was exposed to the heaviest cuts, university funding was reduced sharply and overseas students were expected to pay the full cost of their tuition. The Labour Party blamed the Government for declaring war against the poor. The Government was alarmed by mounting figures of unemployment and at the same time protested that they were doing everything possible by means of tax cuts or other incentives so as to encourage the new industries or business which were expected to create new jobs. Unemployment escalated from 1.3 million in 1979 to over 3 million in 1983, where it remained until 1987. Inflation - which had stood at 8.3 per cent in 1978 - hit 22 per cent over the Conservatives' first year in office, and would not fall below the 1978 level until 1983 (Harris, 1988).

The Government underestimated the changing economic circumstances in which the fixed policies had to operate. The fact that the Government had drawn up the economic policy and worked out how it would operate in practice back in 1978, before two unforeseen events caused major changes in the world economy, was seen as the most burning issue. Firstly, the beginning of 1979 saw a massive explosion in the price of oil. Secondly, the world economy was trapped in a severe recession, caused partly by the rise in oil prices and also by other factors. Therefore, the most alarming consequence of the economic failure was the fast increase in unemployment. Moreover, Margaret Thatcher faced disapproval from the TUC, the Opposition and also from her own supporters in the Conservative Party and in industry.

This period also saw a record number of industrial bankruptcies being reported. In the opinion polls, record lows were reported for the Conservative Party and Thatcher's personal rating fell steeply. In spite of this, Margaret Thatcher was not for turning, even in the face of an unemployment rate of about 3 million people. Consequently, calls to reflate the economy began to appear. The Thatcherites in their reaction to the calls emphasised that "their policies needed time to bear fruit" (Ibid., p. 106). Margaret Thatcher expressed her approach as follows:

The only way we're going to get higher employment, more jobs, is by quite simply the old fashioned way....by companies, businesses, starting up to produce goods or services that other people will buy the right design, the right price, the right value. I believe that we could do much better at that than we are. I believe we have lost a lot of the elements of enterprise ..... I am very much trying to get that back here. It's trying to roll back a whole attitude of mind for many years. It is going to take time. But we will only get more people employed, other than by shuffling round the money that we've got, we'll only get more people employed by the creation of more small businesses, and more self - employment (Harris, 1988, p. 106).

In October at the Conservative Party Conference at Brighton Margaret Thatcher declared she was to follow the chosen path and went on to state: "I will not change just to court popularity... if

ever a Conservative Government starts to do what it knows is wrong because it is afraid to do what is right, that is the time for the Tories to cry “Stop”. But you will never need to do that while I am Prime Minister” (Harris, 1988, p. 107). Regardless of stirring words, it was indisputable that the Government was in the dark. The MTFSS was way off target, unemployment was rising rapidly and inflation was still at 20%. The economist John Forsyth argued for the need “to preserve the industrial structure of the economy and encourage the growth of the non-oil sector” so that Britain “would have to run a smaller deficit and even a public sector surplus” (Harris, 1988, p. 108). Alan Walters, one of the architects of the Government’s monetarist economic policy, and Alfred Sherman in cooperation with Jurg Niehaus reached the same conclusions and confirmed the findings.

Unemployment continued to rise, while inflation stayed high. The popularity of the Conservative Party was very low. Popular discontent increased and was manifested in riots in areas of Brixton in London, Toxteth in Liverpool, Moss Side in Manchester and St Paul’s in Bristol. These riots were seen as a severe blow to the nation’s self-esteem. The British people compared the riots to similar disturbances during the 1960s in the USA; at the time they had thought it could never happen in Britain. Even the academic economic establishment was shocked; 364 economists signed a letter to *The Times* expressing their concerns about the Government’s economic policies. They saw the policies as unworkable and not conducive to a reduction in inflation.

In 1981 Margaret Thatcher undertook her first Cabinet reshuffle. It was designed to make her position in the Cabinet stronger and eliminate all the ‘wets’ from their ministries. This reshuffle gave Margaret Thatcher more power around the Cabinet table, although the principal wets: Prior, Gilmour, Pym, Carrington, Walker and Carlisle remained in place. A few months later, in September 1981, the bigger change came. The wets were either sacked outright or sidetracked into positions where they could do no harm. All these changes made Margaret Thatcher more confident to force through the reforms she wanted. The nation was not being “saved”, according to Margaret Thatcher, because her policies were being implemented at too slow a pace (Moore, 2013).

Slowly, however, the economy began to improve. Inflation fell from a yearly rate of 18 per cent in 1980 to 11.9 per cent in 1981. By 1982 it was 8.6 per cent, plunging to 4.6 per cent in 1983. Interest rates declined from 17 per cent to 9 per cent, while a fall in the value of the pound eased the pressure on exports. After two years of contraction, GDP grew by 2.2 per cent in 1982 and 3.7 per cent in 1983. Exactly how much credit the Thatcher government could take for all this remains contested, but its political significance cannot be doubted (Harris, 1988).

Thatcher felt under pressure in the House of Commons whenever the latest figures were published. Labour MPs accused her of creating “an industrial desert” while Thatcher reminded the

Labour MPs how the unemployment had doubled under their governments and patiently repeated her conviction there was no painless remedy. Margaret Thatcher even portrayed herself as a nurse administering nasty medicine to cure the country's self-inflicted illness.

Which is the better nurse? The one who smothers the patient with sympathy and says 'Never mind, dear, there, there, you just lie back and I'll bring you all your meals.....I'll look after you.' Or the nurse who says 'now, come on, shake out of it... It's time you put your feet on the ground and took a few steps...'. Which do you think is the better nurse? ... The one who says come on, you can do it. That's me (Thatcher quoted from Campbell, 2012, p.163).

This presentation worked. The public started to believe that any effective cure for the nation's sickness would have to be painful and they were to go through it. From the time the nickname TINA – 'There Is No Alternative' appeared. Originally the Chancellor's phrase, it was quickly applied to the Prime Minister. A few months later Margaret Thatcher, at the party conference in Brighton, gave her famous speech to those ones who called for a U-turn. "You turn if you want to. The Lady's not for turning" (Campbell, 2012, p. 163).

On the whole, "the heart of Thatcherism was not in monetarism" (Ibid., p.164). Thatcher used monetarism, economic theory, as a tool. Her main aim was to defeat what she called socialism mainly by encouraging enterprise, cutting restrictive practices and above all reducing the power of unions. Unions and union power symbolized humiliation and the potential destruction of the last Conservative Government in 1972-1974. This was another area in which Thatcher decided to make fundamental changes and it was the area in which she proceeded most cautiously. Thatcher was aware that Edward Heath's failure in this field stemmed from his attempt to reform the entirety of industrial relations law in a single Bill. In contrast, Thatcher's strategy was not to confront the unions. She was convinced that it was ordinary trade unionists who suffered from the abuse of union power. She believed that they were actually supporters of Conservative Party because they knew that "our policy represents their ambition for their own future and for their families, for a better standard of living and better jobs" (Ibid.,p. 165) and therefore, she hoped they would reclaim their unions from the control of the militants. Margaret Thatcher herself marginalized the union barons by ignoring them. The TUC Secretary-General, Len Murray complained that Thatcher "rejected the idea of trade unions as valid institutions within society..." (Ibid.).

In February 1980, after the steel unions began a strike against the British Steel Corporation's plans to rationalize the industry, Margaret Thatcher ruled out action on secondary strikes and strikers' benefits. However, the situation escalated as the dispute spread and consequently led to

violence. At the same time in the test case of *Express Newspapers v. McShane* the House of Lords confirmed trade unions' legal immunity from liability for the consequences of their members' actions. This event increased the pressure on the Government to widen the scope of Prior's Bill. Mrs. Thatcher wanted Prior to add a new clause outlawing secondary action. As it would not have an immediate effect on the strike, she wanted a single-clause Bill to ban secondary picketing immediately, without waiting for the *Employment Bill* to go through all the stages. Prior resisted both proposals, moreover, he had support in the Cabinet. Although Thatcher was defeated in the Cabinet, she repeated her intention to proceed. Moreover, she preserved her reputation with her core supporters as a radical who would have done more, had she not been constrained by her colleagues. This approach to her colleagues is something which would become a familiar tactic, allowing Thatcher to distance herself from the actions of her own Government. Campbell (2012) explains:

It was clever politics, but it was essentially two-faced and disloyal to colleagues who never felt they could rely on her support. In the short run this skilful ambiguity helped establish her authority over colleagues, many of whom were not naturally her supports. But over time it strained the loyalty even of her handful of 'true believers', undermined the cohesion of her Government and ultimately wrought her downfall (Campbell, 2012, p. 167).

Another area addressed by Margaret Thatcher was the nationalized sector of the economy. It was always a central part of the vision of an enterprise economy that the nationalized sector should be substantially reduced at the very least. Thatcher was far keener on privatisation than Heath had ever been. In one of her first speeches as Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher spoke of making a start "in extending the role of private enterprise by reducing the size of the public sector" (Campbell, 2012, p. 168).

One of the greatest challenges came from the miners whose power had been very visible during the two strikes in 1972 and in 1974 when they brought down the Conservative Government. There is evidence suggesting that Thatcher knew that one day she would have to confront the miners – the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). From this perspective Margaret Thatcher made plans, or at least considered ways in which to withstand a potential strike. The first opportunity for a showdown with the NUM came in February 1981, although Thatcher decided to back down on this occasion. Another confrontation came three years later in 1984 but this time Thatcher was determined to follow what she believed to be the right thing, the closure of uneconomic pits.

## 2 TRADE UNION POLICY

### MINERS' STRIKE 1984-85

*"We had to fight the enemy without in the Falklands and now we have to fight the enemy within, which is much more difficult but just as dangerous" (M. Thatcher quoted from Blundell, 2008, p.121).*

Thatcher's first term in office from 1979 to 1983 is seen as her "...acquisition of the reality, as against the appearance of political power" (Harris, 1988, p. 156). In other words, the first term is a story "...of success, of her remarkable achievement in rising, with the odds against her and with less support and good will than any newly elected prime minister since Baldwin, from a position far from strong in Cabinet, Party and the country..."(Ibid.). Thatcher's second term, from 1983 to 1987, is seen more as a demonstration of how Thatcher used political power. One example of the use of power which is also one of the most defining achievements of the second term was the defeat of the National Union of Mineworkers' strike in 1984 -1985. This was the second national coal strike since the 1920s and its defeat was a victory over trade unionism, a force which had already caused the fall of Prime Ministers Ted Heath and James Callaghan.

Thatcher's second term followed the path of the first. In addition to this, "...people felt that under Margaret Thatcher there had been activity, movement, challenge and change; and an attempt to relieve the country of many inhibiting, and some dangerous constraints" (Harris, 1988, p. 156). On the whole, by the end of the second term the economy had strengthened, productivity had increased, inflation had fallen from 21% in 1980 to 4% in 1983 and to 3% in 1987 (Ibid.). On the other side, the political programme, which more or less the same in both terms, was in contrast with the promises which had been given. In 1979 the Conservatives promised to cut taxes at all income levels and promised cuts in public spending. In reality, taxes in real terms increased for all except for the richest and public expenditure rose by 3%. These were the issues which were briefly introduced but not widely discussed in the programme. Trade union reform was another issue which was introduced but which had not been specified in the manifesto.

From the time when Thatcher had replaced Ted Heath as Tory leader, she realized that she would one day have to confront the union radicals. While in her first term, Mrs. Thatcher had tried to avoid direct confrontation with the trade unions, in her second term she was more prepared to fight and believed that she could win. During her first term, Margaret Thatcher had some successes when dealing with the unions (specifically those of the train drivers and health-service workers) but she had experienced some major failures, too. Towards the end of 1980, the National Coal Board

(NCB) wanted to reduce the number of uneconomic pits. The NCB, British Public Corporation, had been created in 1947 with its headquarters in London. The NCB aimed to increase coal production while at the same time reducing the miners' workweek to five days, improving wages and working conditions, and extending fringe benefits. Such efforts were also hailed by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), formed in 1945 from the Miners' Federation of Great Britain (MFGB). In the 1980s, during the administration of Margaret Thatcher, the NCB played an important role when it decided to reverse its past policies and attempt to streamline operations by closing unprofitable pits and laying off mineworkers (Harris, 1988).

Towards the end of 1980, the NCB announced that it wanted to close twenty - three pits which were not likely to make profit. Besides, the miners, led by Joe Gormley, asked for a pay rise. At first, Thatcher wanted to back up the NCB but she discovered that coal stocks at power stations were lower than expected. In the end, in February 1981, Thatcher accepted that she was not in a position to win the fight and so postponed the confrontation. The NUM in the end won pay rises of 30 per cent for its members. In the case of the NUM, Thatcher knew that she would have to face a strike sooner or later. In the meantime, she focused on changing the law in order to reduce the legal immunity of the unions. Moreover, Thatcher regarded the coming strike as an unavoidable clash between hard-left militancy and common - sense economics. Over the next two years there was a buildup of large stocks of coal in the power stations. At the same time the stations were converted where possible to burn oil instead of coal, which one may see as an example of strategic preparing for a possible strike.

Mrs. Thatcher expressed her worries about the power of unions as follows:

But there was also undemocratic socialism, and it too would need to be beaten. I had never had any doubt about the true aim of the hard Left: they were revolutionaries who sought to impose a Marxist system on Britain whatever the means and whatever the cost. Many of them made no effort to conceal their purpose. For them the institutions of democracy were no more than tiresome obstacles on the long march to a Marxist Utopia. While the electoral battle was still being fought their hands had been tied by the need to woo more moderate opinion, but in the aftermath of defeat they were free from constraint and thirsting for battle on their own terms (Thatcher, 1995, p. 287).

The NUM was Britain's most powerful and most militant union. Arthur Scargill, known as 'King Coal' and the president of the NUM, was saying openly that he did not accept the legitimacy of the Conservative government. According to Harris (1988), Arthur Scargill called for "extra-parliamentary action", stating that the and re- election of Margaret Thatcher was "the worst national disaster for 100 years". In addition to this, he predicted "social violence on the streets, aggravated by a paramilitary police force" and resolutely expressed his feelings: "We must resolve to fight in

the trade unions and all other democratic bodies inside and outside Parliament to bring about another general election as quickly as possible to get rid of this vicious government” (Harris, 1988, p. 160). Thatcher saw this as “an attack directed not only against the Government, but against anyone and anything standing in the way of the Left, including fellow miners and their families, the police, the courts, the rule of law and Parliament itself” (Thatcher, 1995, p.287 ).

The coal mining industry by the 1970s had come to symbolize everything that was wrong about Britain. The fall of Ted Heath’s Government after a general election precipitated by the 1973 – 1974 miners’ strike led to the idea that the NUM was a greater power than British Governments or, at the very least, they exerted the power to veto any policy threatening their interests by preventing coal from reaching the power stations. The Government, the NCB and miners wanted a thriving, successful, competitive coal industry. According to Margaret Thatcher the coal industry had become an industry which was devoid of rationality. At the industry’s height on the eve of the First World War it had employed more than a million men in over 3,000 mines with an annual production of 292 million tons. The decline which followed was continuous and the conflicts in the coal industry were worsening. By 1946 production was down to 187 million tons at 980 pits, with a workforce of just over 700,000. The Government began setting targets for coal production and investment in a series of documents known as the ‘Plan for Coal’ in 1950. As Thatcher later wrote: “These consistently overestimated both the demand for coal and the prospects for improvements in productivity within the industry. The only targets that were met were those for investment. Public money was poured in, but two problems proved insoluble: overcapacity and union resistance to the closure of uneconomic pits” (Thatcher, 1995, p.288). The coal industry had, in effect, become an expensive welfare program. Moreover, the safety standards at British mines had improved greatly by the mid-1980s, but this put the British industry at a competitive disadvantage against countries such as China. The miners did their best to keep themselves at work but it became more and more difficult.

When preparing for the confrontation with the miners Thatcher relied mainly on Nigel Lawson who had become Secretary of State for Energy in September 1981. He was made responsible for building up the stocks of coal which would allow the country to endure a coal strike. In order to maximize endurance it was vital that coal stocks were placed at the power stations and not at the pit heads, where miners’ pickets could make movement impossible. However, coal stocks were not the only element determining power station endurance. Some Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) power stations were oil fired. The dependence on coal-fired power was being reduced; more Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) were being planned, a cross-channel

link was being built which would enable power to be purchased from France, and there was already a link in operation between the English and Scottish systems. In addition to this, the government introduced significant changes in trade union legislation. The 1982 *Employment Act* made it vastly more difficult, indeed almost impossible, to form a closed shop, a union with mandatory membership. Unions that engaged in sympathy strikes or dispatched flying pickets could now be sued, fined, or held in contempt of court.

Previous confrontations with the unions had proved the weakness of the leaders of the nationalized industries. Thatcher changed this when she supported the appointment of Sir Walter Marshall, the Chairman of the UK Atomic Energy Authority, as the new chairman of CEGB. Marshall was to cooperate with the Government in the preparations to face a strike. No less important was a choice of the chairman of the Coal Board. Sir Derek Ezra, chairing the Board from 1972 – 1982, was an example of the type of leader which Margaret Thatcher disliked due to his conciliatory approach and reluctance to take tough but economically effective decisions.

The threat started to become apparent in the autumn of 1983. Peter Walker replaced Nigel Lawson as Secretary of State for Energy. He was known as a tough negotiator and also a skilled communicator and hence he was expected to influence public opinion. Politically, he was not the type of Margaret Thatcher as he opposed most of her economic policies. Ian MacGregor became Chairman of the NCB, a former Chairman of the British Steel Corporation, who "... wanted to see a thriving coal industry making good use of investment, technology and human resources" (Thatcher, 1995, p.289). He had converted huge losses into profit, but at the cost of making half the employees redundant. Other appointments seemed to play its role, too. Nicholas Ridley, who had written the plan of 1977, was appointed Secretary of State for Transport. He was made responsible for getting coal from pits to power stations.

In October 1983, the NUM delegate conference voted for a ban on overtime in protest at the Board's proposed 5.2 per cent pay rise and at prospective pit closures. In itself, an overtime ban was not likely to have any effect since coal stocks were high. According to Thatcher (Thatcher, 1995) pit closures on economic grounds remained inevitable since the coal industry was losing over £200 million a year in 1984. Three - quarters of its pits were uneconomical. It is necessary to state here that pit closures were only a continuation of previous policies since between 1974 and 1979 Labour Party had already closed thirty-two pits for economic reasons. Scargill, however, refused any economic justifications for closure. He wanted no pit to be closed unless it was physically exhausted. He denied the existence of uneconomic pits and demanded further investment for all pits regardless of their profitability.

MacGregor formulated his plans during the autumn and winter of 1983 – 1984. At that time the manpower in the industry was 202,000. The Monopolies and Mergers Commission had produced a report into the coal industry in 1983 which showed that some 75 per cent of the pits were making a loss. Moreover, the report confirmed the following:

The longer the problems are left, the worse they will become. Unless there is a significant reduction in the numbers of high-cost pits the NCB's finances will deteriorate even further. The industry's ability to invest in modern capacity in the short and medium term will be jeopardized, for, if the problem is not dealt with, there must come a time when it will be quite impossible for any government to justify to the public the large and growing expenditure of public funds that would be needed (Harris, 1988, p. 168).

Faced with this, MacGregor began to carry out his plans in accordance with his intention to cut the workforce by some 64,000 over three years, reducing capacity by 25 million tons. In December 1983 he decided to accelerate the programme and cut the workforce by 44,000 over the next two years. The terms agreed in January 1984 were, according to Thatcher, “extremely generous: £1,000 for each year of service, paid as a lump sum, the scheme to operate for two years only, so that a man who had been in the pits all his working life would get over £30,000” (Thatcher, 1995, p.290). In the coming year, 1984 -1985, MacGregor proposed 20,000 redundancies. There was a general conviction that this could be achieved without anyone being forced to leave the industry against his will. Around twenty pits would close, and annual capacity would be reduced by 4 million tons a year.

Despite the careful preparations, the moment when the strike began came as a surprise. The strike began in the spring which was seen as a very bad decision and was considered evidence of Scargill's desperate and self - destructive tactics. On March 1<sup>st</sup>, the NCB announced the closure of the Yorkshire colliery of Cortonwood. However, this was a point on which Scargill had misled his own members. In February he had said that the CEEB had only eight weeks of coal stocks. In fact, stocks were far higher. Moreover, the union had a tradition of balloting its members before strike action took place; this time there was no ballot. There was good reason to think that Scargill would not get the necessary majority (55 per cent) to call a national strike at any point in the immediate future. Since he had become President, the NUM membership had voted against strike action three times already. The problem with Scargill's plan was that the miners themselves refused to play the role for which he had cast them. Probably this taught him that if there was to be a strike, he would have to avoid a ballot of his members (Moore, 2015).

Cortonwood may have triggered the strike, but it was not the real cause. The truth is that once the NUM leadership had become determined to resist the closure of any pit on economic grounds, strike action was inevitable unless the NCB were prepared to abdicate effective control of the industry. Even if Cortonwood had never happened, the meeting between the NCB and the mining unions on 6 March might have had the same result. Ian MacGregor outlined his plans for the coming year and confirmed the figure of twenty closures. The reaction from the NUM was swift. That same day the Scottish NUM called a strike from 12 March. Two days later, the national executive of the NUM met and gave official support to the Yorkshire and Scottish strikes.

It is worth mentioning that Margaret Thatcher made clear from the very beginning that "...her government's approach was different from that of her Conservative predecessors." Moreover, she told the Cabinet : "...the dispute in the coal industry was strictly between the NCB and the National Union of Mineworkers and the Government should neither intervene nor comment on the issues"( Moore, 2015, p. 147). On the other hand, it was not possible for the government not to intervene at all. The Government funded the NCB, furthermore, it was responsible for the rule of law, for public order and at the same time for ensuring energy supply. Moreover, Margaret Thatcher knew that her credibility and Britain's credibility depended on her overcoming Arthur Scargill. Therefore, she put a great deal of effort into ensuring control over the response to the strike, both in terms of men and methods. She put in place her own political, administrative and other machinery to ensure victory. Surprisingly, Margaret Thatcher placed her greatest trust in Nicholas Ridley, then Minister of State at the Department of Industry and not in Ian MacGregor or Peter Walker.

Nonetheless, Thatcher was soon forced to admit openly the impossibility of governmental intervention. Ian MacGregor informed her that the NUM was trying to bring the union out on strike nationwide without a ballot. Flying pickets from Yorkshire were preventing miners in Nottinghamshire from going to work and the police did nothing. This was Margaret Thatcher's first real test. Could pits where miners wished to continue working be kept open under the law? Margaret Thatcher immediately called a wider ministerial meeting where she informed her Cabinet about this disturbance and added that "...the Police were not carrying out their duties fully" (Moore, 2015, p. 148). At the start of the week, when the strike had begun, 93 pits were open and 71 were closed; by the middle of the week 133 pits were closed (Ibid.).

Under Rule 43 of the NUM Constitution, a national strike could only be called if the union held a national ballot and a majority of 55 per cent voted in favour. The militant majority on the executive doubted whether they could win such a national ballot. Under Rule 41 of the Constitution, the National Executive could give their official sanction to strikes declared by the constituent areas

that made up the union. If all the areas could be pushed into action individually, this would have the effect of a national strike without the need for a national ballot. It was a ruthless strategy. *The Observer*, frequently critical of Mrs. Thatcher's policy expressed the following:

Britain's trade union leaders have only themselves to blame for Norman Tebbit's latest set of legislative proposals designed to strengthen trade union democracy. The misuse of the block vote system, the reluctance of union leaders to consult their members on vital issues, and the enormous gap that has grown up between the minority who runs the unions and the millions they claim to represent have all helped to make union democracy an urgent subject for reform. In their initial, negative response most union leaders are behaving like the last of the Bourbons (Harris, 1988, p.162).

The strike began on March 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1984 (sources disagree). At the time the coal stocks were plentiful and the demand for electricity waning. At the beginning of the first day of the strike 83 pits were working and 81 were out. Ten of these, according to Thatcher, were not working due to heavy picketing rather than any positive desire to join the strike. By the end of the day the number of pits not working had risen to about 100. The police seemed to be helpless to ensure the right to work for those who wished to work. Thus, the situation was worsening. The criminal law had to be upheld. Thatcher said that "helping those who wished to work was not enough: intimidation must be stopped" (Thatcher, 1995, p.292). She "was determined that the message should go out from government loud and clear: there would be no surrender to the mob and the right to go to work would be upheld" (Ibid.).

Mass picketing continued. The police were by now drafting in officers from around the country to protect the miners who wanted to work: 3000 police officers from seventeen forces were involved. At this point in the dispute the violence centered on Nottinghamshire, where the flying pickets from Yorkshire were determined to secure a quick victory. In spite of the circumstances, the Nottinghamshire men went ahead with their ballot and the result showed 73 per cent against the strike. All in all, of the 70,000 miners balloted, over 50,000 voted to work. (Thatcher, 1995, pp. 292-293).

In analysing Scargill's approach to the strike, it is worth mentioning two mistakes he made at the very beginning of the strike. Firstly, he called the strike in the spring. If he had called the strike in the autumn, the supplies to the power stations might have run out before the end of the winter. Secondly, he refused to hold a national ballot of NUM members. He did this in the knowledge that he would not gain the necessary majority, but the refusal caused that other potentially sympathetic unions (for example, power and transport workers) were unwilling to back the strike. A third

negative perception of Scargill's leadership was his responsibility for escalating violence on the picket lines.

Thatcher set up a committee of ministers under her chairmanship to monitor the strike and to decide what action should be taken. Willie Whitelaw was a member and deputized for Thatcher. Peter Walker, as Energy Secretary, and Leon Brittan, as Home Secretary, were crucial members. The Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, was directly concerned as the issue was of vital importance to the economy; he also brought to bear his experience as former Energy Secretary. Norman Tebbit (Trade and Industry), Tom King (Employment) and Nick Ridley (Transport), all had obvious contributions to make. The committee's purpose was to minimize the impact of the strike on industry to prevent the strike spreading through sympathy actions and to keep coal stocks moving by road and rail. Margaret Thatcher repeatedly made it clear that prime responsibility for dealing with the strike lay with the management of the NCB and other nationalized industries including the CEGB, BSC and British Rail (BR). On the other side, no responsible government could ignore a dispute which posed such a direct threat to the country's economy. Thatcher tried to combine respect for their freedom of action with clear signals as to what would or would not be financially and politically acceptable. On the other hand, it was not an easy task to say whether the Government was intervening too much or too little (Thatcher, 1995).

The strike influenced even the Government's relationship with the police and the courts. Britain has no national police force; at the time of the strike, the police were organized into fifty-two local forces, each headed by a Chief Constable who had operational control. Authority was divided between the Home Secretary, local police authorities (made up of local councillors and magistrates) and Chief Constables. Inevitably during the miners' strike this system of policing was put under considerable strain; challenges to the rule of law posed by violence needed to be dealt with, swiftly and efficiently, at a national level. However, it is evident that this system coped better with the violence than the Labour Party's hysterical denunciations would suggest. According to Thatcher, the police had been given the complete moral and practical support of government – an inevitable precondition for defeating mob violence. On the other side, the relationship between government and the courts was even more sensitive. There were more and more incidents of violence and it “became a real concern to us that so few of those charged had been brought to court and convicted” (Ibid. p. 295). In the end not many of the men of violence were punished.

By the last week of March, the situation was already clear. The strike was unlikely to be over quickly. Scargill had control over the majority of the pits. The following month an NUM Special Delegate Conference voted to reduce the majority required for a strike from 55 per cent to 50 per

cent, which leads to the question of whether a ballot held during a strike, with emotions raised, would have produced a majority for or against Scargill. In any case, this made it even more important to keep the balance of opinion among miners favourable to the Government's cause because it seemed that much of the opposition to the strike within the union came from miners angry at being denied the right to vote on strike action.

The Government's priority was to maximize endurance. Thatcher received weekly reports from the Department of Energy setting out the position. Early in the strike the power stations were consuming coal at the rate of about 1.7 million tons a week, although the net reduction in stocks was smaller because some deliveries were still getting through. The CEGB estimated endurance at about six months but this assumed a build-up to maximum oil burn - that is, using oil-fired stations at full capacity - which had not yet begun. However, Thatcher decided on Monday 26 March that this nettle must now be grasped. While the stocks at the power stations were sufficient, the industrial stocks were much lower: the cement industry was particularly vulnerable and important for the economy as a whole. But it was British Steel Corporation (BSC) whose problems were most immediate. Their integrated steel plants at Redcar and Scunthorpe would have to close within the next fortnight if supplies of coke and coal were not delivered and unloaded (Ibid.).

In May the first talks were held between the NCB and the NUM leadership since the beginning of the strike. The NCB had given two presentations, one on the marketing prospects of the coal industry and another on the physical condition of the pits, some of which were now in danger of becoming unworkable because of the strike. In the end, Scargill made a prepared statement. He insisted that there could be no discussion of pit closures on grounds other than exhaustion, and certainly no closure of pits on economic grounds. Ian MacGregor remarked that he saw no purpose in continuing the meeting in the light of this, but nevertheless he suggested further talks between two senior members of the NCB and two senior representatives of the NUM. Scargill again insisted that the withdrawal of all closure plans was a precondition for any further talks. There the meeting ended (Ibid.).

As the time was progressing, the strike was growing increasingly bitter. On one side, it became evident that more and more miners were losing their enthusiasm and patience for the strike. They asked Scargill about the limited power station endurance. The NUM leadership responded by increasing the allowances they paid to pickets — they paid nothing at all to strikers who did not turn out to picket — recruiting non-miners to the task. There was a general escalation of violence. The tactic was to achieve maximum surprise by concentrating large numbers of pickets at a particular pit at the shortest possible notice. The incident at the Orgreave Coke Works, a picket

intended to prevent coke convoys reaching the Scunthorpe steelworks, was the most shocking demonstration of violence. On Tuesday 29 May over 5,000 picketers engaged in violent clashes with the police in which sixty-nine people were injured.

The following day Thatcher commented on the demonstration:

You saw the scenes ... on television last night. I must tell you that what we have got is an attempt to substitute the rule of the mob for the rule of the law, and it must not succeed. There are those who are using violence and intimidation to impose their will on others who do not want it. They are failing because of two things. First, because of the magnificent police force, well trained for carrying out their duties bravely and impartially. And secondly, because the overwhelming majority of people in this country are honourable, decent and law-abiding and want the law to be upheld and will not be intimidated. I pay tribute to the courage of those who have gone into work through these picket lines ... the rule of law must prevail over the rule of the mob (Thatcher, 1995, p. 298).

Over the next three weeks there were further violent clashes at Orgreave, but the pickets never succeeded in halting the road convoys. The battles at Orgreave had an enormous impact and did a great deal to sway public opinion against the miners. Moreover, this was the first time the Government had learnt about large-scale intimidation in mining villages. This problem was worsening as the strike went on. Working miners were not the only targets: their wives and children were also at risk.

There was a great deal of public criticism of the failure of the nationalized industries to use the civil remedies which trade union laws had provided. People were saying openly that the trade union reforms were being discredited by the failure of the nationalized industries involved to use the legal remedies made available to them. Instinctively, Thatcher had a great deal of sympathy for this view, as did her advisers. Throughout this dispute, in fact, there was much to be said for the point that it was the basic criminal law of the country which was being flouted by the pickets and their leaders, rather than 'Thatcher's laws' (Thatcher, 1995). Meanwhile, the Government watched as a number of pits began reopening and men returned to work. In July and August many pits closed to take their annual holidays, so there were some hopes that there would be a return to work when the holiday period ended. The Government wondered whether Scargill would try to persuade his troops that with autumn approaching there was hope of the NCB being forced to back down by a government unwilling to impose winter power cuts.

It was very important that the NCB should do everything possible to get wavering miners to give up the strike and return to work. On Thatcher's recommendation, Tim Bell, the communications specialist, had begun to advise Ian MacGregor. Moreover, there was a powerful positive case to deploy: massive new investment was available for the pits under existing plans

which were now being held up, and if work resumed there was to be a promised pay rise for miners to look forward to. The negative side meant another aspect: pits might never reopen because of the deterioration which had occurred while the strike continued. Customers were being lost, probably permanently: no one in industry tempted by the subsidies to change from coal to other fuels was likely to have much faith in the continued reliability of coal supplies. It would also have been possible to go ahead with pit closures on economic grounds while the strike was still ongoing. But on balance the risk of alienating moderate miners was too great. Thatcher considered whether to encourage more miners to accept the uniquely generous redundancy terms on offer. There were two problems with respect to redundancy; firstly, even if large numbers of miners took up the offer, there was no guarantee that they would be from the pits which were to be closed. And the real savings lay in closing uneconomic pits. Secondly, there was a real risk that it was the moderate miners, sickened by the violence and intimidation, who would find redundancy most attractive, leaving the pits. Having considered the possibilities, the Government decided to do nothing.

July was the most difficult month of the strike. On Monday 9 July almost out of the blue the TGWU called a national dock strike over a supposed breach of the National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS). The NDLS had been established by the Attlee Government with the aim of eliminating casual labour in the docks. This dock strike would have serious implications for BSC by disrupting the import of coal and iron ore. The Government now had to deal with two strikes instead of one. On the day after the dock strike began, Thatcher insisted on mobilizing opinion over the next 48 hours in order to end the strike as soon as possible. She explained:

We should urge the port employers to adopt a resolute approach and use all available means to strengthen opposition to the strike among workers in industries likely to be damaged by it, and indeed among the public. It must be clearly demonstrated that the pretext for the strike was false and that those taking this action already enjoyed extraordinary privileges. We should make the point that it was estimated that 4,000 out of the 13,000 dockers registered under the NDLS were surplus to the requirements of the industry (Thatcher, 1995, p. 301).

The end of the dock strike was only one of a number of important developments at this time. Following the fruitless meeting between the NCB and NUM on 23 May, talks had resumed at the beginning of July. It was hoped that they would end quickly and that the NCB would succeed this time in exposing the unreasonableness of Scargill's position. There would then be a chance that striking miners would realize that they had no hope of winning and a return to work would begin.

When August came, the Government hoped that the worst of the strike was over. Scargill and the militants were becoming increasingly isolated and frustrated. There was an increase in violence

against working miners and their families. The situation seemed to be under control in Nottinghamshire, but not in Derbyshire since it was more deeply divided and it was closer to the Yorkshire coal fields from where the flying pickets largely came. The dock strike had collapsed. The Government's attitude and the NCB's approach were now generally perceived in a more sympathetic light. The Labour Party was in disarray. Although the return to work remained a trickle — about 500 during July — there was no sign of any weakening of determination at the working pits. Finally, on Tuesday 7 August two Yorkshire miners began a High Court action against the Yorkshire NUM for striking without a ballot. This proved to be a vital case and led eventually to the sequestration of the entire assets of the NUM (Thatcher, 1995).

Thatcher's expectation of victory was threatened by the possibility of a strike by National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers (NACODS). This was a small union of safety overseers whose supervision was required by law before coal could be mined from any pit. The NCB then made greater concessions to NACODS than had offered to the NUM, including an independent review of pit closure. Scargill could have accepted the NACODS terms had they been offered to the NUM. However, he had his own plans, which went far beyond improving the conditions for NUM members. In essence, Scargill rejected anything other than an unconditional withdrawal of all pit closures.

Once the NACODS crisis was over, the government waited. The fact that seven months of strike action had led to no progress was beginning to cause discontent. There was a growing disillusionment with Scargill in many mining communities, and the miners and their families were facing mounting economic pressure. Negotiations between the NCB and the NUM were resumed on 9 September. In the July talks Ian MacGregor had already moved from the principle of closing uneconomic pits to the much more dubious concept of closing pits which could not be 'beneficially developed'. However, Scargill was not prepared to adopt this alternative. Thatcher was scathing about the negotiations and MacGregor's abilities: "...Ian MacGregor did not fully comprehend the devious ruthlessness of the NUM leaders he was arguing with. He was a businessman, not a politician, and thought in terms of reasonableness and reaching a deal" (Ibid., p.308). In any case, it was crucial for the future of the industry and for the future of the country itself that the NUM's claim that uneconomic pits should never be closed should be defeated, and be seen to be defeated, and the use of strikes for political purposes be discredited once and for all.

On 11 September the National Working Miners' Committee was formed. Meanwhile the threat from NACODS appeared again. The leadership of NACODS was now clearly intent on a strike and announced that a strike ballot was to be held on 28 September. Now an agreement on the

issues seemed within reach. On Tuesday 25 September Peter Walker told the ministerial group on coal that it now looked likely that NACODS would vote for a strike. He was right: when the result came through on Friday 82.5 per cent had voted in favour of the strike. This was very bad news for the Government, and Thatcher was very worried about the final outcome. She said: “Throughout the coal strike events swung unpredictably in one direction then another — suddenly things would move our way, then equally suddenly move against us ...” (Ibid., p. 310). Moreover, the autumn was approaching and thus the threats posed by the NACODS strike were becoming more real.

Throughout this whole period, the Government faced hostility coming from outside. The Labour Party Conference fully backed the NUM and condemned the actions of the police. Probably under pressure from the left wing and trade unions, Neil Kinnock’s speech retreated from the more conciliatory line he had taken at the TUC Conference. He condemned violence but made no distinction between the use of violence with the aim of breaking the law and the use of force to uphold it. He even compared the violence with socialism: ‘the violence of despair ... of long-term unemployment ... loneliness, decay and ugliness’ (Ibid.).

Towards the end of October, the situation changed sharply once again. Three events within a week offered some hope for the Government. First, on Tuesday 24 October the NACODS executive agreed not to strike after all. There is no evidence to suggest what caused the decision. Secondly, civil law at last began to bite. The above-mentioned case of two Yorkshire miners against the NUM came to a close when the High Court ruled in favour of the two miners that the strike in Yorkshire could not be described as official. However, the NUM ignored the ruling and as a result a writ was served to Scargill. Finally, it seems possible that Colonel Gaddafi made a donation to the NUM, though the amount is uncertain. Another amount of sum was probably received from the non-existent trade unions of Soviet-controlled Afghanistan (Ibid.). All of this did the NUM’s cause great harm, not least with other trade unionists.

By November 1984 there was little doubt as to who was winning the battle. The NCB seized the moment to launch a drive to encourage the return to work. It was announced that miners who were back at work on Monday 19 November would qualify for a substantial Christmas bonus. The NCB mounted a direct mail campaign to draw the attention of striking miners to the offer. Combined with the miners’ growing disillusionment with Scargill, this had an immediate effect. In the first week after the offer 2,203 miners returned to work, six times more than in the previous week. By the end of the year, 70,000 out of 180,000 miners were working and the coal they produced was getting to the power stations. By mid-January 110,000 out of 180,000 miners were back at work. However, Scargill refused to accept defeat. The most significant return to work was in North

Derbyshire. The strategy was to allow this trend to continue without trying to take any explicit political credit for it, which could have been counter-productive. Thatcher told ministers that the figures should be allowed to speak for themselves. She was keen to bring it home to the public that, in spite of all Scargill's efforts, the trend was now firmly in the right direction. Thatcher commented:

The Government will hold firm. The Coal Board can go no further. Day by day, responsible men and women are distancing themselves from this strike. Miners are asserting their right to go to their place of work. Those in other unions now see clearly the true nature and purpose of those who are leading this strike. This has been a tragic strike but good will emerge from it. The courage and loyalty of working miners and their families will never be forgotten. Their example will advance the cause of moderate and reasonable trade unionism everywhere. When the strike ends it will be their victory (Thatcher, 1995, p.313).

The return to work continued, but so did the violence. The police found it more difficult to prevent violence and intimidation. After Christmas and the deadline for the Christmas bonus the return to work slowed down. Two reasons were seen as responsible for fewer miners returning to work. Firstly, some striking miners who intended to go back to work would only return after Christmas, to avoid the intimidation of their families over the holiday. Secondly, there was news of fresh talks being planned between the NUM and the NCB, and talks always had a negative effect on the movement back to work (Thatcher, 1995, p.314).

As the year ended, it became the Government's priority to encourage a further return to work from 7 January, the first working Monday of the New Year. Although the NCB's bonus offer had expired, there was still a strong financial incentive for strikers to return to work in the near future because they would pay little if any income tax on their wages if they went back before the end of the tax year on 31 March. The ideal result would be to get more than 50 per cent of NUM members back to work. It was also crucial to tell the miners and the public that there would be no power cuts that winter, contrary to Scargill's more desperate predictions. It was now questionable how many miners would return to work in January 1985. Fortunately, the rate of return increased. By the middle of the month almost 75,000 NUM members were no longer on strike and the rate of return was running at about 2,500 a week. It was strong evidence that the end was near. However, Scargill continued to declare publicly that he would not agree to the closure of any pits on economic grounds. Nevertheless, in February more and more miners were returning back to work and the rate of return was increasing. On Wednesday 27 February the magic figure was reached: more than half the members of the NUM were no longer on strike. On Sunday 3 March an NUM Delegates' Conference voted for a return to work against Scargill's advice, and over the next few days even

the most militant areas started to return. Hence the strike eventually came to an end (Thatcher, 1995).

A fuller understanding and assessment of the miners' strike requires a consideration of the culture and the traditions of mining trade unionism. From Margaret Thatcher's perspective the strike was wholly unnecessary. As was mentioned above, The National Union of Mineworkers was formed in 1945 as a successor of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain (MFGB). While the MFGB was more specifically a federation of district trade unions, each with its own organizational structure, rule book and degree of autonomy, the NUM was a general union with only two full-time officials: a president and a general secretary. In reality, however, the NUM remained a federation. The Areas were diverse in both size and function. In some coalfields the craftsmen had their own organisations. There were separate Areas for white collar workers (the Colliery Officials and Staff Area, COSA) and for coke men. In some districts some craftsmen were organized into a separate Power Group. These diversities were caused but not determined by contrasting economic experiences. The coal fields varied in their geology, production methods, and the profitability of the markets or the flexibility of colliery companies. Moreover, miners had differing expectations about the security, payments and the reasonableness of managers and employers.

The dispute in 1973 -1974 had been about pay, at a time in which wage agreements were determined nationally, and this made it easier to achieve solidarity across the industry. The dispute in 1984 -1985 was a different case. This time it was about closures of non-profitable pits and it was therefore harder to ensure the required solidarity from workers at pits whose future was secure. The National Union of Mineworkers, led by Arthur Scargill, took the controversial step of striking without a national ballot, alienating public support and ultimately landing the union in court. Four nuclear power stations had opened since 1976, providing an alternative source of energy, while stockpiles of fuel and the increased supply of North Sea oil diminished the government's reliance on coal.

The political consequences of the strike were ambiguous. On the one hand, the victory emphasised Thatcher's authority and re-established the authority of government over organised labour. Yet the government's approval ratings sank dramatically after the miners returned to work, falling from 42 per cent at the beginning of the strike to just 23 per cent by August 1985. Once beaten, the miners seemed more to be pitied than feared; and Thatcher's rhetoric appeared, to some voters, unduly triumphalist. In the decade after the strike, unemployment in many of these villages had rocketed above 50 percent. Suicide rates rose significantly. In the late 1990s, the European Union declared the region the poorest in Britain and one of the poorest in Europe.

### 3 ANALYSING NEWS IN NEWSPAPERS

#### NEWS AS DISCOURSE

The term 'discourse' has become a common element in a variety of disciplines, including critical theory, sociology, linguistics, philosophy, social psychology and many others. Although it is one of the most widely-used (some disagree and say it is over-used or misused) terms in academia, there is no single definition. Since it is a broad term with a wide range of possible interpretations it is used widely both in analysing literary and non-literary texts. One definition interprets the discourse as follows:

CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a **form of 'social practice'**. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people. (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p. 258)

In a modified version of the taxonomy by Bloor and Bloor (2007, pp. 6-7), the following distinctions are made:

- *discourse-1* is the highest unit of linguistic description; phonemes, morphemes, words, phrases, clauses, sentences and texts are below
- *discourse-2* is a sample of language usage, generally written to be spoken, that is, a speech
- *discourse-3* refers to the communication expected in one situation context, alongside one field and register, such as the discourse of law or medicine
- *discourse-4* is human interaction through any means, verbal and non-verbal
- *discourse-5* is spoken interaction only
- *discourse-6* stands for the whole communicative event

Wodak and Meyer (2009) associate this diversity with three different trends: the German and Central European tradition, in which the term discourse draws on text linguistics; the Anglo-American tradition, in which discourse refers to written and oral texts; and the Foucauldian

tradition, in which discourse is an abstract form of knowledge, understood as cognition and emotions (Jäger and Maier, 2009 in Tenorio, 2011).

Gee (1999) distinguishes *small-d-discourse* and *big-D-discourse*. The former refers to actual language, that is, talk and text and the latter to the knowledge being produced and circulating in talk; to the general ways of viewing and behaving; to the systems of thoughts, assumptions and talk patterns that dominate a particular area; and to the beliefs and actions that make up social practices. Cameron (2001) offers a comparable meaning when she distinguishes between *linguists' discourse* (i.e. language above the sentence and language in use) and *social theorists' discourses(s)* (i.e. practice(s) constituting objects).

Similarly, van Dijk (1997) proposes linguistic, cognitive and socio-cultural definitions. Firstly, he argues that discourse is described at the syntactic, semantic, stylistic and rhetorical levels. Secondly, he adds that it needs to be understood in terms of the interlocutors' processes of production, reception and understanding. And, thirdly, he points to the social dimension of discourse, which he understands as a sequence of contextualised, controlled and purposeful acts accomplished in society, namely, a form of social action taking place in a context (i.e. physical setting, temporal space plus participants). Since context is mostly cognition, that is, it is concerned with our knowledge of social situations and institutions, and of how to use language in them. Van Dijk claims that each context controls a specific type of discourse and that each discourse depends on a specific type of context.

From Widdowson's perspective (2004), texts can be either written or spoken and must be described in linguistic terms and in terms of their intended meaning. Discourse, on the other hand, understood as text in context, is defined by its effect. In his words, discourse "is the pragmatic process of meaning negotiation", and text is its product (2004, p. 8). Co-textual relations are concerned with text and contextual relations with discourse; that is, text cohesion is dependent on discourse coherence.

The CD analysts Fairclough and Wodak (1997, p.276) use the following understanding of discourse: language use in speech and writing, meaning-making in the social process, and a form of social action that is 'socially constitutive' and 'socially shaped'. The concept which Fairclough finally opts for is semiosis, in order allow the inclusion of both linguistic communication and also, for example, visual communication, as well as to generalise across the different meanings of the term of discourse. Semiosis plays a part in representing the world, and also in acting, interacting and constructing identity, and can be identified with different "perspectives of different groups of social actors" (Fairclough, 2009, p.164 in Tenorio, 2011). Discourses can be appropriated or

colonised, and put into practice by enacting, inculcating or materialising them. In contrast, texts are “the semiotic dimension of events” (Ibid.), in which we can find the traces of differing discourses and ideologies (Weiss and Wodak, 2003). Critical Discourse Analysis (abbreviated to CDA) understands discourse as the relatively stable use of language serving the organization and structuring of social life. Within this broader understanding, the term ‘discourse’ is used very differently by different researchers and also across different academic cultures.

The origin of these ideas can be traced back to the work of philosopher Michel Foucault (2002, p. 54), for whom discourses are “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak”. In their interpretation, Fairclough and Wodak (1997, p. 261) add that discourses “are partly realized in ways of using language, but partly in other ways”, for example visual semiosis. Texts are the only evidence for the existence of discourses, the single example of the concrete realisation of abstract forms of knowledge; at the same time, they are interactive and influenced by sociolinguistic factors. In the process of constructing themselves in society, individuals internalise discourses that comprise the core of a community of practice, in the sense that such discourses control and organise what can be talked about, how it can be talked about and by whom. Social practices are meaningful and coherent in that they conform to discourse principles. As manifestations of ideologies, discourses form individual and collective consciousness, and consciousness influences people’s actions; this leads to the understanding that discourse solidifies knowledge through the repetition of ideas and statements, and reflects, shapes and enables social reality (Jäger and Maier, 2009 in Tenorio, 2011). Furthermore, it can be defined by the activities in which participants engage, and the power enacted and reproduced through them; thus, we can speak of feminist or nationalist discourse, doctor-patient or classroom discourse, the discourse of pity, whiteness or science, or hegemonic and resistance discourses. Van Leeuwen (2009, p. 144 in Tenorio, 2011) complements to Foucault’s definition by adding that discourse involves social cognitions “that serve the interests of particular historical and/or social contexts”, represent social practices in text, and transform or decontextualize them.

Schiffrin (1994) distinguishes between two general approaches to the definition of discourse. Firstly, discourse “as a particular unit of language, specifically as a unit of language ‘above’ the sentence”. This approach which focuses on the form which the language takes is known as the formalist or structuralist definition of discourse. Cameron (2001, pp.10-11) adds that “Linguists treat language as a ‘system of systems’, with each system having its own characteristic forms of structure or organisation.” Secondly, the approach which focuses on the social aspect of language understanding is known as the functionalist definition of discourse. In the words of Cameron (2001)

we tend to make sense of discourse partly by making guesses – unconsciously – based on social knowledge.

Those who adopt a functionalist approach, according to Cameron (2001, p. 13), are interested in “what and how language communicates when it is used purposefully in particular instances and contexts”. Thus, language is used to mean something and to do something and these are both linked to the context of its usage. In other words, in order to understand discourse properly, in addition to analysing the inter-relations of sentences, cohesion and coherence, it is necessary to analyse what the speaker or writer is doing through discourse and how this activity is linked to wider contexts. Nowadays, any text (meant as a representation of reality) is approached and read through language. It is for this reason that language is studied, and it is analysed by a variety of forms of discourses.

### **CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS**

The terms ‘discourse’ and ‘discourse analyses (abbreviated to DA) are contested concepts. Theoretically, analytically and methodologically, the field of DA is very diverse. Discourse analysis is a broad and rapidly developing interdisciplinary field concerned with the study of language use in context. It can be characterized as a way of approaching and thinking about a problem, since it enables the hidden motivations behind a text to be revealed. Discourse analysis means the application of critical thought. The study of discourse can be applied to any text, problem or situation. Moreover, new theoretical approaches, methodological devices and research topics have appeared which in the last years continue to be developed and enhanced.

Critical Discourse Analysis (abbreviated to CDA) stems from the critical theory of language which sees the use of language as a form of social practice (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997) and considers the context of language use to be crucial. All social practices occur within specific contexts and are the means by which existing social relations are reproduced or contested and different interests are served. There is no single homogeneous version of CDA; what we see instead, is a wide range of critical approaches which can be classified as CDA (Gee, Scollon, Rogers, Jeffries, Richardson, etc.) – they all share a view of language as a means of social construction; language shapes and is shaped by a society.

The origins of CDA can arguably be found in critical linguistics, which appeared in the late 1970s in the work of R. Fowler, R. Hodge, G. Kress, T. Krew at the University of East Anglia in the UK. Its critical nature originates in the Frankfurt School, especially from the work of Habermas. The roots of CDA lie in the disciplines of Rhetoric, Text linguistics, Anthropology, Philosophy, Socio-Psychology, Cognitive Science, Literary Studies and Sociolinguistics, as well as in Applied

Linguistics and Pragmatics. The terms Critical Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) are often used interchangeably and, in fact, the term CDA has become more commonly used and denotes the theory formerly identified as CL.

Some scholars prefer to use the term Critical Discourse Studies (CDS). For example, Teun van Dijk provides us with a broad overview of the field of (C) DS, in which the methodology developed as follows: between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, a series of novel, and closely related disciplines emerged in the humanities and the social sciences. Despite their different disciplinary backgrounds and the wide diversity of their methodology and objects of investigation, all of these new approaches deal with discourse (Van Dijk, 2007a; Wodak, 2008a). CDA originally developed from a small symposium held in Amsterdam in January 1991. Through the support of the University of Amsterdam, Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak gathered at the symposium to discuss the theories and methodologies of Discourse Analysis, specifically CDA. The emergence of the CDA network was marked by the launch of Van Dijk's journal *Discourse and Society* (1990), as well as by several books which shared similar research goals. Since then, CDA (CDS) has become an established discipline, institutionalized across the globe in many departments and curricula.

CDA has never been and nor has it ever attempted to be or provide a single or specific theory or specific methodology. On the contrary, studies in CDA are manifold, derived from different theoretical backgrounds, and oriented towards different data and methodologies. The definitions of the terms of 'discourse', 'critical', 'ideology', 'power' and so on are also manifold. In general, CDA as a school or paradigm is characterized by a number of principles; for example, all approaches are problem-oriented and thus necessarily interdisciplinary. CDA researchers also attempt to make their own positions and interests explicit while retaining their respective scientific methodologies and remaining self-reflective of their own research processes.

Some of the tenets of CDA can be found in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School dating back to the pre-war period (Agger 1992b; Rasmussen 1996 in Tenorio, 2011). Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 271-80) summarize the main tenets of CDA as follows:

1. CDA addresses social problems
2. Power relations are discursive
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture
4. Discourse does ideological work
5. Discourse is historical

6. The link between text and society is mediated
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory
8. Discourse is a form of social action

Young and Harrison (2004) suggest that there are three main strands of work in CDA. One strand includes work by Fairclough (1989), Fowler (1991), Fowler et al. (1979), Hodge and Kress (1993), and is firmly grounded in linguistic analysis. A second strand, in which Van Dijk's work is central, focuses on the “socio-cognitive aspects of analysis” and “macro- structure of texts” (Young and Harrison, 2004, pp. 3-4). The third strand involves work by Wodak and the Vienna School in which a “discourse- historical approach” is taken (Wodak, 2002, p.5). Among the scholars who have contributed to the development of CDA, Wodak, Fairclough and Van Dijk are the most referenced and quoted in critical studies of media discourse.

However, it can be concluded that CDA does not constitute a well-defined empirical method but rather a variety of approaches with theoretical similarities and research questions of a specific kind. There is no CDA way of gathering data, either. Some authors do not even mention data-gathering methods, while others rely heavily on traditions based outside the sociolinguistic field. Most of the approaches to CDA do not explicitly explain or recommend data-gathering procedures.

## **VAN DIJK' S CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS**

Since I am primarily concerned with uncovering the ways in which social power is exercised in the press, I follow the view presented by Van Dijk (1996) that one of the new tasks of CDA is to study how the manipulation of “*mental models* of social events” may lead to the “formation of *preferred models* of specific situations”..., which may ...be generalised to more general, preferred knowledge, attitudes or ideologies” (Ibid., p.85). According to Van Dijk (1988), critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.

The approach used here focuses on *the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance*. Dominance is defined here as the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups that results in social inequality, and which encompasses political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality. This reproduction process may involve such different modes of discourse power relations as the direct or indirect support, enactment, representation, legitimation,

denial, mitigation or concealment of dominance, among others. More specifically, critical discourse analysts aim to determine what structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events play a role in these modes of reproduction.

Since CDA is not a specific direction of research, it does not have a unitary theoretical framework. Thus, there are many variants of CDA, and they may be theoretically and analytically quite diverse. The critical analysis of conversation is very different from the analysis of news reports in the press or of lessons and teaching at school. Nonetheless, with an awareness of the common perspective and the general aims of CDA, we may also identify some overall conceptual and theoretical frameworks that are closely related. Most CDA analyses will ask questions about the way in which specific discourse structures are deployed in the reproduction of social dominance, or query whether they are part of a conversation, a news report or other genres and contexts. Thus, the typical vocabulary of many scholars in CDA will feature such notions as “power”, “dominance”, “hegemony”, “ideology”, “class”, “gender”, “race”, “discrimination”, “interests”, “reproduction”, “institutions”, “social structure”, and “social order”, in addition to the more familiar discourse analytical notions.

### **Basic concept: macro vs. micro**

Language use, discourse, verbal interaction, and communication all belong to the micro level of the social order. Power, dominance and inequality between social groups are typically terms that belong to a macro level of analysis. Van Dijk (1998 in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001) further claims that this means that CDA has to theoretically bridge the well-known ‘gap’ between the micro and macro approaches. In everyday interactions and experiences, the macro level and micro level form one unified whole.

Van Dijk (1998 in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001) distinguishes several ways to analyse and bridge these levels in order to arrive at a unified critical analysis:

1 **Members–groups**: Language users engage in discourse as members of (several) social groups, organizations, or institutions; and conversely, groups thus may act “by” their members.

2 **Actions–process**: Social acts of individual actors are thus constituent parts of group actions and social processes, such as legislation, news making, or the reproduction of racism.

3 **Context–social structure**: Situations of discursive interaction are similarly part or constitutive of social structure; for example, a press conference may be a typical practice of organizations and media institutions. Thus, “local” and more “global” contexts are closely related, and both exercise constraints on discourse.

4 ***Personal and social cognition***: Language users as social actors have both personal and social cognition: personal memories, knowledge and opinions, as well as those shared with members of the group or culture as a whole. Both types of cognition can influence the interaction and discourse of individual members, whereas shared “social representations” govern the collective actions of a group.

### **Power as control**

A central notion in most critical work on discourse is that of power, more specifically the *social power* of groups or institutions. Van Dijk (1998 in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001) defines social power in terms of *control*. Thus, groups have (more or less) power if they are able to (more or less) control the acts and minds of (members of) other groups. This ability presupposes a *power base* of privileged access to social resources, such as force, money, status, fame, knowledge, information, culture, or indeed various forms of public discourse and communication.

Different *types of power* may be distinguished according to the various resources used to exercise such power: the coercive power of the military and of men of violence will rather be based on force, the rich will have power because of their money, whereas the more or less persuasive power of parents, professors, or journalists may be based on knowledge, information, or authority. Groups may more or less control other groups, or only control them in specific situations or social domains. Moreover, dominated groups may more or less resist, accept, condone, comply with, or legitimate such power, and even find it ‘natural’.

The power of dominant groups may be integrated in laws, rules, norms, habits, and in a quite general consensus and thus take the form of what Gramsci called ‘hegemony’ (Gramsci, 1971 in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001). Class domination, sexism, and racism are characteristic examples of such hegemony. Power is not always exercised in obviously abusive acts of dominant group members but may be enacted in the myriad of taken-for-granted actions of everyday life, as is typically the case in the many forms of everyday sexism or racism (Essed, 1991 in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001). Similarly, not all members of a powerful group are always more powerful than all members of dominated groups; power is only defined here for groups as a whole.

In an analysis of the relations between discourse and power, we therefore find firstly that access to specific forms of discourse, such as those of politics, the media or science, is itself a power resource. Secondly, as suggested earlier, action is controlled by our minds. So, if we are able to influence people's minds through, for example, their knowledge or opinions, we may indirectly control (some of) their actions, as we know from experiences with persuasion and manipulation.

This means that those groups who control the most influential discourse also have a greater chance of controlling the minds and actions of others. We can split the issue of discursive power into two basic questions for CDA research:

1. How do (more) powerful groups control public discourse?
2. How does such discourse control mind and action of (less) powerful groups, and what are the social consequences of such control, such as social inequality?

### **Control of public discourse**

Most people's ability to exert active control of discourse is limited to their everyday talk with family members, friends, or colleagues, and to their passive control over, for example, their media usage. We have seen that among the many other resources that define the power base of a group or institution, *access to* or *control over* public discourse and communication is an important 'symbolic' resource, as is the case for knowledge and information (Dijk, 1998 in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001). Notions of discourse access and control are very general, and it is one of the tasks of CDA to spell out these forms of power in more detail. Thus, in words of Van Dijk, if discourse is defined in terms of complex communicative events, access and control may be defined both for the context and for the structures of text and talk themselves.

Context is defined as the mentally represented structure of those properties of the social situation that are relevant for the production or comprehension of discourse (Duranti and Goodwin 1992; van Dijk 1998b in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001). It consists of categories such as the overall definition of the situation, setting (time, place), ongoing actions (including discourses and discourse genres), the participants in various communicative, social or institutional roles, as well as their mental representations: their goals, knowledge, opinions, attitudes, and ideologies. Controlling context involves control over one or more of these categories; for example, the ability to determine the definition of the communicative situation, deciding on the time and place of the communicative event or the choice of participants required to be present and in which roles, or what knowledge or opinions they should or should not have, and which social actions may or must be accomplished by the discourse.

Also crucial in the enactment or exercise of group power is control not only over content, but also over the structures of text and talk. Relating text and context, thus, we already saw that powerful groups or their members may decide on the (possible) discourse genre(s) or speech acts of an occasion. A teacher or judge may require a direct answer from a student or suspect, respectively, but not a personal story or an argument (Wodak, 1984a, 1986). More critically, we may examine

how powerful speakers may abuse their power in situations, such as when police officers use force to obtain a confession from a suspect (Linell and Jonsson 1991 in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001).

Also vital for all discourse and communication is the question of who controls the topics (semantic macrostructures) and topic change, such as when editors decide what news topics will be covered (Gans 1979; van Dijk 1988a, 1988b), professors decide what topics will be addressed in class, or when men control the topics and topic change in conversations with women (Palmer 1989; Fishman 1983; Leet-Pellegrini 1980; Lindegren-Lerman 1983 in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001).

In many situations, volume may be controlled and speakers ordered to “keep their voice down” or to “keep quiet”, women may be “silenced” in many ways; and in some cultures one needs to “mumble” as a form of respect (Albert, 1972 in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001). The public use of specific words may be banned as subversive in a dictatorship, and discursive challenges to culturally dominant groups (for example, white, western males) by their multicultural opponents may be ridiculed in the media as “politically correct” (Williams, 1995). And finally, the action and interaction dimensions of discourse may be controlled by prescribing or proscribing specific speech acts, and by selectively distributing or interrupting turns (Diamond, 1996, in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001).

In summary, virtually all levels and structures of context, text, and talk can in principle be controlled to a greater or lesser degree by powerful speakers, and this power may be abused at the expense of other participants. It should, however, be stressed that talk and text do not always and directly enact or embody the overall power relations between groups; it is always the context that may interfere with, reinforce, or otherwise transform such relationships.

### **Mind control**

If controlling discourse is the first major form of power, exerting control over people's minds is the other fundamental way of reproducing dominance and hegemony. Within a CDA framework, ‘mind control’ involves more than just acquiring beliefs about the world through discourse and communication. The means suggested below are some ways in which power and dominance are involved in mind control.

Firstly, recipients tend to accept beliefs, knowledge, and opinions (unless they are inconsistent with their personal beliefs and experiences) through discourse from what they see as authoritative, trustworthy, or credible sources, such as scholars, experts, professionals, or respected media (Nesler

et al. 1993, in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001). Secondly, participants in some situations are obliged to be recipients of discourse, for example in the sphere of education and in many work situations. Thirdly, in many situations there are no public discourses or media that can provide information from which alternative beliefs may be derived (Downing, 1984, in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001). Fourthly, and closely related to the previous points, recipients may not have the knowledge and beliefs needed to challenge the discourses or information to which they are exposed (Wodak, 1987, in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001).

CDA also focuses on how discourse structures influence mental representations. At the global level of discourse, topics may influence what people see as the most important information of text or talk, and thus correspond to the top levels of their mental models. For example, expressing such a topic in a headline in news may exert a powerful influence on how an event is defined in terms of a “preferred” mental model (Duin et al. 1988; Van Dijk 1991, in Hamilton, Tannen, Schiffrin, 2001). Thus, a typical feature of manipulation is to communicate beliefs implicitly, that is, without actually asserting them, and with less chance that they will be challenged.

## **4 DISCOURSE STRUCTURES**

### **DISCOURSE AS A COMMUNICATIVE EVENT**

It has been mentioned above that discourse at the general level is a complex unit of linguistic form, meaning and action that can be captured in the notion of communicative event or act. These events or acts might can be analysed further into smaller acts (Dijk, 1988, p.8). For written or printed discourse types, writers produce forms and meanings that are to be understood by the readers. They may explicitly address the readers and provoke reactions. In such written communication, writers and readers are engaged in a form of sociocultural practice (Ibid.). Structures of news reports can only be understood if they are analysed as the result of cognitive and social processes of discourse. For analytical reasons, however, it may be useful to distinguish between cognitive processing or social practices of textual communication and the structures of media texts themselves (Ibid., p. 9). The following short passages will briefly introduce the major structural levels of a written discourse:

#### **Grammatical analysis**

When analysing a specific discourse type, for instance, news reports, the goal is focused on the preferred or typical grammatical structure that characterises language use in the discourse. The analysis of language use in the press may also reveal the perspective of the journalist or newspaper (Ibid., p.11).

#### **Discourse as a Coherent Sequence of Sentences**

Discourse, news reports included, do not consist of isolated sentences. The first step in such an analysis is to study the structures of sequences of sentences. This means that the syntax or semantics of a sentence in discourse is described in terms of the sentential structures and interpretations of its surroundings, usually the preceding sentences in the same text (Ibid., p. 11). In other words, it means that an ideologically-based point of view can be expressed by sentence structures but also by a textual dependence of syntax and semantics (Ibid., p. 12).

#### **The Role of Knowledge in Interpretation**

Knowledge of the world is another necessary factor and this leads to the requirement for a cognitive and social analysis of the knowledge which people in a given culture possess and how they use that knowledge in the interpretation of discourse in general and the establishment of coherence in particular (Ibid., p.12). The knowledge is organized in special clusters, so-called scripts, and they contain all which an individual knows about his or her culture.

### **Macrostructures**

Macrostructures operate at a higher level than the micro level of words, sentences and sentence connections, when we refer to the report as a whole. The term “semantic macrostructure” was introduced to refer to this important aspect of discourse and discourse processing. Macrostructures are derived from the sentence meanings (propositions) of a text by a set of rules in a theory, by operations such as selection, generalization and construction. In a cognitive theory of discourse processing, these rules operate as effective macro strategies that enable readers to derive the topic from a sequence of sentences (Dijk and Kintsch, 1983). “Macrostructures and the cognitive operations ...are crucial in news production processes by reporters and editors and for comprehension, storage, memorization and later reproduction by media users” (Dijk, 1988, p. 14).

### **Superstructures, News Schemata**

Schematic superstructure is used as a form to express and organize the overall meaning or macrostructure of a text as a whole (in addition to a syntactic form to express and organize the meanings of a sentence). The schema can be defined by categories, rules or strategies that specify the ordering of these categories. In news reports, the category of Summary is comprised of Headlines and Lead. The body of the text exhibits schematic functions such as Main Events, Backgrounds, Context, History, Verbal Reactions or Comments, each of which can be further analysed into smaller categories (Ibid., pp. 15-16).

### **Relevance Structuring**

Important information must come first, and this arrangement is used as a major principle. It may affect the overall thematic or schematic organization of the news report and also the ordering of the sentences in paragraphs and the ordering within the sentences themselves (Ibid., p. 16).

### **Rhetorical Structures**

Relevance structuring signals the most important elements of a text. Special operations are performed at each level to make the text more persuasive. News reports may use words functioning as hyperboles, understatements or word and sentence meanings that establish contrast or build to a climax (Ibid.).

## **CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS of THE MINERS' STRIKE of 1984-1985 in the CZECHOSLOVAK DAILY NEWSPAPER *PRAVDA***

We live in a world in which any event can become public through a variety of different sources such as the media or other technological means. The media have become important institutions since they are important presenters of political, social or cultural life. They reflect how events are formed and expressed and they are thus in a position to shape the events themselves. In other words, they play an important role in transforming the events into the form of news. At the same time, they manipulate information according to their own interests. The generally acknowledged task of newspapers is to keep their readers up to date. It should be noted, however, that providing information is not the sole communicative purpose that the modern press, as well as other types of media, will attempt to achieve (Bell, 1991).

According to Widdowson (2007), some texts “have an obvious utility function” whereas others “are meant to serve a range of different social purposes” and it is not uncommon that the functions a text is to fulfil “are ... combined in complex ways” (Ibid., 6). Similarly, Diller (2002) describes newspaper discourse as having three main purposes: providing information, comment (opinion formation) and entertainment. Nonetheless, Diller stresses that “there is a clear tendency in modern journalism to blur the three purposes” (Ibid., 5). In general, newspapers are considered to be a powerful tool in presenting social and national issues in terms of their own ideological perspectives.

By performing a close analysis of a news text, we can reach to a clear or clearer understanding of the nature of news content, since news content is not independent of its means of expression. The close analysis of a text can unpack the ideologies underlying the news and show that even simple-looking news are more complex than they may appear and the described events are rather less distinct. Analysis of this type illustrates how the news is made. The idea is that the news is a ‘product’. Thus, what we are *told* happened (Bell, 1991).

When analysing newspaper discourse, the primary question to ask is what the purpose of a particular text is. Beyond the mere provision of information is there any other purpose (often equally important) or a particular intended effect, as this study attempts to propose? In answering this question, we might consider the three basic types of newspaper articles as proposed by Reah (2002): news reports, editorials and feature articles. According to Reah, “newspaper articles are ostensibly news stories – they report information” whereas “editorials comment, speculate and give opinion”. The third type, the feature article, “falls between the two” as it “picks up an item of news, and develops it via comment, opinion and speculation” (Ibid., 87).

The following analysis focuses on the representation of the UK Miners’ Strike of 1984-1985, in the selected Czechoslovak daily newspaper *Pravda*. The analysis tries to examine the ideological representation of the industrial dispute through Critical Discourse Analysis. Put simply, Critical Discourse Analysis adopting Van Dijk’s approach of the analysed data tries to elucidate how a single news item was presented in the newspaper based on its ideological perspective. The dominant definition of the policy in Czechoslovakia at the time was primarily formulated by the authorities of the communist regime and thus, the press uncritically adopted and communicated that policy. On this basis, I presuppose that the dominant definition at the same time contributed to a manipulated depiction of Thatcher’s policy throughout the event of the Miners’ Strike.

The concept of ideology is often used in the media and the social sciences, yet its actual meaning remains vague. Its connotations in everyday usage are rather negative, while its usage in politics or in the social sciences is more nuanced (Dijk, 2006). In general, ideologies play an important role in the legitimization of power abuse by dominant groups. According to Gramsci (1971) one of the most efficient forms of ideological dominance is when the dominated groups accept dominant ideologies as something natural or as common sense. This form of ideological dominance is known as hegemony. Ideologies have general social functions but also more specifically political functions within the field of politics, known as political ideologies. Hence, one way of classifying ideologies – as well as discourses – is by the social field in which they function, and such an approach allows us to identify political, educational, legal or religious ideologies among others (Dijk, 2006). It is through discourse that political ideologies are acquired, expressed, learned, propagated and contested.

The sample analysis presented in this monograph examines how political ideologies are expressed and reproduced by the structures of the text. The analysis of the articles discusses specific patterns in the presentation of news to show how they underpin the ideological meanings of text. The theory of news structures forms an integral part of the analysis.

In the study and analysis, 306 issues of *Pravda* dating from the beginning of the strike on March 3rd 1984 to the end of the strike on March 7th 1985 were collated, and a total of 116 articles within this corpus deal with the strike. The distribution of the articles throughout the whole period reflects an ongoing interest in the event in the newspaper *Pravda*. These 116 articles were subjected to both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Due to the complexity of the analytical framework, this monograph will only address an issue of qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis is established for thematic structures, schematic structures and selected categories of ideological discourse analysis.

## **QUALITATIVE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS**

### **THEMATIC STRUCTURES**

By thematic structures the hierarchical organization of themes or topics of a text is understood. The most important information within a text is defined by the structures (Dijk, 1988, p. 72).

#### **Topics**

The overall content of the coverage of the Miners' Strike is partly reflected in the different themes or topics of the articles. The following topics were found to appear most often in the articles:

1. There is a strike of miners
2. The government led by M. Thatcher responds to the strike
3. Sympathies with the miners

In addition to these main topics, the defining main news event, there is at least one another topic:

4. Negotiations between the Government and the National Union of Mineworkers  
(NUM) led by Arthur Scargill

In summary, it is topic 1 which stands out. It is the major topic in terms of frequency, with its coverage accounting for 72 % (83 articles) of the corpus. Topic 2 is represented less frequently and has a coverage of 61% (71 articles) and topic 3 has the lowest coverage, appearing in only 44% (51 articles) of the coverage. Thus, the most frequently appearing topic is topic number 1, the topic which focuses on the event itself.

## **Actors**

The main actors in the dispute are:

1. miners and/or the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)
2. the Government led by Margaret Thatcher and the institutions headed by the Government; for example, the police forces and/or the National Coal Board (NCB)
3. other political institutions, for instance, the Labour Party or Communist Party

In summary, it is the miners and/or NUM who are presented as major actors (appearing in 102 articles) and who stand out in terms of frequency. They are followed by the Government and its institutions (91 articles). In contrast, other political institutions (15 articles) hardly come close to actors 1 or 2 in terms of frequency. To conclude, it is the miners and/or NUM and the Conservative Government led by Margaret Thatcher who are the central actors in the event. Yet, although they are represented as central actors, they are quoted very little or not at all. Even more surprising is the fact that when comparing the speaking space for the miners and the speaking space for the Government, it is the miners, the major actor in the events, who receive less speaking space than actor number 2, the Government. The newspaper writes about the activities of the miners, and the harsh conditions which they are exposed to, but, with the exception of a single article, does not provide the reader with their point of view.

## **Headlines**

Newspaper headlines act as forerunners to news reports. They reveal the social, cultural and national representations circulating in a society at any given time. This is particularly true of front-page headlines, which are more carefully chosen in order to evoke specific emotions in the reader. Headlines form the most prominent feature of news discourse (Dijk, 1988). They subjectively express the most important information of the text, for instance, the main topic. They define the situation; in other words, they define specific way in which the reader is going to read and interpret the text. However, headlines can also express secondary topics. The headlines alongside the lead form the summary of the article, which in turn serves as the expression of its macrostructure. It has been shown that this type of macrostructure or thematic structure is recalled most easily by readers (Dijk, 1988).

The main topic, expressed in 49 (42 %) of the 116 article headlines, deals with *various forms of governmental responses to the strike*. The most frequent examples of the main topic in the headlines dealing with the actions of the government and/or Margaret Thatcher against the strike include (translated as literally as possible):

1. Reprisals against the British miners
2. Demonstrations of police power
3. Terror used against the strike
4. 50 wounded, 100 arrested
5. Iron Lady threatens
6. Intimidation of the miners

The implications of these headlines are complex. They point to the toughness of the authorities; more precisely, the actions performed by the authorities are only interpreted in a negative light. No headline expresses the efforts of the Government to reach a compromise or introduce a satisfactory solution. Hence, it may be interpreted by readers of PRAVDA that the British government uses and misuses its power, and does not respect the rights of the miners.

There are two other major topics, the first of which deals with *the miners on strike*. This topic is expressed in 26 (22%) of the 116 article headlines, and the most frequent examples of the topic point to only a single aspect, the dissatisfaction of the miners. Another major topic deals with *support for the miners*. This topic is expressed in 18 (15, 5 %) of the 116 article headlines. The most frequent examples of the main topic in the headlines either express the solidarity of some party with the miners or they call for solidarity. The topic evokes the feelings that the miners are victims who are being treated unjustly and that they thus need support. All articles mentioning that the miners are on strike add that the situation is due to the pit closures and consequent loss of livelihoods. However, none of the articles mention the fact that pit closures on economic grounds remained inevitable since the coal industry was losing over £200 million a year. Three - quarters of its pits were uneconomic at the time.

From this thematic analysis of the headlines, it can be concluded that the vast majority of the headlines deal with the responses of the Government to the striking miners, focusing on the refusal to reverse the decision to close uneconomic pits. The use of brutal methods such as police raids, intimidation, fines, and arrest are mentioned and emphasized several times. No single headline mentions any of the neutral means used by the authorities. The consistent thematic positioning of the miners evokes a common assumption in the mind of readers that the strike was simply a matter

of needlessly destroying the mining communities, which was not the case. Moreover, the thematic positioning of Thatcher's government evokes the belief that the Government was ignoring the approach of the miners and only used violent measures to suppress the strike, which was also not the case.

## **SCHEMATIC STRUCTURES**

Topics are organized in a *thematic structure* which defines their hierarchical ordering or other semantic relations. In other words, the topics of news discourse are not simply a list but they form a hierarchical structure. Moreover, as Van Dijk (1988a) has argued, topics may also play conventional roles in a news story, such as providing information about the Main Event, Context, History or Verbal Reactions. Not all discourse types have fixed conventional schemata, and in the case of news discourse, it is not entirely clear whether news in the press possess a fixed, conventional schema.

The following section of the qualitative analysis continues by examining the overall organization of news items about the strike. The analysis examines *schematic structure* through the schematic categories which are present in the articles. The analysis focuses on the following schematic categories: *Headline*, *Lead*, *Main event*, *Consequences*, *Context*, *History*, *Verbal reactions*, *Expectations* and *Evaluations* (Dijk, 1988a). In some cases, the assignment for some of the categories is not clear.

Each news item in the press has a *Headline* and many items have a *Lead*. Van Dijk (1988a) introduces a basic rule for this arrangement: "Headline precedes Lead and together they precede the rest of the news item. Together they express the major topics of the text". *Context* is often the main event in other or previous news items. It is often signalled by expressions such as "while" or "during" or other expressions of simultaneity. By *History* only the section of a text dealing with no recent past history of actual situations and their events is meant (Ibid.). As for *Consequences*, the newsworthiness of political and social events is partly determined by the seriousness of their consequences. Sometimes, consequences are even more important than the main news events themselves. In such a case, the topics in the *Consequences* category may have the same hierarchical position as the *Main Events* topics; indeed, they may even become the highest level topic and be expressed in the headline (Ibid.). The *Verbal Reactions* category is signalled by the names and roles of news participants and by direct or indirect quotes (Ibid.). *Evaluation* and *Expectation* are the two

major subcategories of the Comments category. Evaluation is an evaluative opinion about the news event and Expectation represents the potential political or other consequences of the event and situation (Ibid.). On the other hand, it is necessary to say that many news texts have only some of these categories. In other words, only *Headline* and *Main Event* are obligatory categories. Other categories are optional. Some categories may be repeated several times.

My analysis has shown that all articles have *Headline* – providing the most prominent and relevant information of the news item. By *Lead* I mean a separated passage following the headline, usually marked off by special printing type. Only 33 of the articles (28%) have this category. Together with the lead, the headline forms the summary of the report, which “strategically serves as the expression of its macrostructure” (Dijk, 1988b, 226). Readers often read and recall only headlines and leads, and these construct the preferred meanings of news texts for readers in addition to the most prominent ideological view of the texts. For the *Main Event* category, explicit information about striking miners was taken into consideration; 106 articles (91%) were identified expressing the category. For the *Consequences* category, any information about individuals becoming unemployed was taken into consideration, with 108 articles (93%) expressing this information. These articles state that miners are on strike because of the threat of pit closures and the consequent potential loss of livelihood.

Two categories were not identified in the analysed articles, those of *Context* and *History*. As has already been mentioned, almost all of the articles inform the reader about the main event; providing information about what is happening and why it is happening. However, none of the articles state why the government wanted to close the pits. As the reader might have found out, pit closures occurred due to the inefficiency of the pits. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, according to Thatcher, pit closures on economic grounds remained inevitable because the coal industry was losing over £200 million a year in 1984. Three – quarters of its pits were uneconomical. In addition to this, pit closures were only a continuation of previous Labour Party policies in the 1970s. Scargill, however, refused any economic justifications and refused to compromise on the issue. This example of context is not present in the articles, although there is a single exception. In article number 32, the author Bedrich Zagar explains: “The British Government wants to close several tens of pits and thus wants to send 20.000 miners to the streets. Something similar will happen to dockers and other labourers since according to the opinion of “the authorities” is that these industries do not make a profit.” The author continues to criticise the capitalist regime, charging the British state with exploitation.

For the category of *Verbal Reactions*, three types or examples can be taken into consideration. The first is the reaction of the miners, either direct or indirect. The second is the reaction or response of the Government/Margaret Thatcher or the NCB to the miners, either directly and indirectly. The third is the reaction of other institutions such as the Labour Party, Communist Party or the TUC. Verbal reactions of the miners are present in 22 articles (45%). However, these are not reactions of the miners themselves, but rather the reaction of Arthur Scargill, the leader of National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). Verbal reactions of the PM or NCB are present in 15 articles (31%) and verbal reactions of the other institutions are present in 12 articles (24%). Verbal reactions of the miners or more precisely Arthur Scargill refer to their “dissatisfaction”, “outrage” and “determination to withstand”. Verbal reactions of the PM are most frequently used with words such as “illegal”, made in reference to the strikes. Verbal reactions of the Labour Party, Communist Party or TUC are most frequently used with the word “support” referring to support for the miners.

The category of *Expectation* refers to the expectation of miners that there would be a quick end to the strike. Only 7 articles express this expectation either implicitly or explicitly. The category of *Evaluation* is present in 6 articles. These articles evaluate the event to certain extent, primarily the approach of the miners and approach of the Prime Minister. For instance, in article number 24, dated 1/6/1984 the author Bedrich Zagar raises following questions: “What have the miners committed? They just protect their jobs the government wants to get rid of. ...Is this a crime?” By these questions the author indirectly expresses his opinion that the decision of the government to close pits and thus cause tens of thousands of miners to lose their livelihoods is unfair.

## LOCAL SEMANTICS

The global structures of news reports, such as their dominant topics, play a major role in how news is processed by readers, but the *local structures* may also contribute to the overall depiction of the event. Stylistic phenomena, such as lexical choice, the syntactic formulation of the underlying actor roles and a number of special semantic properties such as presuppositions, implications or associations play a crucial role in the description or evaluation of the event (Dijk, 1988).

Undoubtedly, it makes a difference whether the miners are pictured as victims of an oppressive authority and thus as deserving of our sympathy or as a group which refuses to understand or does accept the inevitable fact of the inefficiency of the pits. It makes a difference whether Thatcher’s policy is described as one which put a considerable effort into finding an alternative for thousands of unemployed miners or as a ruthless means of trying to get rid of ineffective pits. It is clear that

thematically, the news reports tend to favour the picture of miners as victims and tend to favour the picture of the ruthlessness of Thatcher's policy.

In addition to this, an analysis of the ways in which topics are realized in the text requires an examination of specifications. Topical realization in a text may occur according to a series of major criteria: 1. the level of specificity (the level of description); 2. the degree of completeness at each level; 3. the selection of details at each level; and 4. the perspective or point of view in selecting of criteria 1-3 (Dijk, 1988, p.100). Such specifications may include: numbers (time, location, dates, weight, etc.), the identification of participants and their roles, and the content (declarations, reports).

Since it is not possible to analyse the detailed local structures of all the articles, the study limits itself at this micro level to a few important elements, namely, those which may contribute to the manipulated formation of negative attitudes. The analysis focuses on the choice of words, which is important in providing readers with cues by which to interpret events. This can define how a reader perceives the actions and the intentions of the participants in events, and thereby conveys the message which the producer of the text intends readers to receive. Lexical items construct specific ideological representations of experiences or events. Thus, the structure of vocabulary can be regarded as ideologically based.

Where an unusually high degree of wording occurs, often of related terms, this over wording often indicates a key concept or particular preoccupation that gives certain meanings which the producer of texts intends to convey (Fairclough 1989, Fowler 1991 in Min, 1997). We can identify this type of over - wording in the analysed articles in connection with the concept of the ruthlessness of Thatcher's policy or of violence. These words point to an intense preoccupation with violence and social unrest caused by the most violent industrial dispute in Britain in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It is expressed mainly through the repetition of the words such as:

1. "*threats*" - in article: 8, 10, 15, 20, 21, 41, 54, 55, 85, 89, 94, 109
2. "*intimidation*" - in article: 10, 14, 15, 20, 21, 41, 54, 55, 85, 89, 94, 99, 109,
3. "*persecution*" - in article: 23, 41, 54, 85, 89, 92, 94, 100
4. "*efforts to torpedo the strike*" - in article: 9, 25, 41, 42, 66, and 98
5. "*use of police force*"- in article: 9, 10, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 57, 58, 68, 105, 114
6. "*arresting*"- in article: 17, 20, 26, 28, 50, 53, 59, 64, 66, 68, 73, 80, 84, 92, 93

The following words or sentences are used alongside the above-mentioned words; they serve to support the concepts of the ruthlessness of Thatcher's policy and of violence:

7. *"Justice is not a characteristic feature of the government"* - in article number: 104
8. Margaret Thatcher talks about *"subversive activity of radical left"* - in article number: 92
9. *"the police opposing social support"* – in article number: 58

In addition to this, the following articles provide the reader with a specific form of opinion, evaluation or some other aspect which again contributes to the concept of the ruthlessness of Thatcher's policy and of violence:

10. article number 6, "Keď štrajkujú baníci", 16/3/1984
  - *"no other strike caused such political tension"*
  - *"miners' wives worrying about feeding their children "*
  - *"death of the young picket David Jones was a shock "*
11. article number 11, "Slovo k udalostiam: Terorom proti štrajku", 29/3/1984
  - *"tactics of the Conservatives to qualify the social conflict as breaking the law"*
12. article number 15, "Nekonštruktívna ponuka", 25/4/1984
  - *"police actions against the striking miners have so far cost 75 million pounds"*
13. article number 27, "Brutálny zákrok polície", 9/6/1984
  - *"The Communist daily newspaper Morning Star emphasized that the police action .....was a deliberate and unprovoked 'lesson of violence' "*
14. article number 33, "Na čo je dobrý zákon z roku 1824", 3/7/1984
  - *"...four members of the Communist Party of Great Britain were arrested for organizing collections of food for the families of the striking miners..."*
15. article number 39, "Čo hovorí prieskum", 20/7/1984
  - *"...concerning public opinion, 37.5 per cent supports the Conservative party while 38.5 per cent supports the Labour party."*
  - *"55 per cent of British people are dissatisfied with the achievements of Margaret Thatcher as PM. "*

As the work of van Dijk (2006) demonstrates, there are several categories of Ideological Discourse Analysis which show how various ideologies are expressed in various kinds of structures. In principle, there can be hundreds of such categories. One of these categories is that of *Actor Description (Meaning)*, which shows the way in which actors are described. Generally, there is a tendency to describe ingroup members in a neutral or positive way. In articles 70 and 91 there is a description of how striking British miners and their families spent holidays in Czechoslovakia; the latter article quotes some of these miners and their wives and describes how they enjoyed their holidays and how they felt envious of the better working conditions in Czechoslovakia. In these examples, the ingroup is undoubtedly presented in a positive way only. At the same time such positive self – presentation can be an example of another category, that is, *National Self-glorification (Meaning)*.

Another category which is present in the articles is that of *Example/Illustration (Argumentation)*, which means the presentation of a concrete example usually in the form of a story. Such concrete stories are usually more easily memorized than some abstract arguments. In article number 45 there is a description of how policemen raided the house of a striking miner and without any explanation they took the man and his wife to the police station where they were held overnight. Unfortunately, their small child had to stay at home alone.

Moreover, one other specification leading to the negative depiction of the ruthlessness of Thatcher's policy and of violence is that of numbers and its intentional use. All of the numbers in the analysed articles contribute to a negative depiction of Thatcher's policy. There are the numbers of closing pits : "at least 2 pits to be closed " (article number 1, 7/3/1984 ), a figure which had risen by the next day to "at least 20 pits to be closed " (article number 2, 8/3/1984); the number of striking miners : "ten thousand miners" (article number 1, 7/3/1984), "fourteen thousand miners" (article number 2, 8/3/1984) or "110, 000 miners" (article number 5, 15/3/1984); the number of unemployed miners : "4800 to become unemployed" (article number 1, 7/3/1984 ), "twenty thousand to become unemployed " (article number 3, 12/3/1984) or "80, 000 to become unemployed" (article number 11, 29/3/1984) as well as the number of arrested miners : "5000 striking miners" (article 50, 9/8/1984) and "7000 striking miners" (article 92, 28/11/1984 ). On the other side, for instance, the number expressing the number of uneconomic pits is absent and does not appear in any article, since it would not have contributed to a negative, albeit manipulated, depiction of Thatcher's policy.

## Conclusion

This monograph has tried to introduce several selected aspects of a more systematic analysis of news structures in the press. It illustrates the theory of news structures in a study analysing news coverage on a specific international event. Put simply, it analyses how newspaper articles of a national newspaper, the Czechoslovak daily newspaper *Pravda*, represented a specific international event, the Miners' Strike of 1984-1985 in UK. The first chapter offers an introduction to the figure of Margaret Thatcher and the factors which shaped her personality and political career. It also provides a brief account of the main ideas and main policies which later formed Thatcherism. The second chapter offers a chronological account of the Miners' Strike of 1984-1985. Despite the fact that the miners had been the traditional élite of the trade union movement, Thatcher's firm stand against the trade unions was generally popular. Although the miners and their families had shown courage and also self-sacrifice in defence of the pits, they lost. The Government refused to compromise, and the miners had no choice but to return to work. Margaret Thatcher had defeated the trade union movement, a political force which she viewed as a menace to parliamentary democracy. The third chapter provides an overview of the key theoretical framework which is employed in the analysis. The concepts of discourse and critical discourse analysis are introduced, with the last part of the chapter being devoted to critical discourse analysis following van Dijk's theoretical framework and methods. I would like to stress that the theoretical framework to be employed in the analysis is highly complex and the monograph therefore only addresses some of its issues. The fourth chapter presents a sample analysis of the dispute as represented in the newspaper *Pravda*. The analysis examines how ideology is constructed through thematic structures, schematic structures and selected aspects of local semantics. The analysis has proved that the

specific structures of the text were used or misused to give a manipulated depiction of the strike or a manipulated depiction of the policy of Thatcher's government.

Last but not least, the way in which the analysis is conducted takes a singular perspective, but at no point does this disallow the possibility of alternative readings. Moreover, I am aware of the fact that the representation of any international event in a national newspaper is a broad research area and that this monograph can make only a partial contribution to a more complex topic research.

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## Appendix 1 – List of analysed articles

- 1, *Štrajk baníkov*, in PRAVDA, 7.3.1984, p. 7
- 2, *Pobúrenie baníkov*, in PRAVDA, 8.3.1984, p.7
- 3, *Proti zatváraniu baní*, in PRAVDA, 12.3.1984, p. 4
- 4, *Štrajk britských baníkov*, in PRAVDA, 13.3.1984, p.7
- 5, *Štrajk sa rozrastá*, in PRAVDA, 15.3.1984, p.1
- 6, *Keď štrajkujú baníci*, in PRAVDA, 16.3.1984, p.1 and p. 7
- 7, *Represálie proti britským baníkom*, in PRAVDA, 17.3.1984, p.5
- 8, *Epidémia nezamestnanosti sa rozširuje*, in PRAVDA, 19.3.1984, p.4
- 9, *Demonštrácia policajnej sily*, in PRAVDA, 21.3.1984,p.1
- 10,*Hrubý postoj voči štrajkujúcim*, in PRAVDA, 27.3.1984,p.7
- 11,*Slovo k udalostiam. Terorom proti štrajku*, in PRAVDA, 29.3.1984, p.7
- 12,*Demonštrácie vo Veľkej Británii*, in PRAVDA, 30.3.1984, p.7
- 13, *”Riešenia na úkor pracujúcich”* , in PRAVDA, 2.4.1984, p.4
- 14,*Odpor britských baníkov*, in PRAVDA, 4.4.1984, p.7
- 15, *Nekonštruktívna ponuka*, in PRAVDA, 25.4.1984, p.7
- 16,*Čo očakáva Britániu, keď...*, in PRAVDA, 3.5.1984, p.6
- 17, *Pokus rozoštváť baníkov*, in PRAVDA, 14.5.1984, p.4
- 18, *Odpoveď na masové prepúšťanie z práce*, in PRAVDA, 16.5.1984, p.7
- 19, *Výzva na solidaritu*, in PRAVDA, 19.5.1984, p.1
- 20, *Represie proti britským baníkom*, in PRAVDA, 22.5.1984, p.1 and p. 7
- 21,*Nad'alej represie*, in PRAVDA, 25.5.1984, p. 7
- 22,*Nová vlna štrajkov*, in PRAVDA, 30.5.1984, p.1

- 23, *Polícia proti baníkom*, in PRAVDA, 31.5.1984, p.7
- 24, *Policajný terror proti baníkom*, in PRAVDA, 1.6.1984, p.7
- 25, *Úsilie podkopať štrajk baníkov*, in PRAVDA, 6.6.1984, p.1
- 26, *Baníci demonštrovali v Londýne*, in PRAVDA, 8.6.1984, p. 7
- 27, *Brutálny zákrok polície*, in PRAVDA, 9.6.1984, p.5
- 28, *Solidarita s baníkmi*, in PRAVDA, 13.6.1984, p. 1
- 29, *Tvrдый zásah polície*, in PRAVDA, 19.6.1984, p.7
- 30, *“50 zranených, 100 zatknutých”* , in PRAVDA, 20.6.1984, p.7
- 31, *Odpor baníkov neochabuje*, in PRAVDA, 28.6.1984, p. 7
- 32, *Thatcherovej obušková 'demokracia'* , in PRAVDA, 29.6.1984, p.7
- 33, *Na čo je dobrý zákon z roku 1824...* , in PRAVDA, 3.7.1984, p.7
- 34, *Pochod solidarity s baníkmi* , in PRAVDA, 9.7.1984, p. 7
- 35, *Solidarita s baníkmi*, in PRAVDA, 13.7.1984, p.7
- 36, *Otvorená vojna proti pracujúcim*, in PRAVDA, 16.7.1984, p. 1
- 37, *Zatiaľ bez výnimočného stavu*, in PRAVDA, 17.7.1984, p. 7
- 38, *Premiérka konala protizákonne*, in PRAVDA, 18.7.1984, p.7
- 39, *Čo hovorí prieskum*, in PRAVDA, 20.7.1984, p.7
- 40, *Štrajk pokračuje*, in PRAVDA, 20.7.1984, p.7
- 41, *Železná lady sa vyhráza*, in PRAVDA, 21.7.1984, p.7
- 42, *Vláda torpéduje úsilie baníkov*, in PRAVDA, 23.7.1984, p.5
- 43, *Zásah proti baníkom*, in PRAVDA, 24.7.1984, p.1
- 44, *Ďalšie zatýkanie baníkov*, in PRAVDA, 25.7.1984, p.7
- 45, *Kde vládne násilie a bezprávie*, in PRAVDA, 27.7.1984, p.7
- 46, *TUC proti konzervatívnej vláde*, in PRAVDA, 31.7.1984, p.7
- 47, *Politika spálenej krajiny*, in PRAVDA, 2.8.1984, p.7
- 48, *Bojujú o existenciu*, in PRAVDA, 2.8.1984, p.7
- 49, *Solidarita s britskými baníkmi*, in PRAVDA, 7.8.1984, p.7
- 50, *Ostré zrážky*, in PRAVDA, 9.8.1984, p.7
- 51, *Solidarita s baníkmi*, in PRAVDA, 10.8.1984, p. 7
- 52, *Demonštrácia proti plánom vlády*, in PRAVDA, 13.8.1984, p.4
- 53, *Britskí baníci žalujú*, in PRAVDA, 22.8.1984, p. 7
- 54, *Silnejú tlaky na generálny štrajk*, in PRAVDA, 22.8.1984, p.7
- 55, *Baníci kontra vláda*, in PRAVDA, 23.8.1984, p.7

- 56, *Solidarita s baníkmi*, in PRAVDA, 24.8.1984, p.7
- 57, *Tvrдый zásah polície proti baníkom*, in PRAVDA, 25.8.1984, p.5
- 58, *Polícia proti solidárnym akciám*, in PRAVDA, 29.8.1984, p.7
- 59, *Masové zatýkanie*, in PRAVDA, 30.8.1984, p. 7
- 60, *Tvrdo proti štrajkujúcim*, in PRAVDA, 31.8.1984, p.7
- 61, *Odmietol prejsť klieťkou na krysy*, in PRAVDA, 1.9.1984, p.5
- 62, *Zjazd TUC*, in PRAVDA, 4.9.1984, p. 7
- 63, *Vláda M.Thatcherovej na pranieri*, in PRAVDA, 8.9.1984, p. 5
- 64, *Opať zatýkanie*, in PRAVDA, 11.9.1984, p.7
- 65, *Provokatívne vyhrážky*, in PRAVDA, 14.9.1984, p1
- 66, *Baníci kontra Thatcherová*, in PRAVDA, 19.9.1984, p.7
- 67, *Solidarita s baníkmi*, in PRAVDA, 22.9.1984, p.5
- 68, *Brutalita britskej polície*, in PRAVDA, 26.9.1984, p.7
- 69, *“Vďačnosť” britskej premiérky*, in PRAVDA, 28.9. 1984, p.7
- 70, *Britskí baníci do ČSSR*, in PRAVDA, 1.10.1984, p.4
- 71, *Vyhlasujú štrajky za nezákonné*, in PRAVDA, 1.10.1984, p.5
- 72, *Solidarita s baníkmi*, in PRAVDA, 2.10.1984, p.7
- 73, *Zatýkanie britských baníkov*, in PRAVDA, 3.10.1984, p.7
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*Monograph*

Author: Mgr. Karin Sabolíková, PhD.

Publisher: Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice  
ŠafárikPress Publishers

Year of publication: 2020

Number of pages: 71

Author's sheets : 4,5

Edition: first

ISBN 978-80-8152-951-1 (e-publication)

